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VI. Civil Rights  
 
In This Section: 
 
New Case: R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opprotunity  
Commission 
“SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE WHETHER LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS LAW APPLIES TO GAY 
AND TRANSGENDER WORKERS” 
Adam Liptak  
“TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ASKS SUPREME COURT TO PERMIT EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TRANSGENDER WORKERS” 
Tara Law 
“EEOC’S TRANS BIAS WIN EXPOSES SHAKINESS OF RFRA DEFENSE” 
Vin Gurrieri  
“TITLE VII DOESN’T PROTECT TRANS WORKERS, FUNERAL HOME SAY” 
Danielle Nichole Smith  
“DOJ ARGUES THAT LAW DOESN’T PROTECT TRANSGENDER WORKERS, OPPOSING THE 
EEOC” 
Lorelei Laird  
 
New Case: Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African-American Owned Media   
“SUPREME COURT TO HEAR RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CASE AGAINST COMCAST” 
Adam Liptak  
“SUPREME COURT WILL DECIDE STANDARD FOR PROVING RACIAL BIAS IN 
DISCRIMINATION SUIT AGAINST COMCAST” 
Debra Cassens Weiss  
“SUPREME COURT TO CONSIDER CURBING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS” 
Greg Stohr   
“JUSTICE COULD BLUNT RACIAL BIAS CASES WITH COMCAST RULING” 
Anne Cullen 
“COMCAST, TIME WARNER CABLE HIT WITH $20 BILLION RACIAL BIAS LAWSUIT” 
Jonathan Stempel 
“BLACK-OWNED NETWORK’S BIAS SUIT AGAINST COMCAST” 
Judy Greenwald  
“APPEALS COURT REJECTS CHARTER/COMCAST MOTION TO DISMISS BYRON ALLEN’S 
MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT- UPDATE” 
Dawn C. Chmielewski  
“CALIF. JUDGE DISMISSED $20B RACE BIAS SUIT AGAINST COMCAST” 
Bonnie Eslinger   
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New Case: Babb v. Wilkie  
“JUSTICES TO REVIEW HOW FEDERAL WORKERS PROVE JOB BIAS CLAIM” 
Hassan A. Kanu 
“JUSTICES TO MULL REQUIREMENTS FOR FED. WORKER ADEA CLAIMS” 
Danielle Nichole Smith  
 “SUPREME COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER “BUT-FOR” CAUSATION REQUIRED IN 
FEDERAL-SECTOR ADEA CLAIMS” 
Pamela Wolf 
 
New Case: Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries 
“SUPREME COURT PASSES, FOR NOW, ON A NEW WEDDING CAKE DISPUTE” 
David Savage  
“JUSTICES DODGE NEW CASE DEFENDING DENIAL OF SERVICE TO LGBT COUPLE” 
Marcia Coyle  
“THE SUPREME COURT IS SHOWING AN INSTINCT FOR SELF-PRESERVATION, AT LEAST 
UNTIL NEXT YEAR’S ELECTION” 
Linda Greenhouse  
“U.S. SUPREME COURT ORDERS NEW LOOK AT CLASH OVER GAY-WEDDING CAKE” 
Greg Stohr 
“APPEALS COURT UPHOLDS FINE AGAINST CHRISTIAN BAKERS WHO REFUSED TO MAKE 
SAME-SEX WEDDING CASE” 























R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission  
 
Ruling Below: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral 
Homes, Inc, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 
Overview: Aimee Stephens, who worked at R.G. & G.R. Funeral Homes, was fired when she told 
the funeral director of her transition from male to female and her intentions to dress as a woman 
while at work. After further investigation, the EEOC filed suit claiming that the Funeral home 
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen’s employment on the 
basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes 
and administering a discriminatory-clothing-allowance policy. The Funeral Home argues that it 
did not violate Title VII by requiring Stephens to comply with a sex-specific code, equally 
burdensome to both males and females. Alternatively, the Funeral Home should not be punished 
for their own sincerely held religious beliefs in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA).  
 
Issue: Whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender people based on (1) their 
status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 




R.G. & G.R. HARRIS FUNERAL HOMES, INC., Defendant- Appellee 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit 
 
Decided on March 7, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
MOORE, Circuit Judge:
Aimee Stephens (formerly known as 
Anthony Stephens) was born biologically 
male. While living and presenting as a man, 
she worked as a funeral director at R.G. & 
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. ("the 
Funeral Home"), a closely held for-profit 
corporation that operates three funeral homes 
in Michigan. Stephens was terminated from 
the Funeral Home by its owner and operator, 
Thomas Rost, shortly after Stephens 
informed Rost that she intended to transition 
from male to female and would represent 
herself and dress as a woman while at work. 
Stephens filed a complaint with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC"), which investigated Stephens's 
allegations that she had been terminated as a 
result of unlawful sex discrimination. During 
 536 
the course of its investigation, the EEOC 
learned that the Funeral Home provided its 
male public-facing employees with clothing 
that complied with the company's dress code 
while female public-facing employees 
received no such allowance. The EEOC 
subsequently brought suit against the Funeral 
Home in which the EEOC charged the 
Funeral Home with violating Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") by (1) 
terminating Stephens's employment on the 
basis of her transgender or transitioning 
status and her refusal to conform to sex-based 
stereotypes; and (2) administering a 
discriminatory-clothing-allowance policy. 
The parties submitted dueling motions for 
summary judgment. The EEOC argued that it 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
on both of its claims. For its part, the Funeral 
Home argued that it did not violate Title VII 
by requiring Stephens to comply with a sex-
specific dress code that it asserts equally 
burdens male and female employees, and, in 
the alternative, that Title VII should not be 
enforced against the Funeral Home because 
requiring the Funeral Home to employ 
Stephens while she dresses and represents 
herself as a woman would constitute an 
unjustified substantial burden upon Rost's 
(and thereby the Funeral Home's) sincerely 
held religious beliefs, in violation of 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
("RFRA"). As to the EEOC's discriminatory-
clothing-allowance claim, the Funeral Home 
argued that Sixth Circuit case law precludes 
the EEOC from bringing this claim in a 
complaint that arose out of Stephens's 
original charge of discrimination because the 
Funeral Home could not reasonably expect a 
clothing-allowance claim to emerge from an 
investigation into Stephens's termination. 
The district court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the Funeral Home on both claims. 
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that 
(1) the Funeral Home engaged in unlawful 
discrimination against Stephens on the basis 
of her sex; (2) the Funeral Home has not 
established that applying Title VII's 
proscriptions against sex discrimination to 
the Funeral Home would substantially burden 
Rost's religious exercise, and therefore the 
Funeral Home is not entitled to a defense 
under RFRA; (3) even if Rost's religious 
exercise were substantially burdened, the 
EEOC has established that enforcing Title 
VII is the least restrictive means of furthering 
the government's compelling interest in 
eradicating workplace discrimination against 
Stephens; and (4) the EEOC may bring a 
discriminatory-clothing-allowance claim in 
this case because such an investigation into 
the Funeral Home's clothing-allowance 
policy was reasonably expected to grow out 
of the original charge of sex discrimination 
that Stephens submitted to the EEOC. 
Accordingly, we REVERSE the district 
court's grant of summary judgment on both 
the unlawful-termination and discriminatory-
clothing-allowance claims, GRANT 
summary judgment to the EEOC on its 
unlawful-termination claim, and REMAND 
the case to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Aimee Stephens, a transgender woman who 
was "assigned male at birth," joined the 
Funeral Home as an apprentice on October 1, 
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2007 and served as a Funeral 
Director/Embalmer at the Funeral Home 
from April 2008 until August 2013. During 
the course of her employment at the Funeral 
Home, Stephens presented as a man and used 
her then-legal name, William Anthony 
Beasley Stephens.  
The Funeral Home is a closely held for-profit 
corporation. Thomas Rost ("Rost"), who has 
been a Christian for over sixty-five years, 
owns 95.4% of the company and operates its 
three funeral home locations. Rost proclaims 
"that God has called him to serve grieving 
people" and "that his purpose in life is to 
minister to the grieving." To that end, the 
Funeral Home's website contains a mission 
statement that states that the Funeral Home's 
"highest priority is to honor God in all that we 
do as a company and as individuals" and 
includes a verse of scripture on the bottom of 
the mission statement webpage. The Funeral 
Home itself, however, is not affiliated with a 
church; it does not claim to have a religious 
purpose in its articles of incorporation; it is 
open every day, including Christian holidays; 
and it serves clients of all faiths. "Employees 
have worn Jewish head coverings when 
holding a Jewish funeral service." Although 
the Funeral Home places the Bible, "Daily 
Bread" devotionals, and "Jesus Cards" in 
public places within the funeral homes, the 
Funeral Home does not decorate its rooms 
with "visible religious figures . . . to avoid 
offending people of different religions." Rost 
hires employees belonging to any faith or no 
faith to work at the Funeral Home, and he 
"does not endorse or consider himself to 
endorse his employees' beliefs or non-
employment-related activities."  
The Funeral Home requires its public-facing 
male employees to wear suits and ties and its 
public-facing female employees to wear 
skirts and business jackets. The Funeral 
Home provides all male employees who 
interact with clients, including funeral 
directors, with free suits and ties, and the 
Funeral Home replaces suits as needed. All 
told, the Funeral Home spends approximately 
$470 per full-time employee per year and 
$235 per part-time employee per year on 
clothing for male employees.  
Until October 2014—after the EEOC filed 
this suit—the Funeral Home did not provide 
its female employees with any sort of 
clothing or clothing allowance. Beginning in 
October 2014, the Funeral Home began 
providing its public-facing female employees 
with an annual clothing stipend ranging from 
$75 for part-time employees to $150 for full-
time employees. Rost contends that the 
Funeral Home would provide suits to all 
funeral directors, regardless of their sex, but 
it has not employed a female funeral director 
since Rost's grandmother ceased working for 
the organization around 1950. According to 
Rost, the Funeral Home has received only 
one application from a woman for a funeral 
director position in the thirty-five years that 
Rost has operated the Funeral Home, and the 
female applicant was deemed not qualified.  
On July 31, 2013, Stephens provided Rost 
with a letter stating that she has struggled 
with "a gender identity disorder" her "entire 
life," and informing Rost that she has 
"decided to become the person that [her] 
mind already is." The letter stated that 
Stephens "intend[ed] to have sex 
reassignment surgery," and explained that 
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"[t]he first step [she] must take is to live and 
work full-time as a woman for one year." To 
that end, Stephens stated that she would 
return from her vacation on August 26, 2013, 
"as [her] true self, Amiee [sic] Australia 
Stephens, in appropriate business attire." 
After presenting the letter to Rost, Stephens 
postponed her vacation and continued to 
work for the next two weeks. Then, just 
before Stephens left for her intended 
vacation, Rost fired her. Rost said, "this is not 
going to work out," and offered Stephens a 
severance agreement if she "agreed not to say 
anything or do anything." Stephens 
refused. Rost testified that he fired Stephens 
because "he was no longer going to represent 
himself as a man. He wanted to dress as a 
woman."  
Rost avers that he "sincerely believe[s] that 
the Bible teaches that a person's sex is an 
immutable God-given gift," and that he 
would be "violating God's commands if [he] 
were to permit one of [the Funeral Home's] 
funeral directors to deny their sex while 
acting as a representative of [the] 
organization" or if he were to "permit one of 
[the Funeral Home's] male funeral directors 
to wear the uniform for female funeral 
directors while at work." In particular, Rost 
believes that authorizing or paying for a male 
funeral director to wear the uniform for 
female funeral directors would render him 
complicit "in supporting the idea that sex is a 
changeable social construct rather than an 
immutable God-given gift."  
After her employment was terminated, 
Stephens filed a sex-discrimination charge 
with the EEOC, alleging that "[t]he only 
explanation" she received from 
"management" for her termination was that 
"the public would [not] be accepting of [her] 
transition." She further noted that throughout 
her "entire employment" at the Funeral 
Home, there were "no other female Funeral 
Director/Embalmers." During the course of 
investigating Stephens's allegations, the 
EEOC learned from another employee that 
the Funeral Home did not provide its public-
facing female employees with suits or a 
clothing stipend.  
The EEOC issued a letter of determination on 
June 5, 2014, in which the EEOC stated that 
there was reasonable cause to believe that the 
Funeral Home "discharged [Stephens] due to 
her sex and gender identity, female, in 
violation of Title VII" and "discriminated 
against its female employees by providing 
male employees with a clothing benefit 
which was denied to females, in violation of 
Title VII." The EEOC and the Funeral Home 
were unable to resolve this dispute through an 
informal conciliation process, and the EEOC 
filed a complaint against the Funeral Home in 
the district court on September 25, 2014.  
The Funeral Home moved to dismiss the 
EEOC's action for failure to state a claim. The 
district court denied the Funeral Home's 
motion, but it narrowed the basis upon which 
the EEOC could pursue its unlawful-
termination claim. In particular, the district 
court agreed with the Funeral Home that 
transgender status is not a protected trait 
under Title VII, and therefore held that the 
EEOC could not sue for alleged 
discrimination against Stephens based solely 
on her transgender and/or transitioning 
status. Nevertheless, the district court 
determined that the EEOC had adequately 
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stated a claim for discrimination against 
Stephens based on the claim that she was 
fired because of her failure to conform to the 
Funeral Home's "sex-or gender-based 
preferences, expectations, or stereotypes."  
The parties then cross-moved for summary 
judgment. With regard to the Funeral Home's 
decision to terminate Stephens's 
employment, the district court determined 
that there was "direct evidence to support a 
claim of employment discrimination" against 
Stephens on the basis of her sex, in violation 
of Title VII. However, the court nevertheless 
found in the Funeral Home's favor because it 
concluded that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act ("RFRA")precludes the 
EEOC from enforcing Title VII against the 
Funeral Home, as doing so would 
substantially burden Rost and the Funeral 
Home's religious exercise and the EEOC had 
failed to demonstrate that enforcing Title VII 
was the least restrictive way to achieve its 
presumably compelling interest "in ensuring 
that Stephens is not subject to gender 
stereotypes in the workplace in terms of 
required clothing at the Funeral home." 
Based on its narrow conception of the 
EEOC's compelling interest in bringing the 
claim, the district court concluded that the 
EEOC could have achieved its goals by 
proposing that the Funeral Home impose a 
gender-neutral dress code. The EEOC's 
failure to consider such an accommodation 
was, according to the district court, fatal to its 
case. . Separately, the district court held that 
it lacked jurisdiction to consider the EEOC's 
discriminatory-clothing-allowance claim 
because, under longstanding Sixth Circuit 
precedent, the EEOC may pursue in a Title 
VII lawsuit only claims that are reasonably 
expected to grow out of the complaining 
party's—in this case, Stephens's—original 
charge. The district court entered final 
judgment on all counts in the Funeral Home's 
favor on August 18, 2016, and the EEOC 
filed a timely notice of appeal shortly 
thereafter. 
Stephens moved to intervene in this appeal on 
January 26, 2017, after expressing concern 
that changes in policy priorities within the 
U.S. government might prevent the EEOC 
from fully representing Stephens's interests 
in this case. The Funeral Home opposed 
Stephens's motion on the grounds that the 
motion was untimely and Stephens had failed 
to show that the EEOC would not represent 
her interests adequately. We determined that 
Stephens's request was timely given that she 
previously "had no reason to question 
whether the EEOC would continue to 
adequately represent her interests" and 
granted Stephens's motion to intervene on 
March 27, 2017. We further determined that 
Stephens's intervention would not prejudice 
the Funeral Home because Stephens stated in 
her briefing that she did not intend to raise 
new issues. Six groups of amici curiae also 
submitted briefing in this case. 
II.DISCUSSION                 
A. Standard of Review 
"We review a district court's grant of 
summary judgment de novo."  Summary 
judgment is warranted when "there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." In reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, "we view all facts and any 
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inferences in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party." We also review all "legal 
conclusions supporting [the district court's] 
grant of summary judgment de novo."  
B. Unlawful Termination Claim 
Title VII prohibits employers from 
"discriminat[ing] against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin." "[A] 
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case [of 
unlawful discrimination] by presenting direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent." "[A] 
facially discriminatory employment policy or 
a corporate decision maker's express 
statement of a desire to remove employees in 
the protected group is direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent." Once a plaintiff 
establishes that "the prohibited classification 
played a motivating part in the [adverse] 
employment decision," the employer then 
bears the burden of proving that it would have 
terminated the plaintiff "even if it had not 
been motivated by impermissible 
discrimination."  
Here, the district court correctly determined 
that Stephens was fired because of her failure 
to conform to sex stereotypes, in violation of 
Title VII. ("[W]hile this Court does not often 
see cases where there is direct evidence to 
support a claim of employment 
discrimination, it appears to exist here."). The 
district court erred, however, in finding that 
Stephens could not alternatively pursue a 
claim that she was discriminated against on 
the basis of her transgender and transitioning 
status. Discrimination on the basis of 
transgender and transitioning status is 
necessarily discrimination on the basis of sex, 
and thus the EEOC should have had the 
opportunity to prove that the Funeral Home 
violated Title VII by firing Stephens because 
she is transgender and transitioning from 
male to female. 
1. Discrimination on the Basis of Sex 
Stereotypes 
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a plurality 
of the Supreme Court explained that Title 
VII's proscription of discrimination "'because 
of . . . sex' . . . mean[s] that gender must be 
irrelevant to employment decisions. In 
enacting Title VII, the plurality reasoned, 
"Congress intended to strike at the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women resulting from sex stereotypes.” 
The Price Waterhouse plurality, along with 
two concurring Justices, therefore 
determined that a female employee who 
faced an adverse employment decision 
because she failed to "walk . . . femininely, 
talk . . . femininely, dress . . . femininely, 
wear make-up, have  her hair styled, [or] 
wear jewelry," could properly state a claim 
for sex discrimination under Title VII—even 
though she was not discriminated against for 
being a woman per se, but instead for failing 
to be womanly enough. 
Based on Price Waterhouse, we determined 
that  "discrimination based on a failure to 
conform to stereotypical gender norms" was 
no less prohibited under Title VII than 
discrimination based on "the biological 
differences between men and women." And 
we found no "reason to exclude Title VII 
coverage for non sex-stereotypical behavior 
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simply because the person is a transsexual." 
Thus, in Smith, we held that a transgender 
plaintiff (born male) who suffered adverse 
employment consequences after "he began to 
express a more feminine appearance and 
manner on a regular basis" could file an 
employment discrimination suit under Title 
VII, because such "discrimination would not 
[have] occur[red] but for the victim's 
sex.."  As we reasoned in Smith, Title VII 
proscribes discrimination both against 
women who "do not wear dresses or makeup" 
and men who do. Under any circumstances, 
"[s]ex stereotyping based on a person's 
gender non-conforming behavior is 
impermissible discrimination."  
Here, Rost's decision to fire Stephens because 
Stephens was "no longer going to represent 
himself as a man" and "wanted to dress as a 
woman," falls squarely within the ambit of 
sex-based discrimination that Price 
Waterhouse and Smith forbid. For its part, 
the Funeral Home has failed to establish a 
non-discriminatory basis for Stephens's 
termination, and Rost admitted that he did not 
fire Stephens for any performance-related 
issues.  We therefore agree with the district 
court that the Funeral Home discriminated 
against Stephens on the basis of her sex, in 
violation of Title VII. 
The Funeral Home nevertheless argues that it 
has not violated Title VII because sex 
stereotyping is barred only when "the 
employer's reliance on stereotypes . . . 
result[s] in disparate treatment of employees 
because they are either male or female." 
According to the Funeral Home, an employer 
does not engage in impermissible sex 
stereotyping when it requires its employees 
to conform to a sex-specific dress code—as it 
purportedly did here by requiring Stephens to 
abide by the dress code designated for the 
Funeral Home's male employees—because 
such a policy "impose[s] equal burdens on 
men and women," and thus does not single 
out an employee for disparate treatment 
based on that employee's sex.  In support of 
its position, the Funeral Home relies 
principally on Jespersen v. Harrah's 
Operating Co., and Barker v. Taft 
Broadcasting Co.,. Jespersen held that a sex-
specific grooming code that imposed 
different but equally burdensome 
requirements on male and female employees 
would not violate Title VII.  Barker, for its 
part, held that a sex-specific grooming code 
that was enforced equally as to male and 
female employees would not violate Title 
VII. For three reasons, the Funeral Home's 
reliance on these cases is misplaced. 
First, the central issue in Jespersen and 
Barker—whether certain sex-specific 
appearance requirements violate Title VII—
is not before this court. We are not 
considering, in this case, whether the Funeral 
Home violated Title VII by requiring men to 
wear pant suits and women to wear skirt suits. 
Our question is instead whether the Funeral 
Home could legally terminate Stephens, 
notwithstanding that she fully intended to 
comply with the company's sex-specific 
dress code, simply because she refused to 
conform to the Funeral Home's notion of her 
sex. When the Funeral Home's actions are 
viewed in the proper context, no reasonable 
jury could believe that Stephens was not 
"target[ed] . . . for disparate treatment" and 
that "no sex stereotype factored into [the 
Funeral Home's] employment decision."  
 542 
Second, even if we would permit certain sex-
specific dress codes in a case where the issue 
was properly raised, we would not rely on 
either Jespersen or Barker to do 
so. Barker was decided before Price 
Waterhouse, and it in no way anticipated the 
Court's recognition that Title VII "strike[s] at 
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of 
men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes." Rather, according to Barker, 
"[w]hen Congress makes it unlawful for an 
employer to 'discriminate . . . on the basis of 
. . . sex ...', without further explanation of its 
meaning, we should not readily infer that it 
meant something different than what the 
concept of discrimination has traditionally 
meant." Of course, this is precisely the 
sentiment that Price Waterhouse 
"eviscerated" when it recognized that  "Title 
VII's reference to 'sex' encompasses both the 
biological differences between men and 
women, and gender discrimination, that is, 
discrimination based on a failure to conform 
to stereotypical gender norms." Indeed, 
Barker's incompatibility with Price 
Waterhouse may explain why this court has 
not cited Barker since Price Waterhouse was 
decided. 
As for Jespersen, that Ninth Circuit case is 
irreconcilable with our decision in Smith. 
Critical to Jespersen's holding was the notion 
that the employer's "grooming standards," 
which required all female bartenders to wear 
makeup (and prohibited males from doing 
so), did not on their face violate Title VII 
because they did "not require [the plaintiff] to 
conform to a stereotypical image that would 
objectively impede her ability to perform her 
job." We reached the exact opposite 
conclusion in Smith, as we explained 
that requiring women to wear makeup does, 
in fact, constitute improper sex stereotyping. 
And more broadly, our decision in Smith 
forecloses the Jespersen court's suggestion 
that sex stereotyping is permissible so long as 
the required conformity does not "impede [an 
employee's] ability to perform her job," as the 
Smith plaintiff did not and was not required 
to allege that being expected to adopt a more 
masculine appearance and manner interfered 
with his job performance. Jespersen's 
incompatibility with Smith may explain why 
it has never been endorsed (or even cited) by 
this circuit—and why it should not be 
followed now. 
Finally, the Funeral Home misreads binding 
precedent when it suggests that sex 
stereotyping violates Title VII only when "the 
employer's sex stereotyping resulted in 
'disparate treatment of men and 
women.'" This interpretation of Title VII 
cannot be squared with our holding in Smith. 
There, we did not ask whether transgender 
persons transitioning from male to female 
were treated differently than transgender 
persons transitioning from female to male. 
Rather, we considered whether a transgender 
person was being discriminated against based 
on "his failure to conform to sex stereotypes 
concerning how a man should look and 
behave."  It is apparent from both Price 
Waterhouse and Smith that an employer 
engages in unlawful discrimination even if it 
expects both biologically male and female 
employees to conform to certain notions of 
how each should behave. 
In short, the Funeral Home's sex-specific 
dress code does not preclude liability under 
Title VII. Even if the Funeral Home's dress 
 543 
code does not itself violate Title VII—an 
issue that is not before this court—the 
Funeral Home may not rely on its policy to 
combat the charge that it engaged in improper 
sex stereotyping when it fired Stephens for 
wishing to appear or behave in a manner that 
contradicts the Funeral Home's perception of 
how she should appear or behave based on 
her sex. Because the EEOC has presented 
unrefuted evidence that unlawful sex 
stereotyping was "at least a motivating factor 
in the [Funeral Home's] actions,” and because 
we reject the Funeral Home's affirmative 
defenses, we GRANT summary judgment to 
the EEOC on its sex discrimination claim. 
2. Discrimination on the Basis of 
Transgender/Transitioning Status 
We also hold that discrimination on the basis 
of transgender and transitioning status 
violates Title VII. The district court rejected 
this theory of liability at the motion-to-
dismiss stage, holding that "transgender or 
transsexual status is currently not a protected 
class under Title VII." The EEOC and 
Stephens argue that the district court's 
determination was erroneous because Title 
VII protects against sex stereotyping and 
"transgender discrimination is based on the 
non-conformance of an individual's gender 
identity and appearance with sex-based 
norms or expectations"; therefore, 
"discrimination because of an individual's 
transgender status is always based on gender-
stereotypes: the stereotype that individuals 
will conform their appearance and 
behavior—whether their dress, the name they 
use, or other ways they present themselves—
to the sex assigned them at birth." The 
Funeral Home, in turn, argues that Title VII 
does not prohibit discrimination based on a 
person's transgender or transitioning status 
because "sex," for the purposes of Title VII, 
"refers to a binary characteristic for which 
there are only two classifications, male and 
female," and "which classification arises in a 
person based on their chromosomally driven 
physiology and reproductive function." 
According to the Funeral Home, transgender 
status refers to "a person's self-assigned 
'gender identity'" rather than a person's sex, 
and therefore such a status is not protected 
under Title VII.  
For two reasons, the EEOC and Stephens 
have the better argument. First, it is 
analytically impossible to fire an employee 
based on that employee's status as a 
transgender person without being motivated, 
at least in part, by the employee's sex. The 
Seventh Circuit's method of "isolat[ing] the 
significance of the plaintiff's sex to the 
employer's decision" to determine whether 
Title VII has been triggered illustrates this 
point. In Hively, the Seventh Circuit 
determined that Title VII prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation—a different question than the 
issue before this court—by asking whether 
the plaintiff, a self-described lesbian, would 
have been fired "if she had been a man 
married to a woman (or living with a woman, 
or dating a woman) and everything else had 
stayed the same." If the answer to that 
question is no, then the plaintiff has stated a 
"paradigmatic sex discrimination" claim. 
Here, we ask whether Stephens would have 
been fired if Stephens had been a woman who 
sought to comply with the women's dress 
code. The answer quite obviously is no. This, 
in and of itself, confirms that Stephens's sex 
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impermissibly affected Rost's decision to fire 
Stephens. 
The court's analysis in Schroer v. Billington, 
provides another useful way of framing the 
inquiry. There, the court noted that an 
employer who fires an employee because the 
employee converted from Christianity to 
Judaism has discriminated against the 
employee "because of religion," regardless of 
whether the employer feels any animus 
against either Christianity or Judaism, 
because "[d]iscrimination 'because of 
religion' easily encompasses discrimination 
because of a change of religion.'" By the 
same token, discrimination "because of sex" 
inherently includes discrimination against 
employees because of a change in their sex. 
Here, there is evidence that Rost at least 
partially based his employment decision on 
Stephens's desire to change her sex: Rost 
justified firing Stephens by explaining that 
Rost "sincerely believes that 'the Bible 
teaches that a person's sex (whether male or 
female) is an immutable God-given gift and 
that it is wrong for a person to deny his or her 
God-given sex,'" and "the Bible teaches that 
it is wrong for a biological male to deny his 
sex by dressing as a woman." As amici point 
out in their briefing, such statements 
demonstrate that "Ms. Stephens's sex 
necessarily factored into the decision to fire 
her."  
The Funeral Home argues that Schroer's 
analogy is "structurally flawed" because, 
unlike religion, a person's sex cannot be 
changed; it is, instead, a biologically 
immutable trait. We need not decide that 
issue; even if true, the Funeral Home's point 
is immaterial. As noted above, the Supreme 
Court made clear in Price Waterhouse that 
Title VII requires "gender [to] be irrelevant to 
employment decisions." Gender (or sex) is 
not being treated as "irrelevant to 
employment decisions" if an employee's 
attempt or desire to change his or her sex 
leads to an adverse employment decision. 
Second, discrimination against transgender 
persons necessarily implicates Title VII's 
proscriptions against sex stereotyping. As we 
recognized in Smith, a transgender person is 
someone who "fails to act and/or identify 
with his or her gender"—i.e., someone who 
is inherently "gender non-conforming." 
Thus, an employer cannot discriminate on the 
basis of transgender status without imposing 
its stereotypical notions of how sexual organs 
and gender identity ought to align. There is 
no way to disaggregate discrimination on the 
basis of transgender status from 
discrimination on the basis of gender non-
conformity, and we see no reason to try. 
We did not expressly hold in Smith that 
discrimination on the basis of transgender 
status is unlawful, though the opinion has 
been read to say as much—both by this 
circuit and others. In G.G. v. Gloucester 
County School Board, for instance, the 
Fourth Circuit described Smith as holding 
"that discrimination against a transgender 
individual based on that person's transgender 
status is discrimination because of sex under 
federal civil rights statutes." And in Dodds v. 
United States Department of Education, we 
refused to stay "a preliminary injunction 
ordering the school district to treat an eleven-
year old transgender girl as a female and 
permit her to use the girls' restroom" because, 
among other things, the school district failed 
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to show that it would likely succeed on the 
merits. In so holding, we cited Smith as 
evidence that this circuit's "settled law" 
prohibits "[s]ex stereotyping based on a 
person's gender non-conforming behavior," 
and then pointed to out-of-circuit cases for 
the propositions that "[a] person is defined as 
transgender precisely because of the 
perception that his or her behavior 
transgresses gender stereotypes," and "[t]he 
weight of authority establishes that 
discrimination based on transgender status is 
already prohibited by the language of federal 
civil rights statutes.” Such references support 
what we now directly hold: Title VII 
protects transgender persons because of their 
transgender or transitioning status, because 
transgender or transitioning status constitutes 
an inherently gender non-conforming trait. 
The Funeral Home raises several arguments 
against this interpretation of Title VII, none 
of which we find persuasive. First, the 
Funeral Home contends that the Congress 
enacting Title VII understood "sex" to refer 
only to a person's "physiology and 
reproductive role," and not a person's "self-
assigned 'gender identity.'" But the drafters' 
failure to anticipate that Title VII would 
cover transgender status is of little 
interpretive value, because ”statutory 
prohibitions often go beyond the principal 
evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, 
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws 
rather than the principal concerns of our 
legislators by which we are governed.” And 
in any event, Smith and Price Waterhouse 
preclude an interpretation of Title VII that 
reads "sex" to mean only individuals' 
"chromosomally driven physiology and 
reproductive function." Indeed, we criticized 
the district court in Smith for "relying on a 
series of pre-Price Waterhouse cases from 
other federal appellate courts holding that 
transsexuals, as a class, are not entitled to 
Title VII protection because 'Congress had a 
narrow view of sex in mind' and 'never 
considered nor intended that [Title VII] apply 
to anything other than the traditional concept 
of sex.'" According to Smith, such a limited 
view of Title VII's protections had been 
"eviscerated by Price Waterhouse." The 
Funeral Home's attempt to resurrect the 
reasoning of these earlier cases thus runs 
directly counter to Smith's holding. 
In a related argument, the Funeral Home 
notes that both biologically male and 
biologically female persons may consider 
themselves transgender, such that 
transgender status is not unique to one 
biological sex. It is true, of course, that an 
individual’s biological sex does not dictate 
her transgender status; the two traits are not 
coterminous. But a trait need not be exclusive 
to one sex to nevertheless be a function of 
sex. As the Second Circuit explained in 
Zarda, 
Title VII does not ask whether a 
particular sex is discriminated 
against; it asks whether a particular 
"individual" is discriminated against 
"because of such individual's . . . sex." 
Taking individuals as the unit of 
analysis, the question is not whether 
discrimination is borne only by men 
or only by women or even by both 
men and women; instead, the 
question is whether an individual is 
discriminated against because of his 
or her sex. 
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Because an employer cannot discriminate 
against an employee for being transgender 
without considering that employee's 
biological sex, discrimination on the basis of 
transgender status necessarily entails 
discrimination on the basis of sex—no matter 
what sex the employee was born or wishes to 
be. By the same token, an employer need not 
discriminate based on a trait common to all 
men or women to violate Title VII. After all, 
a subset of both women and men decline to 
wear dresses or makeup, but discrimination 
against any woman on this basis would 
constitute sex discrimination under Price 
Waterhouse.  
Nor can much be gleaned from the fact that 
later statutes, such as the Violence Against 
Women Act, expressly prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of "gender 
identity," while Title VII does not, because 
"Congress may certainly choose to use both a 
belt and suspenders to achieve its objectives.” 
We have, in fact, already read Title VII to 
provide redundant statutory protections in a 
different context. In In re Rodriguez, for 
instance, we recognized that claims alleging 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity may 
fall within Title VII's prohibition on 
discrimination on the basis of national origin, 
even though at least one other federal statute 
treats "national origin" and "ethnicity" as 
separate traits. Moreover, Congress's failure 
to modify Title VII to include expressly 
gender identity "lacks 'persuasive 
significance' because 'several equally tenable 
inferences' may be drawn from such inaction, 
'including the inference that the existing 
legislation already incorporated the offered 
change.'" In short, nothing precludes 
discrimination based on transgender status 
from being viewed both as discrimination 
based on "gender identity" for certain statutes 
and, for the purposes of Title VII, 
discrimination on the basis of sex. 
The Funeral Home places great emphasis on 
the fact that our published decision in Smith 
superseded an earlier decision that stated 
explicitly, as opposed to obliquely, that a 
plaintiff who "alleges discrimination based 
solely on his identification as a transsexual . . 
. has alleged a claim of sex stereotyping 
pursuant to Title VII." But such an 
amendment does not mean, as the Funeral 
Home contends, that the now-binding Smith 
opinion "directly rejected" the notion that 
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of transgender status. The elimination of the 
language, which was not necessary to the 
decision, simply means that Smith did not 
expressly recognize Title VII protections for 
transgender persons based on identity. But 
Smith's reasoning still leads us to the same 
conclusion. 
We are also unpersuaded that our decision in 
Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center, 
precludes the holding we issue today. We 
held in Vickers that a plaintiff cannot pursue 
a claim for impermissible sex stereotyping on 
the ground that his perceived sexual 
orientation fails to conform to gender norms 
unless he alleges that he was discriminated 
against for failing to "conform to traditional 
gender stereotypes in any observable way at 
work." Vickers thus rejected the notion that 
"the act of identification with a particular 
group, in itself, is sufficiently gender non-
conforming such that an employee who so 
identifies would, by this very identification, 
engage in conduct that would enable him to 
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assert a successful sex stereotyping claim." 
The Vickers court reasoned that recognizing 
such a claim would impermissibly "bootstrap 
protection for sexual orientation into Title 
VII." The Funeral Home insists that, under 
Vickers, Stephens's sex-stereotyping claim 
survives only to the extent that it concerns her 
"appearance or mannerisms on the job, but 
not as it pertains to her underlying status as a 
transgender person. 
The Funeral Home is wrong. First, Vickers 
does not control this case because Vickers 
concerned a different legal question. As the 
EEOC and amici Equality Ohio note, Vickers 
"addressed only whether Title VII forbids 
sexual orientation discrimination, not 
discrimination against a transgender 
individual." While it is indisputable that "[a] 
panel of this Court cannot overrule the 
decision of another panel" when the "prior 
decision [constitutes] controlling authority." 
After all, we do not overrule a case by 
distinguishing it. 
Second, we are not bound by Vickers to the 
extent that it contravenes Smith. As noted 
above, Vickers indicated that a sex-
stereotyping claim is viable under Title VII 
only if a plaintiff alleges that he was 
discriminated against for failing to "conform 
to traditional gender stereotypes in any 
observable way at work." The Vickers court's 
new "observable-at-work" requirement is at 
odds with the holding in Smith, which did not 
limit sex-stereotyping claims to traits that are 
observable in the workplace. The 
"observable-at-work" requirement also 
contravenes our reasoning in Barnes v. City 
of Cincinnati—a binding decision that 
predated Vickers by more than a year—in 
which we held that a reasonable jury could 
conclude that a transgender plaintiff was 
discriminated against on the basis of his sex 
when, among other factors, his "ambiguous 
sexuality and his practice of dressing as a 
woman outside of work were well-known 
within the [workplace]."  From Smith and 
Barnes, it is clear that a plaintiff may state a 
claim under Title VII for discrimination 
based on gender nonconformance that is 
expressed outside of work. The Vickers 
court's efforts to develop a narrower rule are 
therefore not binding in this circuit. 
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, we 
hold that the EEOC could pursue a claim 
under Title VII on the ground that the Funeral 
Home discriminated against Stephens on the 
basis of her transgender status and 
transitioning identity. The EEOC should 
have had the opportunity, either through a 
motion for summary judgment or at trial, to 
establish that the Funeral Home violated Title 
VII's prohibition on discrimination on the 
basis of sex by firing Stephens because she 
was transgender and transitioning from male 
to female. 
3. Defenses to Title VII Liability 
Having determined that the Funeral Home 
violated Title VII's prohibition on sex 
discrimination, we must now consider 
whether any defenses preclude enforcement 
of Title VII in this case. As noted above, the 
district court held that the EEOC's 
enforcement efforts must give way to 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
("RFRA"), which prohibits the government 
from enforcing a religiously neutral law 
against an individual if that law substantially 
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burdens the individual's religious exercise 
and is not the least restrictive way to further 
a compelling government interest. The 
EEOC seeks reversal of this decision; the 
Funeral Home urges affirmance. In addition, 
certain amici ask us to affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment on 
different grounds—namely that Stephens 
falls within the "ministerial exception" to 
Title VII and is therefore not protected under 
the Act.  
We hold that the Funeral Home does not 
qualify for the ministerial exception to Title 
VII; the Funeral Home's religious exercise 
would not be substantially burdened by 
continuing to employ Stephens without 
discriminating against her on the basis of sex 
stereotypes; the EEOC has established that it 
has a compelling interest in ensuring the 
Funeral Home complies with Title VII; and 
enforcement of Title VII is necessarily the 
least restrictive way to achieve that 
compelling interest. We therefore 
REVERSE the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in the Funeral Home's 
favor and GRANT summary judgment to the 
EEOC on the unlawful-termination claim. 
a. Ministerial Exception 
We turn first to the "ministerial exception" to 
Title VII, which is rooted in the First 
Amendment's religious protections, and 
which "preclude[s] application of 
[employment discrimination laws such as 
Title VII] to claims concerning the 
employment relationship between a religious 
institution and its ministers." "[I]n order for 
the ministerial exception to bar an 
employment discrimination claim, the 
employer must be a religious institution and 
the employee must have been a ministerial 
employee." "The ministerial exception is a 
highly circumscribed doctrine. It grew out of 
the special considerations raised by the 
employment claims of clergy, which 
'concern[] internal church discipline, faith, 
and organization, all of which are governed 
by ecclesiastical rule, custom, and law.'"  
Public Advocate of the United States and its 
fellow amici argue that the ministerial 
exception applies in this case because (1) the 
exception applies both to religious and non-
religious entities, and (2) Stephens is a 
ministerial employee. Tellingly, however, the 
Funeral Home contends that the Funeral 
Home "is not a religious organization" and 
therefore, "the ministerial exception has no 
application" to this case. Although the 
Funeral Home has not waived the ministerial-
exception defense by failing to raise 
it, the First Amendment's ministerial 
exception" because "[t]his constitutional 
protection is . . . structural"), we agree with 
the Funeral Home that the exception is 
inapplicable here. 
As we made clear in Conlon, the ministerial 
exception applies only to "religious 
institution[s]." While an institution need not 
be "a church, diocese, or synagogue, or an 
entity operated by a traditional religious 
organization," to qualify for the exception, 
the institution must be "marked by clear or 
obvious religious characteristics.” In 
accordance with these principles, we have 
previously determined that the InterVarsity 
Christian Fellowship/USA ("IVCF"), "an 
evangelical campus mission," constituted a 
religious organization for the purposes of the 
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ministerial exception. IVCF described itself 
on its website as "faith-based religious 
organization" whose "purpose 'is to establish 
and advance at colleges and universities 
witnessing communities of students and 
faculty who follow Jesus as Savior and 
Lord.'" In addition, IVCF's website notified 
potential employees that it has the right to 
"hir[e] staff based on their religious beliefs so 
that all staff share the same religious 
commitment." Finally, IVCF required all 
employees "annually [to] reaffirm their 
agreement with IVCF's Purpose Statement 
and Doctrinal Basis."  
The Funeral Home, by comparison, has 
virtually no "religious characteristics." 
Unlike the campus mission in Conlon, the 
Funeral Home does not purport or seek to 
"establish and advance" Christian values.  As 
the EEOC notes, the Funeral Home "is not 
affiliated with any church; its articles of 
incorporation do not avow any religious 
purpose; its employees are not required to 
hold any particular religious views; and it 
employs and serves individuals of all 
religions." Though the Funeral Home's 
mission statement declares that "its highest 
priority is to honor God in all that we do as a 
company and as individuals," the Funeral 
Home's sole public displays of faith, 
according to Rost, amount to placing "Daily 
Bread" devotionals and "Jesus Cards" with 
scriptural references in public places in the 
funeral homes, which clients may pick up if 
they wish. The Funeral Home does not 
decorate its rooms with "religious figures" 
because it does not want to "offend[] people 
of different religions." The Funeral Home is 
open every day, including on Christian 
holidays. And while the employees are paid 
for federally recognized holidays, Easter is 
not a paid holiday.  
Nor is Stephens a "ministerial employee" 
under Hosanna-Tabor. Following Hosanna-
Tabor,  we have identified four factors to 
assist courts in assessing whether an 
employee is a minister covered by the 
exception: (1) whether the employee's title 
"conveys a religious—as opposed to 
secular—meaning"; (2) whether the title 
reflects "a significant degree of religious 
training" that sets the employee "apart from 
laypersons"; (3) whether the employee serves 
"as an ambassador of the faith" and serves a 
"leadership role within [the] church, school, 
and community"; and (4) whether the 
employee performs "important religious 
functions . . . for the religious 
organization." Stephens's title—"Funeral 
Director"—conveys a purely secular 
function. The record does not reflect that 
Stephens has any religious training. Though 
Stephens has a public-facing role within the 
funeral home, she was not an "ambassador of 
[any] faith," and she did not perform 
"important religious functions," rather, Rost's 
description of funeral directors' work 
identifies mostly secular tasks—making 
initial contact with the deceased's families, 
handling the removal of the remains to the 
funeral home, introducing other staff to the 
families, coaching the families through the 
first viewing, greeting the guests, and 
coordinating the families' "final farewell.” 
The only responsibilities assigned to 
Stephens that could be construed as religious 
in nature were, "on limited occasions," to 
"facilitate" a family's clergy selection, 
"facilitate the first meeting of clergy and 
family members," and "play a role in building 
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the family's confidence around the role the 
clergy will play, clarifying what type of 
religious message is desired, and integrating 
the clergy into the experience." Such 
responsibilities are a far cry from the duties 
ascribed to the employee in Conlon, which 
"included assisting others to cultivate 
'intimacy with God and growth in Christ-like 
character through personal and corporate 
spiritual disciplines.'" In short, Stephens was 
not a ministerial employee and the Funeral 
Home is not a religious institution, and 
therefore the ministerial exception plays no 
role in this case. 
 b. Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 to resurrect 
and broaden the Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence that existed before the 
Supreme Court's decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith, which overruled the 
approach to analyzing Free Exercise Clause 
claims set forth by Sherbert v. Verner. To that 
end, RFRA precludes the government from 
"substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise 
of religion even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability," unless the 
government "demonstrates that application of 
the burden to the person—(1) is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means 
of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest." RFRA thus contemplates a two-step 
burden-shifting analysis: First, a claimant 
must demonstrate that complying with a 
generally applicable law would substantially 
burden his religious exercise. Upon such a 
showing, the government must then establish 
that applying the law to the burdened 
individual is the least restrictive means of 
furthering a compelling government interest. 
The questions now before us are whether (1) 
we ought to remand this case and preclude the 
Funeral Home from asserting a RFRA-based 
defense in the proceedings below because 
Stephens, a non-governmental party, joined 
this action as an intervenor on appeal; (2) if 
not, whether the Funeral Home adequately 
demonstrated that it would be substantially 
burdened by the application of Title VII in 
this case; (3) if so, whether the EEOC 
nevertheless demonstrated that application of 
a such a burden to the Funeral Home furthers 
a compelling governmental interest; and (4) 
if so, whether the application of such 
a burden constitutes the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling interest. 
We address each inquiry in turn. 
i. Applicability of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act 
We have previously made clear that 
“Congress intended RFRA to apply only to 
suits in which the government is a party." 
Thus, if Stephens had initiated a private 
lawsuit against the Funeral Home to 
vindicate her rights under Title VII, the 
Funeral Home would be unable to invoke 
RFRA as a defense because the government 
would not have been party to the suit. Now 
that Stephens has intervened in this suit, she 
argues that the case should be remanded to 
the district court with instructions barring the 
Funeral Home from asserting a RFRA 
defense to her individual claims. The EEOC 
supports Stephens's argument.  
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The Funeral Home, in turn, argues that the 
question of RFRA's applicability to Title VII 
suits between private parties "is a new and 
complicated issue that has never been a part 
of this case and has never been briefed by the 
parties." Because Stephens's intervention on 
appeal was granted, in part, on her assurances 
that she "seeks only to raise arguments 
already within the scope of this appeal," the 
Funeral Home insists that permitting 
Stephens to argue now in favor of remand 
"would immensely prejudice the Funeral 
Home and undermine the Court's reasons for 
allowing Stephens's intervention in the first 
place."  
The Funeral Home is correct. Stephens's 
reply brief in support of her motion to 
intervene insists that "no party to an appeal 
may broaden the scope of litigation beyond 
the issues raised before the district court." 
Though the district court noted in a footnote 
that "the Funeral Home could not assert 
a RFRA defense if Stephens had filed a Title 
VII suit on Stephens's own behalf," this 
argument was not briefed by the parties at the 
district-court level. Thus, in accordance with 
Stephens's own brief, she should not be 
permitted to argue for remand before this 
court. 
Stephens nevertheless insists that 
"intervenors . . . are permitted to present 
different arguments related to the principal 
parties' claims." But in Grutter, this court 
determined that proposed intervenors ought 
to be able to present particular "defenses of 
affirmative action" that the principal party to 
the case (a university) might be disinclined to 
raise because of "internal and external 
institutional pressures." Allowing intervenors 
to present particular defenses on the merits to 
judiciable claims is different than allowing 
intervenors to change the procedural course 
of litigation by virtue of their intervention. 
Moreover, we typically will not consider 
issues raised for the first time on appeal 
unless they are "presented with sufficient 
clarity and completeness and [their] 
resolution will materially advance the 
process of th[e] . . . litigation." The merits of 
a remand have been addressed only in 
passing by the parties, and thus have not been 
discussed with "sufficient clarity and 
completeness" to enable us to entertain 
Stephens's claim.  
ii. Prima Facie Case Under RFRA 
To assert a viable defense under RFRA, a 
religious claimant must demonstrate that the 
government action at issue "would (1) 
substantially burden (2) a sincere (3) 
religious exercise."  In reviewing such a 
claim, courts must not evaluate whether 
asserted "religious beliefs are mistaken or 
insubstantial." Rather, courts must assess 
"whether the line drawn reflects 'an honest 
conviction.'" In addition, RFRA, as amended 
by the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
("RLUIPA"), protects "any exercise of 
religion, whether or not compelled by, or 
central to, a system of religious belief."  
The EEOC argues that the Funeral Home's 
RFRA defense must fail because "RFRA 
protects religious exercise, not religious 
beliefs," and the Funeral Home has failed to 
"identif[y] how continuing to employ 
Stephens after, or during, her transition 
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would interfere with any religious 'action or 
practice.'" The Funeral Home, in turn, 
contends that the "very operation of [the 
Funeral Home] constitutes protected 
religious exercise" because Rost feels 
compelled by his faith to "serve grieving 
people" through the funeral home, and thus 
"[r]equiring [the Funeral Home] to authorize 
a male funeral director to wear the uniform 
for female funeral directors would directly 
interfere with—and thus impose a substantial 
burden on—[the Funeral Home's] ability to 
carry out Rost's religious exercise of caring 
for the grieving."  
If we take Rost's assertions regarding his 
religious beliefs as sincere, which all parties 
urge us to do, then we must treat Rost's 
running of the funeral home as a religious 
exercise—even though Rost does not suggest 
that ministering to grieving mourners by 
operating a funeral home is a tenet of his 
religion, more broadly. The question 
then becomes whether the Funeral Home has 
identified any way in which continuing to 
employ Stephens would substantially burden 
Rost's ability to serve mourners. The Funeral 
Home purports to identify two burdens. 
"First, allowing a funeral director to wear the 
uniform for members of the opposite sex 
would often create distractions for the 
deceased's loved ones and thereby hinder 
their healing process (and [the Funeral 
Home's] ministry)," and second, "forcing [the 
Funeral Home] to violate Rost's faith . . . 
would significantly pressure Rost to leave the 
funeral industry and end his ministry to 
grieving people." Neither alleged burden is 
"substantial" within the meaning of RFRA. 
The Funeral Home's first alleged burden—
that Stephens will present a distraction that 
will obstruct Rost's ability to serve grieving 
families—is premised on presumed biases. 
As the EEOC observes, the Funeral Home's 
argument is based on "a view that Stephens is 
a 'man' and would be perceived as such even 
after her gender transition," as well as on the 
"assumption that a transgender funeral 
director would so disturb clients as to 'hinder 
healing.'" The factual premises underlying 
this purported burden are wholly unsupported 
in the record. Rost testified that he has never 
seen Stephens in anything other than a suit 
and tie and does not know how Stephens 
would have looked when presenting as a 
woman. Rost's assertion that he believes his 
clients would be disturbed by Stephens's 
appearance during and after her transition to 
the point that their healing from their loved 
ones' deaths would be hindered, at the very 
least raises a material question of fact as to 
whether his clients would actually be 
distracted, which cannot be resolved in the 
Funeral Home's favor at the summary-
judgment stage. Thus, even if we were to find 
the Funeral Home's argument legally 
cognizable, we would not affirm a finding of 
substantial burden based on a contested and 
unsupported assertion of fact. 
But more to the point, we hold as a matter of 
law that a religious claimant cannot rely on 
customers' presumed biases to establish a 
substantial burden under RFRA. Though we 
have seemingly not had occasion to address 
the issue, other circuits have considered 
whether and when to account for customer 
biases in justifying discriminatory 
employment practices. In particular, courts 
asked to determine whether customers' biases 
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may render sex a "bona fide occupational 
qualification" under Title VII have held that 
"it would be totally anomalous . . . to allow 
the preferences and prejudices of the 
customers to determine whether the sex 
discrimination was valid." District courts 
within this circuit have endorsed these out-
of-circuit opinions.  
Of course, cases like Diaz, Fernandez, 
and Bradley concern a different situation 
than the one at hand. We could agree that 
courts should not credit customers' 
prejudicial notions of what men and women 
can do when considering whether sex 
constitutes a "bona fide occupational 
qualification" for a given position while 
nonetheless recognizing that those same 
prejudices have practical effects that would 
substantially burden Rost's religious practice 
(i.e., the operation of his business) in this 
case. But the Ninth Circuit rejected similar 
reasoning in Fernandez, and we reject it here. 
In Fernandez, the Ninth Circuit held that 
customer preferences could not transform a 
person's gender into a relevant consideration 
for a particular position even if the record 
supported the idea that the employer's 
business would suffer from promoting a 
woman because a large swath of clients 
would refuse to work with a female vice-
president. Just as the Fernandez court refused 
to treat discriminatory promotion practices as 
critical to an employer's business, 
notwithstanding any evidence to that effect in 
the record, so too we refuse to treat 
discriminatory policies as essential to Rost's 
business—or, by association, his religious 
exercise. 
The Funeral Home's second alleged burden 
also fails. Under Holt v. Hobbs, a 
government action that "puts [a religious 
practitioner] to th[e] choice" of "'engag[ing] 
in conduct that seriously violates [his] 
religious beliefs' [or] . . . fac[ing] serious" 
consequences constitutes a substantial 
burden for the purposes of RFRA. Here, Rost 
contends that he is being put to such a choice, 
as he either must "purchase female attire" for 
Stephens or authorize her "to dress in female 
attire while representing [the Funeral Home] 
and serving the bereaved," which purportedly 
violates Rost's religious beliefs, or else face 
"significant[] pressure . . . to leave the funeral 
industry and end his ministry to grieving 
people." Neither of these purported choices 
can be considered a "substantial burden" 
under RFRA. 
First, though Rost currently provides his male 
employees with suits and his female 
employees with stipends to pay for clothing, 
this benefit is not legally required and Rost 
does not suggest that the benefit is religiously 
compelled. In this regard, Rost is unlike the 
employers in Hobby Lobby, who rejected the 
idea that they could simply refuse to provide 
health care altogether and pay the associated 
penalty (which would allow them to avoid 
providing access to contraceptives in 
violation of their beliefs) because they felt 
religiously compelled to provide their 
employees with health insurance. And while 
"it is predictable that the companies 
[in Hobby Lobby] would face a competitive 
disadvantage in retaining and attracting 
skilled workers" if they failed to provide 
health insurance, the record here does not 
indicate that the Funeral Home's clothing 
benefit is necessary to attract workers; in 
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fact, until the EEOC commenced the present 
action, the Funeral Home did not provide any 
sort of clothing benefit to its female 
employees. Thus, Rost is not being forced to 
choose between providing Stephens with 
clothing or else leaving the business; this is a 
predicament of Rost's own making. 
Second, simply permitting Stephens to wear 
attire that reflects a conception of gender that 
is at odds with Rost's religious beliefs is not 
a substantial burden under RFRA. We 
presume that the "line [Rost] draw[s]"—
namely, that permitting Stephens to represent 
herself as a woman would cause him to 
"violate God's commands" because it would 
make him "directly involved in supporting 
the idea that sex is a changeable social 
construct rather than an immutable God-
given gift," constitutes "an honest 
conviction." But we hold that, as a matter of 
law, tolerating Stephens's understanding of 
her sex and gender identity is not tantamount 
to supporting it. 
Most circuits, including this one, have 
recognized that a party can sincerely believe 
that he is being coerced into engaging in 
conduct that violates his religious convictions 
without actually, as a matter of law, being so 
engaged. Courts have recently confronted 
this issue when non-profit organizations 
whose religious beliefs prohibit them "from 
paying for, providing, or facilitating the 
distribution of contraceptives," or in any way 
"be[ing] complicit in the provision of 
contraception" argued that the Affordable 
Care Act's opt-out procedure—which 
enables organizations with religious 
objections to the contraceptive mandate to 
avoid providing such coverage by either 
filling out a form certifying that they have a 
religious objection to providing 
contraceptive coverage or directly notifying 
the Department of Health and Human 
Services of the religious objection—
substantially burdens their religious practice.  
Eight of the nine circuits to review the issue, 
including this court, have determined that the 
opt-out process does not constitute a 
substantial burden. The courts reached this 
conclusion by examining the Affordable Care 
Act's provisions and determining that it was 
the statute—and not the employer's act of 
opting out—that "entitle[d] plan participants 
and beneficiaries to contraceptive coverage." 
As a result, the employers' engagement with 
the opt-out process, though legally 
significant in that it leads the government to 
provide the organizations' employees with 
access to contraceptive coverage through an 
alternative route, does not mean the 
employers are facilitating the provision of 
contraceptives in a way that violates their 
religious practice.  
We view the Funeral Home's compliance 
with antidiscrimination laws in much the 
same light. Rost may sincerely believe that, 
by retaining Stephens as an employee, he is 
supporting and endorsing Stephens's views 
regarding the mutability of sex. But as a 
matter of law, bare compliance with Title 
VII—without actually assisting or facilitating 
Stephens's transition efforts—does not 
amount to an endorsement of Stephens's 
views. As much is clear from the Supreme 
Court's Free Speech jurisprudence, in which 
the Court has held that a statute requiring law 
schools to provide military and nonmilitary 
recruiters an equal opportunity to recruit 
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students on campus was not improperly 
compelling schools to endorse the military's 
policies because "[n]othing about recruiting 
suggests that law schools agree with any 
speech by recruiters," and "students can 
appreciate the difference between speech a 
school sponsors and speech the school 
permits because legally required to do so, 
pursuant to an equal access policy." 
Similarly, here, requiring the Funeral Home 
to refrain from firing an employee with 
different religious views from Rost does not, 
as a matter of law, mean that Rost is 
endorsing or supporting those views. Indeed, 
Rost's own behavior suggests that he sees the 
difference between employment and 
endorsement, as he employs individuals of 
any or no faith, "permits employees to wear 
Jewish head coverings for Jewish services," 
and "even testified that he is not endorsing 
his employee's religious beliefs by 
employing them."  
At bottom, the fact that Rost sincerely 
believes that he is being compelled to make 
such an endorsement does not make it so. 
Accordingly, requiring Rost to comply with 
Title VII's proscriptions on discrimination 
does not substantially burden his religious 
practice. The district court therefore erred in 
granting summary judgment to the Funeral 
Home on the basis of its RFRA defense, and 
we REVERSE the district court's decision on 
this ground. As Rost's purported burdens are 
insufficient as a matter of law, we GRANT 
summary judgment to the EEOC with respect 
to the Funeral Home's RFRA defense. 
iii. Strict Scrutiny Test 
Because the Funeral Home has not 
established that Rost's religious exercise 
would be substantially burdened by requiring 
the Funeral Home to comply with Title VII, 
we do not need to consider whether the 
EEOC has adequately demonstrated that 
enforcing Title VII in this case is the least 
restrictive means of furthering a compelling 
government interest. However, in the interest 
of completeness, we reach this issue and 
conclude that the EEOC has satisfied its 
burden. We therefore GRANT summary 
judgment to the EEOC with regard to the 
Funeral Home's RFRA defense on the 
alternative grounds that the EEOC's 
enforcement action in this case survives strict 
scrutiny. 
(a) Compelling Government Interest 
Under the "to the person" test, the EEOC 
must demonstrate that its compelling interest 
"is satisfied through application of the 
challenged law [to] . . . the particular claimant 
whose sincere exercise of religion is being 
substantially burdened." This requires 
"look[ing] beyond broadly formulated 
interests justifying the general applicability 
of government mandates and scrutiniz[ing] 
the asserted harm of granting specific 
exemptions to particular religious 
claimants."  
As an initial matter, the Funeral Home does 
not seem to dispute that the EEOC "has a 
compelling interest in the 'elimination of 
workplace discrimination, including sex 
discrimination.'" However, the Funeral 
Home criticizes the EEOC for "cit[ing] a 
general, broadly formulated interest" to 
support enforcing Title VII in this 
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case. According to the Funeral Home, the 
relevant inquiry is whether the EEOC has a 
"specific interest in forcing [the Funeral 
Home] to allow its male funeral directors to 
wear the uniform for female funeral directors 
while on the job." The EEOC instead asks 
whether its interest in "eradicating 
employment discrimination" is furthered by 
ensuring that Stephens does not suffer 
discrimination (either on the basis of sex-
stereotyping or her transgender status), lose 
her livelihood, or face the emotional pain and 
suffering of being effectively told "that as a 
transgender woman she is not valued or able 
to make workplace contributions.” Stephens 
similarly argues that "Title VII serves a 
compelling interest in eradicating all the 
forms of invidious employment 
discrimination proscribed by the statute," and 
points to studies demonstrating that 
transgender people have experienced 
particularly high rates of "bodily harm, 
violence, and discrimination because of their 
transgender status."  
The Funeral Home's construction of the 
compelling-interest test is off-base. Rather 
than focusing on the EEOC's claim—that the 
Funeral Home terminated Stephens because 
of her proposed gender nonconforming 
behavior—the Funeral Home's test focuses 
instead on its defense (discussed above) that 
the Funeral Home merely wishes to enforce 
an appropriate workplace uniform. But the 
Funeral Home has not identified any cases 
where the government's compelling interest 
was framed as its interest in disturbing a 
company's workplace policies. For instance, 
in Hobby Lobby, the issue, which the Court 
ultimately declined to adjudicate, was 
whether the government's "interest in 
guaranteeing cost-free access to the four 
challenged contraceptive methods" was 
compelling—not whether the government 
had a compelling interest in requiring closely 
held organizations to act in a way that 
conflicted with their religious practice. 
The Supreme Court's analysis in cases like 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, and Holt guides our 
approach. In those cases, the Court ultimately 
determined that the interests generally served 
by a given government policy or statute 
would not be "compromised" by granting an 
exemption to a particular individual or group. 
Thus, in Yoder, the Court held that the 
interests furthered by the government's 
requirement of compulsory education for 
children through the age of sixteen (i.e., "to 
prepare citizens to participate effectively and 
intelligently in our open political system" and 
to "prepare[] individuals to be self-reliant and 
self-sufficient participants in society") were 
not harmed by granting an exemption to the 
Amish, who do not need to be prepared "for 
life in modern society" and whose own 
traditions adequately ensure self-sufficiency. 
Similarly, in Holt, the Court recognized that 
the Department of Corrections has a 
compelling interest in preventing prisoners 
from hiding contraband on their persons, 
which is generally effectuated by requiring 
prisoners to adhere to a strict grooming 
policy, but the Court failed to see how the 
Department's "compelling interest in 
staunching the flow of contraband into and 
within its facilities . . . would be seriously 
compromised by allowing an inmate to grow 
a 1/2-inch beard."  
Here, the same framework leads to the 
opposite conclusion. Failing to enforce Title 
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VII against the Funeral Home means the 
EEOC would be allowing a particular 
person—Stephens—to suffer discrimination, 
and such an outcome is directly contrary to 
the EEOC's compelling interest in combating 
discrimination in the workforce. In this 
regard, this case is analogous to Eternal 
Word, in which the Eleventh Circuit 
determined that the government had a 
compelling interest in requiring a particular 
nonprofit organization with religious 
objections to the Affordable Care Act's 
contraceptive mandate to follow the 
procedures associated with obtaining an 
accommodation to the Act because 
applying the accommodation 
procedure to the plaintiffs in these 
cases furthers [the government's] 
interests because the accommodation 
ensures that the plaintiffs' female plan 
participants and beneficiaries—who 
may or may not share the same 
religious beliefs as their employer—
have access to contraception without 
cost sharing or additional 
administrative burdens as the ACA 
requires. 
The Eternal Word court reasoned that 
"[u]nlike the exception made in Yoder for 
Amish children," who would be adequately 
prepared for adulthood even without 
compulsory education, the "poor health 
outcomes related to unintended or 
poorly timed pregnancies apply to the 
plaintiffs' female plan participants or 
beneficiaries and their children just as they do 
to the general population." Similarly, here, 
the EEOC's compelling interest in 
eradicating discrimination applies with as 
much force to Stephens as to any other 
employee discriminated against based on sex. 
It is true, of course, that the specific harms the 
EEOC identifies in this case, such as 
depriving Stephens of her livelihood and 
harming her sense of self-worth, are simply 
permutations of the generic harm that is 
always suffered in employment 
discrimination cases. But O Centro's "to the 
person" test does not mean that the 
government has a compelling interest in 
enforcing the laws only when the failure to 
enforce would lead to uniquely harmful 
consequences. Rather, the question is 
whether "the asserted harm of granting 
specific exemptions to particular religious 
claimants" is sufficiently great to require 
compliance with the law. Here, for the 
reasons stated above, the EEOC has 
adequately demonstrated that Stephens has 
and would suffer substantial harm if we 
exempted the Funeral Home from Title VII's 
requirements. 
Finally, we reject the Funeral Home's claim 
that it should receive an exemption, 
notwithstanding any harm to Stephens or the 
EEOC's interest in eradicating 
discrimination, because "the constitutional 
guarantee of free exercise[,] effectuated here 
via RFRA . . . [,] is a higher-order right that 
necessarily supersedes a conflicting statutory 
right." This point warrants little discussion. 
The Supreme Court has already determined 
that RFRA does not, in fact, "effectuate . . . 
the First Amendment's guarantee of free 
exercise," because it sweeps more broadly 
than the Constitution demands. And in any 
event, the Supreme Court has expressly 
recognized that compelling interests can, at 
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times, override religious beliefs—even those 
that are squarely protected by the Free 
Exercise Clause. We therefore decline to 
hoist automatically Rost's religious interests 
above other compelling governmental 
concerns. The undisputed record 
demonstrates that Stephens has been and 
would be harmed by the Funeral Home's 
discriminatory practices in this case, and the 
EEOC has a compelling interest in 
eradicating and remedying such 
discrimination. 
(b) Least Restrictive Means 
The final inquiry under RFRA is whether 
there exist "other means of achieving [the 
government's] desired goal without imposing 
a substantial burden on the exercise of 
religion by the objecting part[y]." "The least-
restrictive-means standard is exceptionally 
demanding," and the EEOC bears the burden 
of showing that burdening the Funeral 
Home's religious exercise constitutes the 
least restrictive means of furthering its 
compelling interests. Where an alternative 
option exists that furthers the government's 
interest "equally well," the government "must 
use it.” In conducting the least-restrictive-
alternative analysis, "courts must take 
adequate account of the burdens a requested 
accommodation may impose on 
nonbeneficiaries." Cost to the government 
may also be "an important factor in the least-
restrictive-means analysis."  
The district court found that requiring the 
Funeral Home to adopt a gender-neutral dress 
code would constitute a less restrictive 
alternative to enforcing Title VII in this case, 
and granted the Funeral Home summary 
judgment on this ground. According to the 
district court, the Funeral Home engaged in 
illegal sex stereotyping only with respect to 
"the clothing Stephens [c]ould wear at work," 
and therefore a gender-neutral dress code 
would resolve the case because Stephens 
would not be forced to dress in a way that 
conforms to Rost's conception of Stephens's 
sex and Rost would not be compelled to 
authorize Stephens to dress in a way that 
violates Rost's religious beliefs. 
Neither party endorses the district court's 
proposed alternative, and for good reason. 
The district court's suggestion, although 
appealing in its tidiness, is tenable only if we 
excise from the case evidence of sex 
stereotyping in areas other than attire. 
Though Rost does repeatedly say that he 
terminated Stephens because she "wanted 
to dress as a woman" and "would no 
longer dress as a man,” the record also 
contains uncontroverted evidence that Rost's 
reasons for terminating Stephens extended to 
other aspects of Stephens's intended 
presentation. For instance, Rost stated that he 
fired Stephens because Stephens "was no 
longer going to represent himself as a man," 
and Rost insisted that Stephens presenting as 
a female would disrupt clients' healing 
process because female clients would have to 
"share a bathroom with a man dressed up as 
a woman." The record thus compels the 
finding that Rost's concerns extended beyond 
Stephens's attire and reached Stephens's 
appearance and behavior more generally. 
At the summary-judgment stage, where a 
court may not "make credibility 
determinations, weigh the evidence, or draw 
[adverse] inferences from the facts," the 
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district court was required to account for the 
evidence of Rost's non-clothing-based sex 
stereotyping in determining whether a 
proposed less restrictive alternative furthered 
the government's "stated interests equally 
[as] well.” Here, as the evidence above 
shows, merely altering the Funeral Home's 
dress code would not address the 
discrimination Stephens faced because of her 
broader desire "to represent [her]self as a 
[wo]man." Indeed, the Funeral Home's 
counsel conceded at oral argument that Rost 
would have objected to Stephens's coming 
"to work presenting clearly as a woman and 
acting as a woman," regardless of whether 
Stephens wore a man's suit, because that 
"would contradict [Rost's] sincerely held 
religious beliefs."  
The Funeral Home's proposed alternative—
to "permit businesses to allow the 
enforcement of sex-specific dress codes for 
employees who are public-facing 
representatives of their employer, so long as 
the dress code imposes equal burdens on the 
sexes and does not affect employee dress 
outside of work," is equally flawed. The 
Funeral Home's suggestion would do nothing 
to advance the government's compelling 
interest in preventing and remedying 
discrimination against Stephens based on her 
refusal to conform at work to stereotypical 
notions of how biologically male persons 
should dress, appear, behave, and identify. 
Regardless of whether the EEOC has a 
compelling interest in combating sex-specific 
dress codes—a point that is not at issue in this 
case—the EEOC does have a compelling 
interest in ensuring that the Funeral Home 
does not discriminate against its employees 
on the basis of their sex. The Funeral Home's 
proposed alternative sidelines this interest 
entirely.  
The EEOC, Stephens, and several amici 
argue that searching for an alternative to Title 
VII is futile because enforcing Title VII is 
itself the least restrictive way to further 
EEOC's interest in eradicating discrimination 
based on sex stereotypes from the workplace. 
We agree. 
To start, the Supreme Court has previously 
acknowledged that "there may be instances in 
which a need for uniformity precludes the 
recognition of exceptions to generally 
applicable laws under RFRA." The Court 
highlighted Braunfeld v. Brown, as an 
example of a case where the "need for 
uniformity" trumped "claims for religious 
exemptions." In Braunfeld, the plurality 
"denied a claimed exception to Sunday 
closing laws, in part because . . . [t]he whole 
point of a 'uniform day of rest for all workers' 
would have been defeated by exceptions." 
Braunfeld thus serves as a particularly apt 
case to consider here, as it too concerned an 
attempt by an employer to seek an exemption 
that would elevate its religious practices 
above a government policy designed to 
benefit employees. If the government's 
interest in a "uniform day of rest for all 
workers" is sufficiently weighty to preclude 
exemptions, see O Centro, then surely the 
government's interest in uniformly 
eradicating discrimination against employees 
exerts just as much force. 
The Court seemingly recognized Title VII's 
ability to override RFRA in Hobby Lobby, as 
the majority opinion stated that its decision 
should not be read as providing a "shield" to 
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those who seek to "cloak[] as religious 
practice" their efforts to engage in 
"discrimination in hiring, for example on the 
basis of race." As the Hobby Lobby Court 
explained, "[t]he Government has a 
compelling interest in providing an equal 
opportunity to participate in the workforce 
without regard to race, and prohibitions on 
racial discrimination are precisely tailored to 
achieve that critical goal." We understand 
this to mean that enforcement actions brought 
under Title VII, which aims to "provid[e] an 
equal opportunity to participate in the 
workforce without regard to race" and an 
array of other protected traits, will 
necessarily defeat RFRA defenses to 
discrimination made illegal by Title VII. The 
district court reached the opposite 
conclusion, reasoning that Hobby Lobby did 
not suggest that "a RFRA defense can never 
prevail as a defense to Title VII" because "[i]f 
that were the case, the majority would 
presumably have said so." But the majority 
did say that anti-discrimination laws are 
"precisely tailored" to achieving the 
government's "compelling interest in 
providing an equal opportunity to participate 
in the workforce" without facing 
discrimination.  
As Stephens notes, at least two district-level 
federal courts have also concluded that Title 
VII constitutes the least restrictive means for 
eradicating discrimination in the workforce.  
We also find meaningful Congress's decision 
not to include exemptions within Title VII to 
the prohibition on sex-based discrimination. 
As both the Supreme Court and other circuits 
have recognized, "[t]he very existence of a 
government-sanctioned exception to a 
regulatory scheme that is purported to be the 
least restrictive means can, in fact, 
demonstrate that other, less-restrictive 
alternatives could exist." Indeed, a driving 
force in the Hobby Lobby Court's 
determination that the government had failed 
the least-restrictive-means test was the fact 
that the Affordable Care Act, which the 
government sought to enforce in that case 
against a closely held organization, "already 
established an accommodation for nonprofit 
organizations with religious objections." 
Title VII, by contrast, does not contemplate 
any exemptions for discrimination on the 
basis of sex. Sex may be taken into account 
only if a person's sex "is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of [a] 
particular business or enterprise,"—and in 
that case, the preference is no longer 
discriminatory in a malicious sense. Where 
the government has developed a 
comprehensive scheme to effectuate its goal 
of eradicating discrimination based on sex, 
including sex stereotypes, it makes sense that 
the only way to achieve the scheme's 
objectives is through its enforcement. 
State courts' treatment of RFRA-like 
challenges to their own antidiscrimination 
laws is also telling. In several instances, state 
courts have concluded that their respective 
antidiscrimination laws survive strict 
scrutiny, such that religious claimants are not 
entitled to exemptions to enforcement of the 
state prohibitions on discrimination with 
regard to housing, employment, medical 
care, and education. These holdings support 
the notion that antidiscrimination laws allow 
for fewer exceptions than other generally 
applicable laws. 
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As a final point, we reject the Funeral Home's 
suggestion that enforcing Title VII in this 
case would undermine, rather than advance, 
the EEOC's interest in combating sex 
stereotypes. According to the Funeral Home, 
the EEOC's requested relief reinforces sex 
stereotypes because the agency essentially 
asks that Stephens "be able to dress in a 
stereotypical feminine manner." This 
argument misses the mark. Nothing in Title 
VII or this court's jurisprudence requires 
employees to reject their employer's 
stereotypical notions of masculinity or 
femininity; rather, employees simply may not 
be discriminated against for a failure to 
conform. Title VII protects both the right of 
male employees "to c[o]me to work with 
makeup or lipstick on [their] face[s]," and the 
right of female employees to refuse to "wear 
dresses or makeup," without any internal 
contradiction. 
In short, the district court erred in finding that 
EEOC had failed to adopt the least restrictive 
means of furthering its compelling interest in 
eradicating discrimination in the workplace. 
Thus, even if we agreed with the Funeral 
Home that Rost's religious exercise would be 
substantially burdened by enforcing Title VII 
in this case, we would nevertheless 
REVERSE the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to the Funeral Home and 
hold instead that requiring the Funeral Home 
to comply with Title VII constitutes the least 
restrictive means of furthering the 
government's compelling interest in 
eradicating discrimination against Stephens 
on the basis of sex. Thus, even assuming 
Rost's religious exercise is substantially 
burdened by the EEOC's enforcement action 
in this case, we GRANT summary judgment 
to the EEOC on the Funeral Home's RFRA 
defense on this alternative ground. 
C. Clothing-Benefit Discrimination Claim 
The district court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Funeral Home on the 
EEOC's discriminatory clothing-allowance 
claim. We long ago held that the scope of the 
complaint the EEOC may file in federal court 
in its efforts to enforce Title VII is "limited to 
the scope of the EEOC investigation 
reasonably expected to grow out of the 
charge of discrimination." The EEOC now 
urges us to hold that Bailey is incompatible 
with subsequent Supreme Court precedent 
and therefore no longer binding on this 
court. Because we believe that the EEOC 
may properly bring a clothing-allowance 
claim under Bailey, we need not decide 
whether Bailey has been rendered obsolete. 
In Bailey, a white female employee charged 
that her employer failed to promote her on 
account of her sex, generally failed to 
promote women because of their sex, failed 
to pay equally qualified women as well as 
men, and failed to recruit and hire black 
women because of their race. While 
investigating these claims, the EEOC found 
there was no evidence to support the 
complainant's charges of sex discrimination, 
but there was reasonable cause to believe the 
company had racially discriminatory hiring 
and promotion practices. In addition, the 
EEOC learned that the employer had 
seemingly refused to hire one applicant on 
the basis of his religion. After failed efforts at 
conciliation, the EEOC initiated a lawsuit 
against the employer alleging both racial and 
religious discrimination. We held that the 
 562 
EEOC lacked authority to bring an 
enforcement action regarding alleged 
religious discrimination because "[t]he 
portion of the EEOC's complaint 
incorporating allegations of religious 
discrimination exceeded the scope of the 
EEOC investigation of [the defendant 
employer] reasonably expected to grow out 
of [the original] charge of sex and race 
discrimination."  We determined, however, 
that the EEOC was authorized to bring race 
discrimination claims against the employer 
because the original charge alleged racial 
discrimination against black applicants and 
employees and the charging party—a white 
woman—had standing under Title VII to file 
such a charge with the EEOC because she 
"may have suffered from the loss of benefits 
from the lack of association with racial 
minorities at work."  
As we explained in Bailey, the EEOC may 
sue for matters beyond those raised directly 
in the EEOC's administrative charge for two 
reasons. First, limiting the EEOC complaint 
to the precise grounds listed in the charge of 
discrimination would undercut Title VII's 
"effective functioning" because laypersons 
"who are unfamiliar with the niceties of 
pleading and are acting without the assistance 
of counsel" submit the original charge. 
Second, an initial charge of discrimination 
does not trigger a lawsuit; it instead triggers 
an EEOC investigation. The matter evolves 
into a lawsuit only if the EEOC is unable "to 
obtain voluntary compliance with the law. . . 
. Thus it is obvious that the civil action is 
much more intimately related to the EEOC 
investigation than to the words of the charge 
which originally triggered the investigation." 
At the same time, however, we concluded 
in Bailey that allowing the EEOC to sue for 
matters beyond those reasonably expected to 
arise from the original charge would 
undermine Title VII's enforcement process. 
In particular, we understood that an original 
charge provided an employer with "notice of 
the allegation, an opportunity to participate in 
a complete investigation of such allegation, 
and an opportunity to participate in 
meaningful conciliation discussions should 
reasonable cause be found following the 
EEOC investigation." We believed that the 
full investigatory process would be short-
circuited, and the conciliation process 
thereby threatened, if the EEOC did not file a 
separate charge and undertake a separate 
investigation when facts are learned 
suggesting an employer may have engaged in 
"discrimination of a type other than that 
raised by the individual party's charge and 
unrelated to the individual party. 
The EEOC now insists that Bailey is no 
longer good law after the Supreme Court's 
decision in General Telephone Company of 
the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC. In General 
Telephone, the Supreme Court held that Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which governs class actions, does not apply 
to enforcement actions initiated by the 
EEOC. As part of its reasoning, the Court 
found that various requirements of Rule 23—
such as the requirement that "the claims or 
defenses of the representative parties [must 
be] typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class," FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3)—are 
incompatible with the EEOC's enforcement 
responsibilities under Title VII: 
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The typicality requirement is said to 
limit the class claims to those fairly 
encompassed by the named plaintiff's 
claims. If Rule 23were applicable to 
EEOC enforcement actions, it would 
seem that the Title VII counterpart to 
the Rule 23 named plaintiff would be 
the charging party, with the EEOC 
serving in the charging party's stead 
as the representative of the class. Yet 
the Courts of Appeals have held that 
EEOC enforcement actions are not 
limited to the claims presented by the 
charging parties. Any violations that 
the EEOC ascertains in the course of 
a reasonable investigation of the 
charging party's complaint are 
actionable. The latter approach is far 
more consistent with the EEOC's role 
in the enforcement of Title VII than is 
imposing the strictures of Rule 23, 
which would limit the EEOC action 
to claims typified by those of the 
charging party. 
The EEOC argues that this passage directly 
contradicts the holding in Bailey, in which 
we rejected the EEOC's argument that it "can 
investigate evidence of any other 
discrimination called to its attention during 
the course of an investigation."  
Though there may be merit to the EEOC's 
argument, we need not resolve Bailey's 
compatibility with General Telephone at this 
time because our holding in Bailey does not 
preclude the EEOC from bringing a clothing-
allowance-discrimination claim in this case. 
First, the present case is factually 
distinguishable from Bailey. In Bailey, the 
court determined that allegations of religious 
discrimination were outside the scope of an 
investigation "reasonably related" to the 
original charge of sex and race discrimination 
because, in part, "[t]he evidence presented at 
trial by the EEOC to support its allegations of 
religious discrimination did not involve 
practices affecting [the original charger]." 
Here, by contrast, Stephens would have been 
directly affected by the Funeral Home's 
allegedly discriminatory clothing-allowance 
policy had she not been terminated, as the 
Funeral Home's current practice indicates 
that she would have received either no 
clothing allowance or a less valuable clothing 
allowance once she began working at the 
Funeral Home as a woman. And, unlike the 
EEOC's investigation of religious 
discrimination in Bailey, the EEOC's 
investigation into the Funeral Home's 
discriminatory clothing-allowance policy 
concerns precisely the same type of 
discrimination—discrimination on the basis 
of sex—that Stephens raised in her initial 
charge. 
Second, we have developed a broad 
conception of the sorts of claims that can be 
"reasonably expected to grow out of the 
initial charge of discrimination." As we 
explained in Davis v. Sodexho, "where facts 
related with respect to the charged claim 
would prompt the EEOC to investigate a 
different, uncharged claim, the plaintiff is not 
precluded from bringing suit on that 
claim." And we have also cautioned that 
"EEOC charges must be liberally construed 
to determine whether . . . there was 
information given in the charge that 
reasonably should have prompted an EEOC 
investigation of [a] separate type of 
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discrimination." Here, Stephens alleged that 
she was fired after she shared her intention to 
present and dress as a woman because the 
Funeral Home "management [told her that it] 
did not believe the public would be accepting 
of [her] transition" from male to female. It 
was reasonable to expect, in light of this 
allegation, that the EEOC would investigate 
the Funeral Home's employee-appearance 
requirements and expectations, would learn 
about the Funeral Home's sex-specific dress 
code, and would thereby uncover the Funeral 
Home's seemingly discriminatory clothing-
allowance policy. As much is clear from our 
decision in Farmer v. ARA Services, Inc, in 
which "we held that the plaintiffs could bring 
equal pay claims alleging that their union 
discriminated in negotiating pay scales for 
different job designations, despite the fact 
that the plaintiffs' EEOC charge alleged only 
that the union failed to represent them in 
securing the higher paying job designations." 
As we recognized then, underlying the 
Farmer plaintiffs' claim was an implicit 
allegation that the plaintiffs were as qualified 
and responsible as the higher-paid 
employees, and this fact "could reasonably be 
expected to lead the EEOC to investigate why 
different job designations that required the 
same qualifications and responsibilities used 
disparate pay scales." By the same token, 
Stephens's claim that she was fired because 
of her planned change in appearance and 
presentation contains an implicit allegation 
that the Funeral Home requires its male and 
female employees to look a particular way, 
and this fact could (and did) reasonably 
prompt the EEOC to investigate whether 
these appearance requirements imposed 
unequal burdens—in this case, fiscal 
burdens—on its male and female employees. 
We therefore REVERSE the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to the Funeral 
Home on the EEOC's discriminatory-
clothing-allowance claim and REMAND 
with instructions to consider the merits of the 
EEOC's claim. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Discrimination against employees, either 
because of their failure to conform to sex 
stereotypes or their transgender and 
transitioning status, is illegal under Title VII. 
The unrefuted facts show that the Funeral 
Home fired Stephens because she refused to 
abide by her employer's stereotypical 
conception of her sex, and therefore the 
EEOC is entitled to summary judgment as to 
its unlawful-termination claim. RFRA 
provides the Funeral Home with no relief 
because continuing to employ Stephens 
would not, as a matter of law, substantially 
burden Rost's religious exercise, and even if 
it did, the EEOC has shown that enforcing 
Title VII here is the least restrictive means of 
furthering its compelling interest in 
combating and eradicating sex 
discrimination. We therefore REVERSE the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the Funeral Home and GRANT 
summary judgment to the EEOC on its 
unlawful-termination claim. We also 
REVERSE the district court's grant of 
summary judgment on the EEOC's 
discriminatory-clothing-allowance claim, as 
the district court erred in failing to consider 
the EEOC's claim on the merits. 
We REMAND this case to the district court 
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“Supreme Court to Decide Whether Landmark Civil Rights Law Applies to Gay 
and Transgender Workers”  
 
 




April 22, 2019  
 
The Supreme Court announced on Monday 
that it would decide whether the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 guarantees protections from 
workplace discrimination to gay and 
transgender people in three cases expected to 
provide the first indication of how the court’s 
new conservative majority will approach 
L.G.B.T. rights. 
The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission has said the 1964 act does 
guarantee the protections. But the Trump 
administration has taken the opposite 
position, saying that the landmark legislation 
that outlawed discrimination based on race, 
religion, national origin and, notably, sex, 
cannot fairly be read to apply to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation or 
transgender status. 
The three cases the court accepted are the first 
concerning L.G.B.T. rights since 
the retirement last summer of Justice 
Anthony M. Kennedy, a champion of gay 
rights. His replacement by the more 
conservative Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh 
could shift the court’s approach to cases 
concerning gay men, lesbians and 
transgender people. 
Most federal appeals courts have interpreted 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to exclude 
sexual orientation discrimination. But two of 
them, in New York and Chicago, recently 
issued decisions ruling that discrimination 
against gay men and lesbians is a form of sex 
discrimination. 
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case 
from New York, Altitude Express Inc. v. 
Zarda, No. 17-1623, along with one from 
Georgia that came to the opposite 
conclusion, Bostock v. Clayton County, Ga., 
No. 17-1618. 
The New York case was brought by a 
skydiving instructor, Donald Zarda, who said 
he was fired because he was gay. His 
dismissal followed a complaint from a female 
customer who had voiced concerns about 
being tightly strapped to Mr. Zarda during a 
tandem dive. Mr. Zarda, hoping to reassure 
the customer, told her that he was “100 
percent gay.” 
Mr. Zarda sued under Title VII and lost the 
initial rounds. He died in a 2014 skydiving 
accident, and his estate pursued his case. 
Last year, a divided 13-judge panel of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit allowed the lawsuit to 
proceed. Writing for the majority, Chief 
Judge Robert A. Katzmann concluded 
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that “sexual orientation discrimination is 
motivated, at least in part, by sex and is thus 
a subset of sex discrimination.” 
In dissent, Judge Gerard E. Lynch wrote that 
the words of Title VII did not support the 
majority’s interpretation. 
“Speaking solely as a citizen,” he wrote, “I 
would be delighted to awake one morning 
and learn that Congress had just passed 
legislation adding sexual orientation to the 
list of grounds of employment discrimination 
prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. I am confident that one day — 
and I hope that day comes soon — I will have 
that pleasure.” 
“I would be equally pleased to awake to learn 
that Congress had secretly passed such 
legislation more than a half-century ago — 
until I actually woke up and realized that I 
must have been still asleep and dreaming,” 
Judge Lynch wrote. “Because we all know 
that Congress did no such thing.” 
The arguments in the Second Circuit had a 
curious feature: Lawyers for the federal 
government appeared on both sides. One 
lawyer, representing the E.E.O.C., said Title 
VII barred discrimination against gay people. 
Another, representing the Trump 
administration, took the contrary view. 
The Georgia case was brought by a child 
welfare services coordinator who said he was 
fired for being gay. The 11th Circuit, in 
Atlanta, ruled against him in a short, 
unsigned opinion that cited a 1979 
decision that had ruled that “discharge for 
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title 
VII.” 
The justices also agreed to decide the 
separate question of whether Title VII bars 
discrimination against transgender people. 
The case, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes 
v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, No. 18-107, concerns Aimee 
Stephens, who was fired from a Michigan 
funeral home after she announced in 2013 
that she was a transgender woman and would 
start working in women’s clothing. 
“What I must tell you is very difficult for me 
and is taking all the courage I can muster,” 
she wrote to her colleagues. “I have felt 
imprisoned in a body that does not match my 
mind, and this has caused me great despair 
and loneliness.” 
Ms. Stephens had worked at the funeral home 
for six years. Her colleagues testified that she 
was able and compassionate. 
Two weeks after receiving the letter, the 
home’s owner, Thomas Rost, fired Ms. 
Stephens. Asked for the “specific reason that 
you terminated Stephens,” Mr. Rost said: 
“Well, because he was no longer going to 
represent himself as a man. He wanted to 
dress as a woman.” 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati, ruled for Ms. 
Stephens. Discrimination against transgender 
people, the court said, was barred by Title 
VII. 
“It is analytically impossible to fire an 
employee based on that employee’s status as 
a transgender person without being 
motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s 
sex,” the court said, adding, “Discrimination 
‘because of sex’ inherently includes 
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discrimination against employees because of 
a change in their sex.” 
John J. Bursch, a lawyer with Alliance 
Defending Freedom, which represents the 
funeral home, said the appeals court had 
impermissibly revised the federal law. 
“Neither government agencies nor the courts 
have authority to rewrite federal law by 
replacing ‘sex’ with ‘gender identity’ — a 
change with widespread consequences for 
everyone,” Mr. Bursch said in a statement. 
“The funeral home wants to serve families 
mourning the loss of a loved one, but the 
E.E.O.C. has elevated its political goals 
above the interests of the grieving people that 
the funeral home serves.” 
James D. Esseks, a lawyer with the American 
Civil Liberties Union, which represents Ms. 
Stephens and Mr. Zarda’s estate, said the 
cases concern elementary principles of 
fairness. 
“Most of America would be shocked if the 
Supreme Court said it was legal to fire Aimee 
because she’s transgender or Don because he 
is gay,” Mr. Esseks said in a statement. “Such 
a ruling would be disastrous, relegating 
L.G.B.T.Q. people around the country to a 
second-class citizen status.” 
There is a second issue in Ms. Stephens’s 
case, one that could allow her to win however 
the Supreme Court might rule on whether 
Title VII applies to discrimination against 
transgender people. In 1989, the court 
said discrimination against workers because 
they did not conform to gender stereotypes 
was a form of sex discrimination. 
The Sixth Circuit ruled for Ms. Stephens on 
that ground, too, saying she had been fired 
“for wishing to appear or behave in a manner 
that contradicts the funeral home’s 
perception of how she should behave or 
appear based on her sex.” 
All three cases present the question of how 
courts should interpret statutes whose 
drafters might not have contemplated the 
sweep of the language they wrote. 
In January, in a minor arbitration case, 
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch wrote that courts 
should ordinarily interpret statutes as they 
were understood at the time of their 
enactment. In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg said that was not 
always so. 
“Congress,” she wrote, “may design 
legislation to govern changing times and 
circumstances.” Quoting from an earlier 
decision, she added: “Words in statutes can 
enlarge or contract their scope as other 
changes, in law or in the world, require their 
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The Trump administration’s Department 
of Justice is asking the Supreme Court to 
set a legal precedent that would enable 
employers to fire employees because they 
are transgender. 
The Department of Justice has submitted 
a brief to the Court Friday asking the 
Justices to rule that Title VII, a federal 
law that prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex, race, 
color, religion or national origin, does not 
protect transgender people. The 
department argued that they should throw 
out a lower court ruling that found that a 
funeral home that fired a transgender 
woman had discriminated against her. 
The brief concerns R.G. & G.R. Harris 
Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, one of three 
cases that the Supreme Court agreed to 
hear earlier this year that concern whether 
Title VII can be applied to LGBTQ 
workers. 
In the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the 6th Circuit found that the owner of the 
funeral home, Thomas Rost, had violated 
the law when he fired Aimee Stephens, a 
transgender woman who worked for the 
company from 2007 to 2013. According 
to court documents, Stephens sent the 
company a letter in 2013 that said she 
struggled with a “gender identity 
disorder” and planned to begin to live as 
a woman, including by wearing the 
company’s female uniform – a jacket and 
skirt – instead of a suit and tie. 
The company argued that Stephens was 
fired because she refused to wear the 
company’s dress code and argued that 
“[m]aintaining a professional dress code 
that is not distracting to grieving families 
is an essential industry requirement that 
furthers their healing process.” 
In its brief, the Department of Justice has 
argued in favor of the funeral home, 
arguing that Title VII only protects what 
it defines as “biological sex.” 
“In 1964 [when Title VII was enacted], 
the ordinary public meaning of ‘sex’ was 
biological sex. It did not encompass 
transgender status,” the DOJ writes, 
clarifying, “In the particular context of 
Title VII—legislation originally designed 
to eliminate employment discrimination 
against racial and other minorities—it 
was especially clear that the prohibition 
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on discrimination because of “sex” 
referred to unequal treatment of men and 
women in the workplace.” 
Chase Strangio, an American Civil 
Liberties Union attorney representing 
Stephens, told HuffPo that the case could 
weaken Title VII protections both for 
transgender people and other groups. 
“People don’t realize that the stakes are 
extending not just the trans and LGB 
communities, but every person who 
departs from sex stereotypes: Women 
who want to wear pants in the workplace, 
men who want more childbearing 



































March 8, 2018 
 
The Sixth Circuit’s groundbreaking decision 
Wednesday that a funeral home owner’s 
religious beliefs didn't shield him from a  
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission suit claiming he illegally fired a 
transgender employee serves as a clear 
warning to employers that the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act is a questionable 
tool to defend against trans discrimination 
suits, experts say.  
In its ruling, the Sixth Circuit held that R.G. 
& G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. violated 
Title VII by firing funeral director Aimee 
Stephens after she informed owner Thomas 
Rost that she was transitioning from male to 
female and wanted to dress in women’s 
clothing at work.  
The panel also determined that Rost wasn't 
entitled to a defense under RFRA, a 1993 
federal law that blocks the government from 
enforcing a religiously neutral law that 
“substantially burdens” people’s “religious 
exercise” unless that law is the least 
restrictive way to further a compelling 
government interest, which in this case was 
the EEOC’s interest in enforcing anti-
discrimination laws.  
Lynly Egyes, litigation director at the 
Transgender Law Center, said Wednesday 
that the advocacy group is “thrilled” with the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision since it affirms that 
transgender people are protected under Title 
VII.  
“One of the things that’s also important about 
the Sixth Circuit’s case is that it also states 
that people can’t be fired under the facade of 
religious liberty,” Egyes said. “Title VII is 
very clear and the court’s decision was 
incredibly clear about people not being able 
to use religious liberty as a reason for firing 
transgender people.”  
Denise M. Visconti of management-side firm 
Littler Mendelson PC said the Sixth Circuit 
took a similar position on the RFRA aspect of 
the decision, saying it “certainly does draw 
some lines” around the ability of employers 
to use the statute as a defense.  
Under the ruling, Visconti said that simply 
employing someone who is transgender 
places no burden on someone’s religious 
exercise, and that even if such a burden did 
exist the elimination of discrimination is a 
compelling interest which would override a 
RFRA defense.  
“I think given that the court covered both 
prongs, certainly within the Sixth Circuit, it 
places a very substantial limitation on 
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employers being able to utilize an RFRA 
defense or, more importantly, using RFRA as 
essentially a sword to justify discrimination,” 
Visconti said. “I think this case certainly is a 
pretty clear road map suggesting to 
employers that this might not be a viable 
defense.”  
The ruling by the Sixth Circuit overturned a 
portion of U.S. District Judge Sean F. Cox’s 
2016 ruling that the EEOC’s enforcement 
action burdened Rost’s free exercise of 
religion and that Title VII’s bar on 
discrimination based on sex, which the 
EEOC had argued let Stephens act and dress 
like a woman, was not the least restrictive 
means of protecting her rights. The lower 
court suggested that the EEOC could have 
achieved its goals by proposing that the 
funeral home adopt a gender-neutral dress 
code.  
But far from being too restrictive of Rost's 
rights, Title VII’s requirement that he tolerate 
Stephens’ gender identity didn’t 
“substantially” burden his religious beliefs, 
the Sixth Circuit said, rejecting Rost’s 
argument that letting Stephens wear women’s 
clothing would “create distractions” for the 
funeral home’s customers “and thereby 
hinder their healing process,” and that 
making Rost tolerate her transition would 
push him to leave the funeral industry and 
“end his ministry to grieving people.”  
Instead, the Sixth Circuit in part said that an 
individual asserting the RFRA defense can’t 
rely on customers’ presumed biases to 
establish a substantial burden under RFRA, 
and that “tolerating Stephens’ understanding 
of her sex and gender identity is not 
tantamount to supporting it.”  
Jackson Lewis PC principal Michelle 
Phillips, whose practice focuses heavily on 
LGBT issues, said the Rost family in this case 
was too intractable toward Stephens and 
failed to even consider affording her an 
accommodation. Rost’s firing of Stephens, 
Phillips said, was “basically blatant 
discrimination” and “on its face 
problematic.”  
“This is an important case because you have 
to strike a balance as an employer whether 
it’s your own personal religious beliefs or the 
religious beliefs of others and you still have 
to come to some sort of an accommodation,” 
Phillips said. “So, the rigidity of the employer 
in this case to me was one of the most 
important messages. You cannot have knee-
jerk reactions and have to engage in the 
process of accommodation in good faith.”  
David Lopez of Outten & Golden LLP — the 
EEOC’s general counsel when the case was 
filed in 2014 as one of the agency’s first two 
lawsuits accusing an employer of sex 
discrimination against a transgender 
individual — said he was pleased with the 
decision and that the Sixth Circuit got it right.  
“This is the latest in a series of 
groundbreaking decisions recognizing that 
Title VII’s prohibitions on discrimination 
because of sex covers the LGBT community 
— in this case gender identity,” Lopez said. 
“The RFRA part obviously was important 
because ... it was a new defense that was 
asserted in the context of this case that 
thankfully the Sixth Circuit rejected.”  
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Phillips noted, however, that RFRA is likely 
to come up again in other cases before other 
circuits, and that the more recent judicial 
appointments by the Trump administration 
may serve as “a more receptive audience” for 
those religious liberty arguments.  
“There is a movement of certain religious-
based organizations that are going to 
continue using this ground, whether it’s 
upheld or not, at every opportunity they can 
as an insidious way to try and impact the 
law,” Phillips said.  
But as to the broader implications of the case 
beyond the RFRA element, Phillips said its 
initial filing by the EEOC was “a clear signal 
... that protection for transgender and gender 
nonconforming individuals are per se sex 
discrimination because they relate to 
preconceived notions of how men and 
women are expected to act in the workplace.”  
Phillips pointed out that they filed the suit in 
a jurisdiction where there was no protection 
under state law for gender identity, noting 
that only 19 states plus Washington, D.C., 
grant such protection.  
Fred Sultan of Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP 
said that while the RFRA portion of the Sixth 
Circuit’s ruling likely won’t have much 
impact for most employers since the statute 
won’t apply to them, the ruling still sends a 
strong message that all companies should be 
paying close attention to  
transgender rights in the workplace since the 
EEOC will enforce them.  
“It reminds employers that they need to be 
training employees and supervisors to avoid 
discrimination based on sex stereotyping, and 
that includes gender identity,” Sultan said.  
As far as whether other circuit courts will 
adopt a similar precedent to the Sixth Circuit 
that Title VII protects against bias based on 
transgender status, Sarah Riskin of Nilan 
Johnson Lewis PA said “that is certainly the 
trend.”  
Riskin pointed out that the Second Circuit 
last week ruled that sexual orientation is 
protected under Title VII in a case known as 
Zarda, making it “two cases from two circuits 
that are favorable — on a broad scale — to 
LGBT plaintiffs, in only a few weeks' time.”  
“It used to be that gender-identity claims 
could only be pursued as a sex-stereotyping 
claim, if at all,” Riskin said. “That trend has 
been shifting, though, and yesterday's 
decision is one more step towards a per se 
gender-identity discrimination claim in other 
circuits."  
The case is EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris 
Funeral Homes Inc., case number 16-2424, in 













Danielle Nichole Smith 
 
November 6, 2018   
 
The funeral home asking the U.S. Supreme 
Court to overturn a Sixth Circuit ruling that 
federal law protects transgender workers 
from discrimination told the high court on 
Tuesday that the U.S. Department of Justice's 
recent brief adopting its stance showed that 
the case should be reviewed and reversed.  
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. said 
in its reply brief that the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, 
which is represented by the Justice 
Department in the case, acknowledged that 
the Sixth Circuit wrongly held that the 
funeral home flouted Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act and high court precedent when it 
fired Aimee Stephens, who the business said 
violated its sex-specific dress code.  
However, the funeral home departed from the 
agency by arguing that the justices should 
consider the case regardless of whether they 
granted two petitions for certiorari on the 
related question of whether Title VII 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.  
The Justice Department said in its October 
brief that Title VII’s ban on bias “because of 
... sex” doesn’t cover gender identity, as the 
Sixth Circuit ruled, because Congress didn’t 
intend to protect transgender workers when it 
passed the 1964 statute. Additionally, the 
Sixth Circuit wrongly found that the funeral 
home’s dress code enforcement was a form 
of sex-stereotyping prohibited by the high 
court’s 1989 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
ruling, the agency said, since there weren't 
different burdens imposed on male and 
female workers.The Department of Justice's 
brief reversed the EEOC's earlier stance at the 
Sixth Circuit.  
Still, even though the U.S. disagreed with the 
Sixth Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court 
shouldn’t consider the funeral home’s case if 
it denies the two cert petitions concerning 
sexual orientation discrimination in Altitude 
Express Inc. v. Zarda and Bostock v. Clayton 
County, the agency said. The question in 
those cases implicated a “much deeper and 
more entrenched circuit conflict” while the 
question in the funeral home’s appeal had 
been less addressed by the circuits, the 
agency contended.  
But the funeral home disagreed Tuesday, 
saying that the Sixth Circuit fundamentally 
changed Title VII by saying that “sex” in 
itself was a stereotype and by replacing “sex” 
with “gender identity." And there shouldn’t 
be a circuit split on an important component 
of federal employment law, the funeral home 
said.  
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“The EEOC now admits that the 
interpretations of Title VII and Price 
Waterhouse that it persuaded the Sixth 
Circuit to adopt below are wrong as a matter 
of law, present important and recurring 
questions, and conflict with the law of other 
circuits,” the funeral home said. “That alone 
warrants this court’s review and reversal.”  
The funeral home also addressed Stephens’ 
arguments urging the Supreme Court to deny 
its writ petition. Stephens had asserted that 
the Supreme Court didn’t need to hear the 
funeral home’s appeal over whether 
transgender status is protected under Title 
VII since the judgment in her favor was 
supported enough by the Sixth Circuit’s 
findings regarding sex-stereotypes under 
Price Waterhouse.  
Stephens also said that the funeral home 
wrongly asked the court to consider in its 
petition whether the Price Waterhouse ruling 
kept employers from applying sex-specific 
policies to its employees on the basis of sex 
rather than gender identity. That question 
hadn’t been decided by the appeals court and 
she had been fired for more than just her 
intention not to comply with the funeral 
home’s dress code, Stephens said.  
The case wasn’t the “right vehicle” for 
addressing any of the questions in the funeral 
home’s petition, Stephens argued.  
But Harris Funeral Homes contended on 
Tuesday that the Sixth Circuit had focused on 
whether the funeral home could make 
Stephens dress based on its notion of her sex, 
getting at the very question the funeral home 
raised in its petition. Stephens also wrongly 
argued that the funeral home engaged sex-
stereotypes since reproduction-related 
physical differences aren’t gender- based 
stereotypes, Harris Funeral Homes said, 
citing a court opinion.  
And the Sixth Circuit had viewed the issues 
of transgender discrimination and sex-
stereotyping under Title VII as “inextricably 
intertwined,” the funeral home said.  
The funeral home also argued that Stephens 
downplayed the circuit split regarding the 
issue, saying that the split “implicates at least 
five circuits and 40 years of jurisprudence” 
and required the attention of the Supreme 
Court.  
Counsel and representatives for the parties 
didn’t respond Tuesday to requests for 
comment.  
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes is 
represented by Kristen K. Waggoner, David 
A. Cortman, Gary S. Mccaleb, James A. 
Campbell, Jeana Hallock and John J. Bursch 
of the Alliance Defending Freedom.  
The federal government is represented by 
Noel Francisco, Joseph Hunt, John Gore, Eric 
Treene, Charles Scarborough and Stephanie 
Marcus of the Department of Justice.  
Stephens is represented by David Cole, Jay 
Kaplan, Daniel Korobkin, Michael Steinberg, 
John Knight, Gabriel Arkles, James Esseks 
and Louise Melling of the American Civil 
Liberties Union.  
The case is R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral 
Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment 
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Opportunity Commission et al., case number 


















































Lorelei Laird  
 
October 26, 2018   
 
When Aimee Stephens was fired from a 
Michigan funeral home, the federal Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission took 
up her case, arguing that her employer could 
not legally fire her for transitioning from 
living publicly as a man to living as a woman. 
But when R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Home 
v. EEOC landed at the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the Office of the Solicitor General argued the 
opposite—that no federal law forbids 
employers from firing employees solely for 
being transgender. In a brief filed October 24, 
the office argued that the federal prohibition 
of sex discrimination does not apply to 
discrimination based on gender identity. No 
lawyers from the EEOC put their names on 
the brief, the National Law Journal noted; 
Stephens is represented by the ACLU. 
Although it’s unusual for one federal agency 
to oppose another, the solicitor general’s 
position is consistent with positions taken by 
the Justice Department under Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions. The DOJ had 
previously supported the EEOC’s position, 
but in 2017, Sessions released a 
memo arguing that Title VII does not protect 
workers from discrimination based on gender 
identity. That memo came months after DOJ 
argued before the New York-based 2nd U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals that Title VII also 
doesn’t apply to discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. 
In that case, Zarda v. Altitude Express, the 
2nd Circuit ultimately ruled in favor of the 
plaintiff, a skydiving teacher who was fired 
after a customer complained that he was gay. 
That created a split with the 11th Circuit, 
which ruled that Title VIII did not protect a 
plaintiff who was fired for revealing his 
sexuality, in Bostock v. Clayton County 
Board of Commissioners. Both cases are 
pending before the Supreme Court. In the 
brief on Stephens’s case, Solicitor General 
Noel Francisco argues that the Court should 
wait to take it up until a ruling 
in Zarda, Bostock or both. If it denies review 
in the other cases, the government argues that 
it should also deny review in this case. 
ACLU attorney John Knight, representing 
Stephens, asked the court to deny review 
now, the National Law Journal says. His brief 
notes that the Supreme Court has already 
ruled that Title VII prohibits sex 
stereotyping, an issue in this case. 
Stephens was hired at the funeral home when 
living as a man, but told her employer in 2013 
that she intended to have sex reassignment 
surgery and live as a woman. After a 
vacation, she told her employer, she would 
return as a woman and dress according to the 
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home’s dress code for women. Owner 
Thomas Rost fired Stephens. The DOJ’s brief 
says Rost is a Christian who sincerely 
believes God commands people to adhere to 
their biological sexes. The district court 
ultimately ruled for the funeral home under 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; the 
6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
finding Title VII applied and RFRA did not 
offer an exemption. 
Former ABA President Linda Klein issued a 
press release in 2017 expressing 
disappointment in DOJ’s new position, as 







































Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African-American Owned Media 
 
Ruling Below: Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned Media v. Comcast Corp., 914 F.3d 1261 
(9th Cir. 2018).  
 
Overview: Comcast expressed interest in Entertainment Studios’ programming and later reversed 
its position and gave network time to a lesser-known network. Comcast claimed that it lacked 
capacity to carry Entertainment Studios before choosing to give network time to the other 
programming. Comcast argues that its decision was prompted by ordinary business calculations. 
The National Association of African American-Owned Media argued that Comcast’s decision was 
race-discrimination. 
 
Issue: Whether the claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C Sec 1981 fails in the absence of 
but-for-causation.  





COMCAST CORPORATION, Defendant- Appellee 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
 
Decided on February 4, 2019 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
SCHROEDER, SMITH, JR., and NGUYEN,  
Circuit Judges:  
 
The panel unanimously votes to deny the 
petition for panel rehearing. Judge M. Smith 
and Judge Nguyen vote to deny the petition 
for rehearing en banc, and Judge Schroeder 
so recommends. The full court has been 
advised of the petition for rehearing en banc, 
and no judge of the court has requested a vote 
on it. The petition for panel rehearing and the 










NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN OWNED MEDIA, Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
v. 
COMCAST CORPORATION, Defendant- Appellee 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
 
Decided on November 19, 2018  
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
SCHROEDER, M. SMITH, and NGUYEN, 
Circuit Judges:  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants National Association of 
African American-Owned Media 
(NAAAOM) and Entertainment Studios 
Networks, Inc. (Entertainment Studios, and 
together with NAAAOM, Plaintiffs) appeal 
the district court's dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6) of their second amended complaint 
(SAC). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291, and we reverse and remand.  
Entertainment Studios, an African American-
owned operator of television networks, 
sought for more than a decade to secure a 
carriage contract from Defendant-Appellee 
Comcast Corporation (Comcast), the largest 
cable television-distribution company in the 
United States. These efforts were 
unsuccessful, and Plaintiffs filed suit, 
claiming that Comcast's refusal to contract 
was racially motivated and in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1981. The district court thrice 
dismissed Plaintiffs' complaints, concluding 
in its third and final dismissal order that "not 
one fact added to the SAC is either 
antithetical to a decision not to contract with 
[Entertainment Studios] for legitimate 
business reasons or, in itself, indicates that 
the decision was racially discriminatory."  
1. We conclude that the district court 
improperly dismissed Plaintiffs' SAC. As 
discussed at length in the contemporaneously 
filed opinion in National Association of 
African American-Owned Media v. Charter 
Communications, Inc., No. 17-55723, to 
prevail in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on their § 
1981 claim, Plaintiffs needed only to 
plausibly allege that discriminatory intent 
was a factor in Comcast's refusal to contract, 
and not necessarily the but-for cause of that 
decision. Here, Plaintiffs' SAC includes 
sufficient allegations from which we can 
plausibly infer that Entertainment Studios 
experienced disparate treatment due to race 
and was thus denied the same right to contract 
as a white-owned company, which violates § 
1981. These allegations include: Comcast's 
expressions of interest followed by repeated 
refusals to contract; Comcast's practice of 
suggesting various methods of securing 
support for carriage only to reverse its 
position once Entertainment Studios had 
taken those steps; the fact that Comcast 
carried every network of the approximately 
500 that were also carried by its main 
competitors (Verizon FIOS, AT&T U-verse, 
and DirecTV), except Entertainment Studios' 
channels; and, most importantly, Comcast's 
decisions to offer carriage contracts to 
"lesser-known, white-owned" networks 
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(including Inspirational Network, Fit TV, 
Outdoor Channel, Current TV, and Baby 
First Americas) at the same time it informed 
Entertainment Studios that it had no 
bandwidth or carriage capacity. Although 
Comcast notes that legitimate, race-neutral 
reasons for its conduct are contained within 
the SAC, when considered in the light most 
favorable to Plaintiffs, we cannot conclude 
that these alternative explanations are so 
compelling as to render Plaintiffs' theory of 
racial animus implausible.  
We can infer from the allegations in the SAC 
that discriminatory intent played at least 
some role in Comcast's refusal to contract 
with Entertainment Studios, thus denying the 
latter the same right to contract as a white-
owned company. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 
stated a plausible claim pursuant to § 1981, 
and their SAC should not have been 
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).  
 
2. For the reasons discussed at length in our 
opinion in Charter Communications, we also 
conclude that the First Amendment does not 
bar Plaintiffs' § 1981 claim.  
 
3. Because we reverse the district court's 
dismissal of Plaintiffs' SAC, we need not 
consider whether the court abused its 
discretion when it denied Plaintiffs further 
leave to amend.  
 
4. We deny Plaintiffs' motion to take judicial 
notice.  
 






“Supreme Court to Hear Racial Discrimination Case Against Comcast” 
 
 




June 10, 2019 
 
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to 
decide whether Comcast, the nation’s largest 
cable company, may be sued for race 
discrimination over its decision not to carry 
programming from an entertainment 
company owned by Byron Allen, an African-
American entrepreneur. 
A federal appeals court in California 
ruled that the case could move forward 
under a Reconstruction-era federal law that 
gives “all persons” the same right to “make 
and enforce contracts” as “is enjoyed by 
white citizens.” 
A unanimous three-judge panel of the court, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, said that Mr. Allen’s company, 
Entertainment Studios Networks, had made 
accusations that were serious enough to avoid 
dismissal at an early stage of the litigation. 
Entertainment Studios said Comcast had 
expressed interest in its programming but 
never closed a deal, reversed its position on 
what Entertainment Studios needed to do to 
secure carriage, carried every network that its 
main competitors did except Entertainment 
Studios and offered space to “lesser known, 
white owned” networks even as it said it 
lacked capacity to carry Entertainment 
Studios. 
Comcast, in urging the Supreme Court to 
hear its appeal, said its decision not to make 
a deal with Mr. Allen’s company was 
prompted by ordinary business calculations, 
“including bandwidth constraints, a 
preference for sports and news 
programming” and insufficient demand for 
Entertainment Studios’s offerings. 
Comcast’s stated reasons were pretexts, 
Entertainment Studios said in its own brief. 
“For example,” the brief said, “Comcast 
claimed that it did not have sufficient 
bandwidth to carry Entertainment Studios’s 
channels, but Comcast launched more than 
80 white-owned channels at the same time.” 
The race-discrimination suit, Comcast’s brief 
said, was based on claims of “an outlandish 
racist conspiracy.” 
“Plaintiffs contend that Comcast did not base 
its decision on legitimate business 
considerations, but on an outlandish racist 
plot against ‘100 percent African-American-
owned media companies’ — a contrived 
racial category gerrymandered to include 
plaintiffs and virtually no one else — that 
involved, among others, the United States 
government, the country’s oldest and most 
respected civil rights organizations 
(including the N.A.A.C.P. and the National 
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Urban League), prominent African-
Americans (including Earvin ‘Magic’ 
Johnson, Sean ‘Diddy’ Combs and Al 
Sharpton), and ‘white-owned media,’” 
Comcast’s brief said. 
Entertainment Studios said it was not 
pursuing those claims. “Like it did in the 
Ninth Circuit below, Comcast is still 
attacking a conspiracy claim that respondents 
dropped over three years ago,” Entertainment 
Studios’s brief said. “Respondents are 
pursuing a direct claim against Comcast. 
Comcast cannot avoid this lawsuit by 
ignoring the allegations against it.” 
The legal question for the justices in the case, 
Comcast Corporation v. National Association 
of African American-Owned Media, No. 18-
1171, is whether Entertainment Studios must 
assert and prove that race was the key reason 
for Comcast’s decision or one factor among 
many. 
The appeals court said the second kind of 
evidence would suffice. 
“Plaintiffs needed only to plausibly allege 
that discriminatory intent was a factor in 
Comcast’s refusal to contract,” the 
unanimous three-judge panel wrote, “and not 
necessarily the but-for cause of that 
decision.” 
In a statement, Comcast said the case 
concerned “a technical point of law” and that 
it was proud of its efforts to promote 
diversity. 
“Comcast has an outstanding record of 
supporting and fostering diverse 
programming, including programming from 
African-American owned channels, two 
more of which we launched earlier this year,” 
the company’s statement said. “There has 
been no finding of discriminatory conduct by 
Comcast against this plaintiff because there 
has been none. We carry more than 100 
networks geared toward diverse audiences.” 
Mr. Allen issued a statement disputing some 
of the points Comcast made. 
“This case is not about African-American-
themed programming, but is about African-
American ownership of networks,” he said. 
“Unfortunately, the networks Comcast refers 
to as ‘African-American-owned’ are not 
wholly owned by African-Americans, and 
did not get any carriage until I stood up and 












“Supreme Court Will Decide Standard for Proving Racial Bias in Discrimination 





Debra Cassens Weiss 
 
June 10, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to 
decide whether a black-owned media 
company has to show but-for causation in its 
Section 1981 discrimination suit against 
Comcast for failing to carry its programming. 
The court agreed to decide the issue in the 
case of Entertainment Studios Networks. The 
company alleges that Comcast Corp. has 
refused to carry any of the network’s 
channels for more than seven years, even as 
Comcast launched more than 80 lesser-
known, white-owned channels. “For years, 
Comcast has given Entertainment Studios the 
run-around,” the company says its brief 
opposing certiorari. 
Entertainment Studios alleges discrimination 
in contract in violation of Section 1981 of the 
Civil Rights Act, a Reconstruction-era law. 
In a ruling for Entertainment Studios, the 9th 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals at San 
Francisco said the company only has to show 
that discrimination was a “motivating factor” 
in Comcast’s refusal to contract. 
Comcast says in its petition for certiorari that 
at least five federal appeals courts have 
reached contrary decisions. “And for good 
reason: Nothing in the text of the statute 
purports to displace the common-law rule 
requiring but-for causation,” the cert petition 
says. 
Comcast pointed out that Congress permitted 
“motivating factor” discrimination claims 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act but 
didn’t add a similar provision to Section 
1981. 
The brief for Entertainment Studios counters 
that Congress added the provision to Title VII 
to protect discrimination victims, and that 
doesn’t mean that Congress intended to 
narrow civil rights claims under Section 
1981. 
Entertainment Studios also says the federal 
appellate decisions cited by Comcast didn’t 
address burdens at the pleading stage. 
Comcast is represented by Miguel Estrada of 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. Entertainment 
Studios is represented by Erwin 
Chemerinsky, dean at the University of 
California at Berkeley School of Law. 
Chemerinsky is also a regular ABA Journal 
contributor. 
USA Today, Reuters, the Hollywood 
Reporter and Think Progress have coverage 
of the Supreme Court’s decision to hear the 
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case, Comcast Corp. v. National Association 




















































June 10, 2019  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider 
making it harder to press some types of civil 
rights suits, agreeing to hear an appeal from 
cable television provider Comcast Corp. in a 
clash with a black-owned media company. 
Comcast is attempting to stop a lawsuit 
by Entertainment Studios Networks Inc., 
which says racial discrimination is the reason 
it couldn’t get its channels onto the carrier’s 
cable systems. A federal appeals court let the 
suit go forward. 
At issue is a provision known as Section 
1981, a Reconstruction-era law that bars 
racial discrimination in contracting. Comcast 
says the appeals court improperly made it 
easier to sue under that statute than under 
other civil rights laws. 
Entertainment Studios, owned by comedian 
and producer Byron Allen, says it tried for 
years to get its channels carried by Comcast. 
The suit alleges that Comcast officials 
refused to reach a deal, even while expanding 
offerings of lesser-known, white-owned 
channels. Entertainment Studios is pressing a 
similar suit against Charter Communications 
Inc. 
In letting the suits go forward, the San 
Francisco-based 9th U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals said Entertainment Studios needed 
to show only that racial discrimination was a 
“motivating factor” in the decisions. 
Comcast, which says its decision was made 
for legitimate business reasons, says Section 
1981 requires Entertainment Studios to show 
that it would have received a contract had it 
not been for racial bias. That’s a standard the 
Supreme Court has applied in other contexts, 
including claims of age discrimination and 
retaliation. 
Comcast said in a statement that it carries 
more than 100 networks geared toward 
diverse audiences. 
“At this stage, the case is about a technical 
point of law that was decided in a novel way 
by the 9th Circuit,” Comcast said in an 
emailed statement. “We hope the Supreme 
Court will reverse the 9th Circuit’s unusual 
interpretation of the law and bring this case 
to an end.” 
Entertainment Studios urged the court not to 
hear the case. In an emailed statement, Allen 
said his suit is about black ownership of 
television networks, not black-themed 
programming. 
“Comcast -- one of the biggest lobbyists in 
Washington, D.C. -- will continue to lose this 
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case, and the American people who stand 
against racial discrimination will win,” Allen 
said. 
Charter Communications is pressing a similar 
Supreme Court appeal, but the high court will 
hear only the Comcast case. 
The court will hear the case in the nine-month 
term that starts in October. The case is 
Comcast v. National Association of African 



























June 21, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to 
consider what role racism must play in a 
contract decision before a discrimination case 
against Comcast can move forward, and 
attorneys expect the justices' answer will 
make it a little harder to keep race 
discrimination cases alive.  
On the high court’s docket is a Ninth Circuit 
decision that revived a $20 billion racial 
discrimination case against Comcast Corp. 
over its consistent refusals to work with 
African American-owned media company 
Entertainment Studios. Owned by former 
comedian Byron Allen, Entertainment 
Studios contends that Allen’s skin color is the 
reason the studio hasn't been able to get 
Comcast to carry its channels for years.  
The Ninth Circuit panel concluded that 
Allen's company has shown that 
“discriminatory intent played at least some 
role in Comcast’s refusal to contract,” and 
that was enough to keep the case afloat. 
Entertainment Studios need not show racial 
bias was the decisive factor, the panel said.  
But to many attorneys, the panel's use of a 
"motivating factor" test marked a significant 
departure from other U.S. courts' growing 
reliance on the "but for" standard, which the 
Supreme Court has increasingly held up in 
discrimination cases over the past decade.  
Under the but-for test, Allen’s company 
would need to show that Comcast would have 
carried the studio’s channels “but for” racial 
bias — in other words, that discrimination 
tipped the scales towards denial — not just 
that discrimination was a motivating factor in 
the studio’s failure to secure a Comcast 
contract.  
Legal scholars told Law360 that the justices' 
decision to take the case was probably 
motivated by their desire to clean up the 
contradictory case law and impose 
uniformity over how these claims should be 
weighed.  
“The issue of which discrimination statutes 
have access to a motivating factor standard is 
one that has been in a considerable state of 
disarray ever since the court’s decision in the 
Gross case," said Katie Eyer, a law professor 
at Rutgers School of Law who specializes in 
anti-discrimination law.  
In the Supreme Court's 2009 ruling in Gross 
v. FBL Financial Services, the justices 
adopted the but-for standard for Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act suits, 
making it harder for workers to prove a claim 
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under the ADEA. Before that ruling, Eyer 
explained that the mixed-motive standard 
was generally assumed to be available in all 
discrimination statutes.  
“Prior to that,” Eyer said, “the courts of 
appeals had basically treated all of the 
various anti-discrimination statutes similarly, 
and had included what’s called the mixed-
motive burden-shifting paradigm, where the 
plaintiff can just show motivating factor.”  
And since then, she said, the Supreme Court 
has been sussing out what this means for the 
other anti-discrimination laws, statute by 
statute.  
Allen’s studio brought its claim under section 
1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code, a 
Reconstruction-era statute that bars race 
discrimination in contracting by declaring 
that everyone “shall have the same right to 
make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by 
white citizens.”  
And Eyer said it’s likely justices won’t agree 
with the standard the Ninth Circuit adopted 
for that statute, even though she felt it was a 
reasonable interpretation.  
“In the Ninth Circuit, I think they reasonably 
concluded that having the same right means 
the right to be considered for a contract 
without your race playing any role in the 
decision,” she said. “But I’m not sure if the 
[high] court will reach that same result.”  
In the event the justices’ cement the but-for 
test as the standard that should be applied to 
section 1981, she said discrimination 
plaintiffs will have a slightly more difficult 
time supporting their claims.  
“It certainly won’t make it significantly 
harder to bring these types of lawsuits,” she 
noted, “but it will make it marginally harder.”  
Eyer voiced once caveat, however. She said 
the justices could make it a great deal more 
difficult to claim discrimination in 
contracting if they rule that the but-for test is 
met only if racism was the sole reason for 
being denied a contract.  
“I think that’s wrong and I think it would be 
inconsistent with what the court has said in 
some other cases," she said, arguing that this 
interpretation is not supportable under the 
language of any of the statutes at issue.  
And this test would be essentially impossible 
for discrimination plaintiffs to meet, she said. 
“In real life, there’s almost always a variety 
of factors,” Eyer said. “Discrimination may 
be what tips the balance, but it’s rarely the 
only thing standing alone.”  
But barring any imposition of sole causation 
into the matter, McCarter & English LLP 
partner Hugh Murray similarly felt that there 
would be no drastic impact on race 
discrimination cases if the but-for test winds 
up as the default in section 1981.  
“That will influence a little bit the way that 
people have to plead their cases and prove 
their cases,” Murray said. “But at the end of 
the day, it’s not a huge issue because most 
plaintiffs will want to prove they were 
harmed by the race discrimination in any 
event.”  
Murray doesn't think there's too much 
"disarray" left in the discrimination causation 
landscape. He contended that the but-for test 
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has been largely settled as the default 
standard by both the Supreme Court and 
lower level courts, painting the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling as an outlier.  
“The Ninth Circuit likes to have its own way. 
They do that a lot,” Murray said, suggesting 
the decision may be attributable to the court’s 
historically left lean.  
The panel’s decision “does allow for more 
claims of race discrimination to survive,” he 
added, “so, to the extent that it has a liberal-
conservative axis to it, it’s on the liberal 
side.”  
Murray said his “strong supposition” is that 
the justices took up the case to clear away the 
inconsistent ruling, so they can implement 
but-for causation as the default test in section 
1981 as well, which he emphasized would 
only make it harder at the margins.  
“If folks want to bring a lot of lawsuits 
against people who have expressed improper 
and unacceptable racial attitudes, having a 
motivating factor standard would make those 
cases easier,” Murray said.  
“But the law traditionally is not trying to 
solve every problem in the world, it’s trying 
to correct actual harms,” he added.  
The high court’s decision to review the case 
marks a win for the country’s preeminent 
business advocacy organization, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, which had 
complained that the mixed-motive standard 
could leave companies vulnerable to 
frivolous discrimination suits.  
“Employment decisions are inherently 
subjective in some measure. So it will be 
relatively easy for a plaintiff to allege that 
discrimination was a motivating factor,” the 
organization told the justices in an amicus 
brief in April. The ruling increases the odds 
that "entirely legitimate workplace decisions 
will result in burdensome litigation and 
undeserved reputational harms," the chamber 
said.  
Charter Communications Inc. also stands to 
benefit from the justices’ decision, as Allen’s 
studio brought a related discrimination case 
against Charter that balances on the same 
issues.  
Entertainment Studios contends Charter also 
refused to carry the studio’s channels because 
its owner, Byron Allen, is African American, 
and both cases were lodged in California 
federal court several years ago by Allen’s 
firm alongside the National Association of 
African American-Owned Media.  
While a California federal judge shut down 
the Comcast case in late 2016 — finding that 
legitimate business reasons may have 
stymied the business relationship, not racial 
animus — a separate judge in the same 
California court decided to let the Charter 
case move forward just a few weeks later.  
The high court's ultimate ruling is expected to 
govern in both cases, as the pair of suits were 
evaluated and ruled on by the Ninth Circuit 
in tandem. After two separate appeals, the 
Ninth Circuit found the studio's claims can 
proceed against the pair of broadcast 
behemoths, finding but-for causation isn't 
required in either case.  
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While Allen’s company believes its claims 
can stand under the higher causation 
standard, the studio’s counsel  
noted that federal courts have long enforced 
the broad reach of section 1981. 
It's a "viable and very important federal civil 
rights statute” and is crucial to fighting race-
based contracting  
decisions in court, Skip Miller of Miller 
Barondess LLP told Law360 on Thursday. 
He added that “this is especially important in 
the media business, as here, where black-
owned businesses have been  almost 
completely shut out.”  
Charter, which has its own Supreme Court 
review petition pending, said last week it’s 
not commenting on the high court’s decision 
to take up the Comcast case. And counsel and 
representatives for Comcast did not respond 
to repeated requests for comment.  
Comcast is represented by Miguel A. 
Estrada, Thomas G. Hungar, Douglas Fuchs, 
Jesse A. Cripps, Bradley J. Hamburger and 
Samuel Eckman of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher 
LLP.  
Charter is represented by Paul D. Clement, 
Jeffrey S. Powell, Judson D. Brown, Devin S. 
Anderson and William K. Lane III of 
Kirkland & Ellis LLP.  
NAAAOM and Entertainment Studios are 
represented by Skip Miller, J. Mira Hashmall 
and David W. Schecter of Miller Barondess 
LLP and Erwin Chemerinsky of the 
University of California, Berkeley School of 
Law.  
The cases are Comcast Corp. v. National 
Association of African American-Owned 
Media et al., case number 18- 1171, and 
Charter Communications Inc. v. National 
Association of African American-Owned 
Media et al., case number 18-1185, in the 




















Jonathan Stempel  
 
February 23, 2015 
 
Comcast Corp and Time Warner Cable Inc 
have been sued for $20 billion for allegedly 
discriminating against African American-
owned media and employing advocates such 
as the NAACP and the Rev. Al Sharpton to 
advance their bias. 
The lawsuit was filed on Friday in Los 
Angeles federal court by the National 
Association of African-American Owned 
Media as U.S. regulators review the proposed 
$45 billion merger between the two biggest 
U.S. cable operators. 
The same group filed a $10 billion lawsuit in 
December against AT&T Inc and DirecTV, 
whose own proposed merger is also under 
regulatory review. 
According to the complaint, Comcast entered 
into “memoranda of understanding” with 
Sharpton, the NAACP and other advocacy 
groups to provide large cash “donations” in 
exchange for their not interfering with its 
alleged refusal to contract with African-
American-owned media. 
The complaint said the agreements were 
struck after Comcast was criticized for 
similar failures in 2010 when it was buying 
part of entertainment company 
NBCUniversal, which it now fully owns. 
Sharpton and his National Action Network, 
the complaint said, allegedly received “over 
$3.8 million in ‘donations’ and as salary” for 
his work as an MSNBC host. 
The complaint also said Comcast and Time 
Warner Cable each have only one fully 
African American-owned channel, the Africa 
Channel, and that Time Warner Cable has 
acquiesced in Comcast’s discrimination in 
anticipation of the merger’s completion. 
A Comcast spokeswoman called the lawsuit 
“frivolous,” saying it followed the 
Philadelphia-based company’s good faith 
negotiations with the plaintiff over many 
years. 
“We do not generally comment on pending 
litigation, but this complaint represents 
nothing more than a string of inflammatory, 
inaccurate, and unsupported allegations,” she 
said. 
A Time Warner Cable spokeswoman 
declined to discuss the lawsuit, but said the 
New York-based company and Comcast 
remain separate, “including with respect to 
programming decisions.” 
Sharpton also rejected the allegations, saying 
they could support defamation 
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counterclaims, and that his group has 
received less than $1 million from Comcast. 
“The lawsuit is the epitome of an insult to the 
black community” and has “not one scintilla 
of evidence,” Sharpton said in a phone 
interview. 
The NAACP did not immediately respond to 
requests for comment. 
Entertainment Studios Networks Inc, owned 
by comedian and producer Byron Allen, is 
also suing Comcast and Time Warner Cable. 
The case is National Association of African-
American Owned Media et al v. Comcast 
Corp et al, U.S. District Court, Central 























November 20, 2018 
Comcast Corp. may have discriminated 
against a black-owned network in refusing to 
contract with it to distribute its shows, says a 
federal appeals court, in reversing a lower 
court ruling and reinstating the network’s 
lawsuit. 
Los Angeles-based Entertainment Studios 
Networks Inc., an African American-owned 
television network operator, has sought for 
more than a decade to secure a contract from 
Philadelphia-based Comcast Corp., the 
largest cable television distribution company 
in the United States, according to Monday’s 
ruling by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals in San Francisco in National 
Association of African American-Owned 
Media; Entertainment Studios Networks Inc. 
v. Comcast Corp. 
Entertainment Studios and the NAAAM filed 
suit in U.S. District Court in Pasadena, 
California, claiming its refusal to contract 
with the network was racially motivated. 
The district court dismissed the case, which a 
three-judge appeals court panel unanimously 
reversed. The plaintiffs’ complaint “includes 
sufficient allegations from which we can 
plausibly infer that Entertainment Studios 
experienced disparate treatment due to race 
and was thus denied the same right to contract 
as a white-owned company,” said the ruling. 
“These allegations include: Comcast’s 
expressions of interest followed by repeated 
refusals to contract; Comcast’s practice of 
suggesting various methods of security 
support for carriage only to reverse its 
position once Entertainment Studios had 
taken these steps; the fact that Comcast 
carried every network of the approximately 
500 that were also carried by its main 
competitors…except Entertainment Studios’ 
channels; and, most importantly, Comcast’s 
decision to offer carriage contracts to ‘lesser-
known white-owned’ networks…at the same 
time it informed Entertainment Studios that it 
had no bandwidth or carriage capacity. 
“Although Comcast notes that legitimate, 
race-neutral reasons for its conduct are 
contained within the (complaint), when 
considered in the light most favorable to 
Plaintiffs, we cannot conclude that these 
alternative explanations are so compelling as 
to render Plaintiffs’ theory of racial animus 
implausible,” said the ruling. 
“We can infer from the allegations in the 
(complaint) that discriminatory intent played 
at least some role in Comcast’s refusal to 
contact with Entertainment Studios, thus 
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denying the latter the same right to contract 
as a white-owned company,” said the ruling, 
in reversing the lower court ruling and 



















“Appeals Court Rejects Charter/Comcast Motion to Dismiss Byron Allen’s 





Dawn C. Chmielewski  
 
February 4, 2019  
 
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals today 
rejected Comcast and Charter’s motion to 
dismiss Byron Allen’s multibillion-
dollar civil rights lawsuit against them. Read 
the filing here and details of the case below. 
Here is a statement Allen released after the 
ruling: 
“Comcast and Charter are wrong by 
pursuing a legal defense that the First 
Amendment allows them to 
discriminate. 
We are very pleased with the ruling 
by the Ninth Circuit to uphold their 
decisions in our favor for a second 
time. If Comcast and Charter want to 
pursue the Supreme Court, we are 
highly confident that the Supreme 
Court will affirm the Ninth Circuit 
and support these historic legal 
decisions. Unfortunately, Brian 
Roberts of Comcast and Tom 
Rutledge of Spectrum/Charter have 
refused my offers to sit down to 
discuss these very serious matters. 
Now, we have no choice but to enter 
the discovery phase to depose all of 
their executives and business 
associates, as well as receive all of 
their correspondence/emails and 
contracts, to prove our cases in front 
of a jury. 
Every American, elected official, 
civil rights organization, and the 
Department of Justice should be 
offended that the largest cable 
companies in the U.S. pursued a legal 
defense that the First Amendment 
allowed them to discriminate against 
ANY American. Comcast’s and 
Charter’s shareholders and Board 
members should find this immoral, 
unacceptable, and be concerned that 
these companies will be held fully 
accountable because this has 
officially become very serious 
business. 
We will continue to win these cases 
because we are on the right side of 
history. As the Bible has taught us, 
what is done in the dark will come to 
light.” 
PREVIOUSLY, November 19: A federal 
appeals court cleared the way for Byron 
Allen’s Entertainment Studios Networks to 
pursue civil rights suits against two of the 
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nation’s biggest cable operators, Charter 
Communications and Comcast. 
These lawsuits seek sizable damages  — $20 
billion against Comcast and $10 billion 
against Charter — for alleged violations of 
the Civil Rights Act. 
The African-American executive said he 
tried for years to get the cable giants to carry 
his networks, which were available to 
millions of television viewers through rival 
distributors including Verizon, DirecTV, 
AT&T, DISH. Allen said he has been 
repeatedly rebuffed, and alleges race played 
a factor. 
Charter attempted to have Entertainment 
Studios Network’s suit dismissed on First 
Amendment grounds, arguing that its choice 
of cable channels is a form of expression. 
The Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit 
today supported the district court’s ruling, 
which found that the First Amendment 
doesn’t shield Charter from engaging in 
discriminatory conduct. The appeals court 
reached a similar decision in the suit against 
Comcast, sending both cases back to the trial 
court. 
“These two decisions against Comcast and 
Charter are very significant, unprecedented, 
and historic,” said Allen in a statement 
lauding the decision. “The lack of true 
economic inclusion for African Americans 
will end with me, and these rulings show that 
I am unwavering in my commitment to 
achieving this long overdue goal.” 
Charter and Comcast issued separate 
statements, expressing disappointment with 
the ruling. 
“We respectfully disagree with the Court’s 
decision, and are reviewing the decision and 
considering our options,” Comcast said in a 
statement. 
Charter issued a more pointed in its response, 
calling the allegations of racial animus a 
“desperate tactic.” 
“This lawsuit is a desperate tactic that this 
programmer has used before with other 
distributors,” said Charter in a statement to 
Deadline. “We are disappointed with today’s 
decision and will vigorously defend 
ourselves against these claims.” 
Entertainment Studios Networks — a 
constellation of eight channels, including 
Pets.TV, Comedy.TV, Recipe.TV, Justice 
Central.TV and its recent, high-profile 
acquisition, The Weather Channel — filed 
suits in federal district court in Los Angeles. 
The Los Angeles-based media 
company alleged Charter’s former senior 
vice president of programming, Allan Singer, 
refused to meet with Entertainment Studios 
representatives. Singer rescheduled and 
postponed meetings and offered 
“disingenuous” explanations for refusing to 
carry it programming, according to court 
documents. 
Singer said bandwidth limitations and 
operational demands precluded carriage of 
ENT’s cable networks, while reaching 
carriage agreements with “lesser-known, 
white-owned channels” such as the rural 
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focused RFD-TV and the horror channel 
Chiller. 
Court documents cite evidence of racial bias, 
including one instance in which Singer 
allegedly approached an African-American 
protest group outside Charter’s headquarters 
and told them “to get off welfare.” Charter 
CEO Tom Rutledge referred to Allen as 
“Boy” at an industry event, court documents 
allege. 
“Plaintiffs suggest that these incidents are 
illustrative of Charter’s institutional racism,” 
the Appeals Court writes, in summarizing the 
case’s history. “Noting also that the cable 
operator had historically refused to carry 
African American-owned channels and, prior 
to its merger with Time Warner Cable, had a 
board of directors composed only of white 
men.” 
Entertainment Studios ascribed similar 
discriminatory motives on the part of 
Comcast, which offered carriage deals to 
such networks as Inspirational Network, Fit 
TV, Outdoor Channel and Baby First 
Americas while informing Allen it had no 
bandwidth or storage capacity for his 
networks. 
The National Association of African 
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October 5, 2016  
 
A California judge Wednesday dismissed a 
$20 billion racial discrimination suit filed 
against Comcast by television producer 
Byron Allen’s company and the National 
Association of African American Owned 
Media, saying an amended complaint still 
didn’t show how Comcast's decision not to 
carry their stations involved bias.  
The three-page ruling by U.S. District Judge 
Terry J. Hatter granting Comcast’s motion to 
dismiss the second amended complaint from 
Allen’s Entertainment Studios Networks and 
the association stated that the court had noted 
pleading deficiencies in dismissing the prior 
version of the suit. Those deficiencies hadn’t 
been cured in the second complaint, Judge 
Hatter said.  
“[T]he court clearly identified the problem: 
the benchmarks provided by plaintiffs — 
allegedly representing demand by viewers for 
ESN channels — were ambiguous, and did 
not exclude the alternative explanation that 
Comcast’s refusal to contract with ESN was 
based on legitimate business reasons,” the 
judge states.  
ESN and NAAAOM launched the suit in 
February 2015, claiming Comcast engaged in 
discrimination and then paid off civil rights 
groups to look the other way. It’s operative 
complaint states that the cable network’s 
refusal to contract with Entertainment 
Studios is racially discriminatory. Comcast 
has called the litigation "extortionate."  
In his Wednesday ruling, Judge Hatter says 
the second amended complaint “merely 
provided the court with different opaque 
benchmarks.”  
For example, plaintiffs added the statement 
that 80 million people have access to ESN 
channels across the country.  
“But, similar to the viewer growth statistics 
in the FAC, this allegation represents 
potential, not actual, demand for ESN 
content, and thus it does not necessarily 
undercut the Comcast’s alternative 
explanation,” the judge wrote. “In short, not 
one fact added to the SAC is either 
antithetical to a decision not to contract with 
ESN for legitimate business reasons or, in 
itself, indicates that the decision was racially 
discriminatory.”  
An attorney for the National Association of 
African American Owned Media and 
Entertainment Studios Networks, Skip Miller 
of Miller Barondess LLP, said the plaintiffs 
will appeal “and get this decision overturned” 
so the case can be reinstated.  
"We have more than adequately pleaded a 
claim for racial discrimination under section 
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1981 of the Civil Rights Act, based on 
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent,” 
Miller wrote in an email.  
In its complaint, Entertainment Studios says 
it owns and operates seven different 24-hour-
a-day television networks.  
“These networks include Emmy-nominated 
and Emmy-award winning shows and talent, 
and original programming featuring well-
known celebrities, all of which help to 
increase market demand for the networks,” 
the suit states.  
Representatives for Comcast were not 
immediately reachable on Wednesday. In 
July, the global media company blasted the 
suit as being nothing more than “extortion by 
litigation,” and telling the California federal 
judge the suit should be dismissed because it 
is is a “scam” backed with nothing more than 
conspiracy theories.  
In its memorandum supporting a motion to 
dismiss, Comcast argued that after it, as well 
as other major broadcasters, declined to carry 
ESN's collection of “bandwidth-hogging 
high-definition channels,” the network 
“shifted its business model to extortion by 
litigation,” and has now levied a host of 
“incendiary” claims against Comcast and 
other broadcasters.  
But despite repeatedly alleging that Comcast 
is conspiring with the Federal 
Communications Commission and the 
NAACP to keep African-American-owned 
channels off the air, ESN's second amended 
complaint still has not backed up its 
allegations with any of the facts, according to 
Comcast.  
“One would expect plaintiffs making such 
incendiary accusations — systematic 
discrimination by multiple publicly traded 
companies, a betrayal of the core mission of 
the nation’s oldest and most respected civil 
rights organizations, and state-sanctioned 
racism in a federal government agency — to 
come forward with specific, compelling facts 
to back up those allegations,” Comcast states.  
Comcast argues that ESN has specifically 
targeted broadcasters while they have 
mergers pending regulatory review, the better 
to “maximize media attention for ESN” and 
potentially throw roadblocks before the 
mergers, pointing out that the suit was filed 
against Comcast and Time Warner Cable 
during their proposed merger, which has 
since been called off. After that, TWC 
entered a new proposed merger with Charter 
— and ESN filed suit against Charter, 
according to Comcast.  
"In fact, ESN’s allegation that 80 million 
subscribers have access to its channels is 
especially useless at showing consumer 
demand because tens of millions of those 
subscribers were acquired only after 
Plaintiffs began their industry-wide 
campaign of extortionate litigation," 
Comcast said.  
In August 2015, Judge Hatter dismissed the 
suit for the first time, holding that the 
complaint didn’t establish civil rights groups’ 
ties to California or provide enough evidence 
to demonstrate that Comcast excluded the 
100 percent African-American-owned 
network from its television carriage. In 
September, ESN and NAAAOM dropped a 
Ninth Circuit appeal of Judge Hatter's order 
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dismissing the case after the judge allowed 
them to amend the complaint.  
On Wednesday, Entertainment Studios 
Network Inc. slammed a bid by Charter 
Communications Inc. to duck a $10 billion 
suit alleging it blocks black-owned 
companies’ access to cable networks, telling 
a California federal judge that its racial 
discrimination claim has standing.  
Charter, the third-largest television 
distributor in the U.S., contended in a motion 
to dismiss last month that plaintiffs 
Entertainment Studios Network Inc. and the 
National Association of African American 
Owned Media LLC are on a crusade to accuse 
major cable companies of “sensational 
charges of discrimination” to force them into 
carrying ESN channels.  
ESN and NAAAOM are represented by 
Louis R. Miller, Amnon Z. Siegel and Lauren 
R. Wright of Miller Barondess LLP.  
Comcast is represented by Miguel A. 
Estrada, Michael R. Huston, Douglas Fuchs, 
Jesse A. Cripps and Bradley J. Hamburger of 
Gibson Dunn.  
The case is National Association of African 
American Owned Media et al. v. Comcast 
Corp. et al., case number 2:15-cv-01239, in 
















Babb v. Wilkie 
 
Ruling Below: Babb v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 743 F.App’x 280 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 
Overview: Dr. Babb, a pharmacist at the C.W. Young VA Medical Center, argued that her 
managers violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967. She claimed that she was discriminated based on her gender and age, 
retaliated against because she had engaged in protected EEOC activity, and subjected her to a 
hostile work environment. She appeals from the district court’s summary judgement grant in favor 
of the Secretary. 
 
Issue: Whether the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, which provides that personnel actions affecting agency employees aged 40 years or older 
shall be made free from any “discrimination based on age,” 29 U.S.C Sec. 633a(a), requires a 
plaintiff to prove that age was a but-for cause of the challenged personnel action.  




SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, Defendant- Appellee 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit 
 
Decided on July 16, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
ED CARNES, Chief Judge, NEWSOM and SILER, Circuit Judges  
PER CURIAM: 
 
This appeal arises from an employment-
discrimination action filed by Dr. Noris 
Babb, a pharmacist at the C.W. “Bill” Young 
VA Medical Center in Bay Pines, Florida, 
against the Secretary of the Department of 
Veterans Affairs. Babb alleges that her 
managers discriminated against her based on 
her gender and age, retaliated against her 
because she had engaged in protected EEOC 
activity, and subjected her to a hostile work 
environment—all in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § § 621 
et seq. Babb appeals from the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Secretary.  
 
Babb raises three issues on appeal. First, she 
contends that the district court erred by 
applying the McDonnell Douglas standard 
rather than the more lenient “motivating 
factor” test to her gender- and age-
 603 
discrimination and retaliation claims. 
Second, she asserts that the district court 
overlooked genuine issues of material fact 
concerning intent and pretext. And finally, 
she argues that the district court erroneously 
granted summary judgement on her hostile-
work-environment claim.  
Having considered the parties’ written briefs 
and oral arguments, we affirm the district 
court’s grant of summary judgement on 
Babb’s ADEA claim, her Title VII retaliation 
claim, and her hostile-work-environment 
claim. We reverse the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment on Babb’s gender-
discrimination claim and remand for 





The facts here are complex—or at least 
unwieldy. For the sake of clarity, we divide 
our summary into three parts: (a) a 
description of Babb’s employment and 
responsibilities in the years leading up to her 
(and others’) complaints about alleged 
gender and age discrimination; (b) a brief 
description of those complaints; and (c) a 
slightly more extended description of the 
actions that Babb contends constituted 
unlawful discrimination and/or retaliation, as 
well as the Secretary’s asserted reasons for 




Babb, a clinical pharmacist, joined the 
Medical Center in 2004. As a clinical 
pharmacist, Babb worked under the auspices 
of the Medical Center’s Pharmacy Services 
division. In 2006, Babb accepted a position 
as a geriatrics pharmacist. Between 2006 and 
June 2013, Babb was assigned to an 
“interdisciplinary team” of caregivers in the 
Medical Center’s Geriatric Clinic. 
Accordingly, Babb’s work scope and 
responsibilities were governed by a service 
agreement between Pharmacy Services and 
Geriatric. As a clinical pharmacist working in 
the Geriatric Clinic, Babb was supervised 
both by Dr. Leonard Williams, Chief of the 
Geriatric Clinic, and by Pharmacy Services 
administrators—Dr. Marjorie Howard, 
Babb’s direct Pharmacy Services supervisor; 
Dr. Keri Justice, Associate Chief of 
Pharmacy; and Dr. Robert Stewart, the 
Clinical Pharmacy Supervisor. 
 
 In 2009, while a member of the 
interdisciplinary team, Babb obtained an 
“advanced scope of practice,” which meant 
that she could practice “disease state 
management” (or “DSM”)—i.e., she could 
see patients and prescribe medication for 
conditions within the scope of her expertise 
without consulting a physician. In 2010, the 
VA announced a nationwide initiative called 
“Patient Aligned Care Team” (or “PACT”), 
which triggered staffing changes at the 
Medical Center. As part of the PACT 
initiative, the VA established qualifications 
standards pursuant to which pharmacists 
spending at least 25% of their time practicing 
DSM would be eligible for promotion to GS-
13. Because she had an advanced scope that 






Along the way, Babb and some of her 
colleagues concluded that Pharmacy Services 
was implementing the new qualifications 
standards in a way that evinced gender and 
age discrimination. Two other clinical 
pharmacists at the Medical Center, Drs. 
Donna Trask and Anita Truitt, filed EEO 
complaints in September 2011. In April and 
May 2012, Babb sent emails supporting 
Trask and Truitt to an EEOC investigator, 
and later, in March 2014, Babb gave a 
deposition in support of Trask and Truitt. 
Babb also advocated on her own behalf; in a 
February 2013 conversation with Dr. Justice, 
Babb says that she identified herself as 
“another over 40 female with a grievance” 
and complained about management’s 
decision (of which more below) not to have 
her practice DSM anymore. In May 2013, 
Babb filed the EEOC complaint that 




In the fall of 2012, Pharmacy Services and 
Geriatric began renegotiating the services 
agreement governing Babb’s responsibilities. 
Babb asked a Pharmacy Services supervisor 
whether she should “do anything” about the 
negotiations but was told that they would be 
“taken care of at the Service Chief level and 
[that she] didn’t need to be concerned about 
it.” Babb later found out that two younger 
pharmacists—Drs. Lindsey Childs and 
William Lavinghousez—did participate in 
the service-agreement negotiations; 
Pharmacy Services explained that both were 
infectious-disease specialists and that its 
representative was unfamiliar with 
infectious-disease treatment protocol and so 
needed their input.  
 
Pharmacy Services and Geriatric finalized 
the new service agreement governing Babb’s 
responsibilities in December 2012. While 
they considered having Babb remain in the 
Geriatric Clinic, keep her advanced scope, 
and spend at least 25% of her time practicing 
DSM, they ultimately concluded that such a 
solution was unworkable. In particular, 
although Dr. Williams wanted to keep Babb 
in the Geriatric Clinic, he thought that 
reserving 25% of her time for DSM posed 
two problems: (1) he feared that it would 
detract from her role as a clinical pharmacist 
and patient caregiver and increase wait times 
for geriatric patients; and (2) he did not think 
that the DSM model was particularly well 
suited to geriatric patients. Accordingly, 
Williams determined that the Geriatric Clinic 
could not afford to allow Babb to devote 
more than three “slots” per day to DSM. 
Those three slots would equate to only about 
18.75% of Babb’s time, well short of the 25% 
required for promotion under the new PACT-
based standards. When it became clear that 
Geriatric would not agree to an arrangement 
that would permit Babb to meet the necessary 
25% DSM threshold, Pharmacy Services and 
Geriatric agreed that Babb would not have 
any scheduled DSM responsibilities but 
would instead perform all of her work as part 
of an integrated patient-care team.  
 
Because Babb would no longer practice DSM 
under the new service agreement, she would 
not need an advanced scope. Accordingly, 
shortly after the new service agreement was 
finalized, Pharmacy Services management 
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began the process of removing Babb’s 
advanced-scope designation.  
 
During this same time period, Babb sought 
opportunities in the Medical Center’s 
anticoagulation clinic. Initially in the fall of 
2012, and then again in January 2013, Babb 
requested anticoagulation training so that she 
could help out in the anticoagulation clinic. 
Pharmacy Services denied both requests on 
the grounds that the clinic was responsible for 
training medical residents, that the clinic was 
understaffed and lacked the capacity to train 
additional people, and that the training was 
unrelated to Babb’s work as a clinical 
pharmacist in the Geriatric Clinic. 
 
 Separately, in April 2013, Babb applied for 
two open positions in the anticoagulation 
clinic. A three-member panel conducted 
interviews for the positions and ultimately 
selected two younger female pharmacists. 
The interviewers explained that the two 
selected candidates had more anticoagulation 
experience than Babb (who had none) and 
that Babb had used unprofessional language 
and criticized other Medical Center 
employees during her interview. Babb herself 
characterized the interview as “the worst 
interview of [her] life.”  
 
That same month, Pharmacy Services 
convened an administrative investigation 
board (“AIB”) to investigate a vulgar letter 
received by Dr. Gary Wilson, Chief of 
Pharmacy Services. The letter discussed 
concern over promotion practices in 
pharmacy between GS-11 and GS-13. During 
the AIB’s investigation, Justice testified that 
Babb had been part of a group of pharmacists 
known as “mow-mows” or “squeaky wheels” 
who were “never happy, always 
complaining,” and that certain employees 
perceived that “they were [being] 
discriminated against because they were 
older and female.” Wilson testified that he 
believed that Babb had “felt that [she was 
being] discriminated against over age and 
sex.” The AIB questioned a total of 26 
employees; Babb was “really upset” about 
being one of those questioned.  
 
When Babb learned that she had not been 
selected for either of the anticoagulation 
positions for which she had interviewed, she 
filed the EEOC complaint that led to this suit 
in May 2013. She also requested that she be 
moved out of the Geriatric Clinic and into the 
“float pool,” where she would cover for 
absent staff in a variety of areas. Babb’s 
position as a floater did not require an 
advanced scope and did not present 
promotion opportunities. Pharmacy Services 
approved Babb’s request. Soon after Babb 
began floating in July 2013, Babb’s 
supervisor received two complaints about 
Babb that had been filed by one of Babb’s 
coworkers. The first asserted that Babb had 
been rude to a patient, the second that Babb 
had failed to answer her pager. Babb’s 
supervisor talked to her about the complaints, 
and Pharmacy Services management knew 
about them, but they did not result in any 
discipline and did not affect Babb’s 
performance appraisal. Babb enjoyed her 
time in the float pool. 
 
In early 2014, Babb applied for and was 
promoted to a PACT position that involved 
work in the hospital’s Module B and Module 
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D. The announcement that advertised the job 
opening read as follows: “Four 9 hour shifts 
Tuesday through Friday 7:00 am – 4:30 pm 
with a 4 hour shift Saturday 8:00 am-
12:00pm. Nights, weekends and holiday[s] 
on a fair and equitable rotational schedule.” 
In April 2014, Justice submitted paperwork 
to facilitate Babb’s promotion; she marked 
“excellent” on all applicable forms and 
remarked that Babb was “an excellent 
practitioner with a broad knowledge of 
clinical pharmacy” and “great with patients!” 
The VA approved Babb’s promotion to GS-
13 in August 2014. After starting her new job, 
Babb learned that she was entitled to only 
four hours of holiday pay for each of the five 
Monday federal holidays. (A traditional 
schedule with five eight-hour weekday shifts 
would provide eight hours of holiday pay for 
each Monday holiday. ) Babb was “very 
upset” and said that she would not have taken 
the job if she had known about the holiday-
pay issue. The Medical Center offered to 
change Babb’s schedule, but she declined; 
she testified that due to the additional pay she 
gets for working on Saturdays, she makes 
more money than employees who work eight 




Babb sued the Secretary of the Department of 
Veterans Affairs in July 2014. In her 
complaint, Babb claimed that her managers 
discriminated against her based on her gender 
and age, retaliated against her because she 
had engaged in protected EEOC activity, and 
subjected her to a hostile work 
environment—all in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § § 621 
et seq.  
 
The Secretary filed a motion for summary 
judgment, which the district court granted. 
The court analyzed the gender- and age-
discrimination claims, as well as the 
retaliation claim, under the burden-shifting 
framework established in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green. With respect to each 
of the claims, the court found (1) that Babb 
had established a prima facie case, (2) that the 
Secretary had proffered legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory, non-retaliatory reasons 
for the challenged employment actions, and 
(3) that no jury could reasonably conclude 
that those reasons were pretextual. On Babb’s 
hostile-work environment claim, the court 
held that the remarks about which Babb 
complained were not sufficiently severe and 
pervasive to create an objectively abusive 






Babb first contends that the district court 
erred by applying the McDonnell Douglas 
test, rather than the more lenient motivating-
factor test, to her “mixed motive” Title VII 
gender-discrimination claim. We agree. 
 
In Quigg v. Thomas County School District, 
we held that a plaintiff alleging a mixed-
motive Title VII discrimination claim need 
not satisfy McDonnell Douglas’s “overly 
burdensome” standard. Instead, we 
concluded that a plaintiff need only offer 
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“evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: 
(1) the defendant took an adverse 
employment action against the plaintiff; and 
(2) [a protected characteristic] was a 
motivating factor for the defendant’s adverse 
employment action.” Gender discrimination 
constitutes a motivating factor if it “factored 
into [the employer’s] decisional process.”  
 
The Secretary does not dispute that Quigg’s 
motivating-factor standard applies to Babb’s 
mixed-motive gender-discrimination claim. 
Nor does the Secretary dispute that the 
district court failed to apply Quigg’s standard 
and evaluated Babb’s claim under 
McDonnell Douglas instead. The Secretary 
asserts, however, that Babb waived her 
mixed-motive claim by failing to allege it 
specifically in her complaint. We disagree. 
As a plurality of the Supreme Court 
explained in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a 
plaintiff should not be required to label her 
complaint “as either a ‘pretext’ case or a 
‘mixed-motives’ case from the beginning in 
the District Court” because “[d]iscovery 
often will be necessary before the plaintiff 
can know whether both legitimate and 
illegitimate considerations played a part in 
the decision against her.” Here, Babb 
sufficiently raised her mixed-motive theory 
in the district court by arguing it in response 
to the Secretary’s summary judgment 
motion.  
 
Rather than determine for ourselves whether 
Babb’s evidence meets Quigg’s motivating-
factor standard, we think it more prudent to 
remand Babb’s gender-discrimination claim 
to the district court for consideration under 
the proper test in the first instance. 
B 
 
Babb next contends that the district court 
erred in applying the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, rather than the motivating-factor 
test, to her ADEA age-discrimination claim. 
If we were writing on a clean slate, we might 
well agree. It is true, as the Secretary says, 
that the Supreme Court held in Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc., that the provision of 
the ADEA applicable to private-sector 
employees precludes application of a 
motivating-factor standard. In so holding, the 
Court hewed closely to that provision’s 
particular text: “It shall be unlawful for an 
employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s age.” As the 
Court’s italics indicate, it focused on the 
phrase “because of”— which, the Court held, 
requires an age-discrimination plaintiff to 
prove “that age was the ‘reason’ that the 
employer decided to act,” i.e., “the ‘but-for’ 
cause of the employer’s adverse decision.”  
 
As Babb has pointed out here, the provision 
of the ADEA that governs discrimination 
claims brought by federal-sector employees 
reads differently. In pertinent part, and with 
exceptions not relevant here, it states that 
“[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees 
or applicants for employment who are at least 
40 years of age shall be made free from any 
discrimination based on age.” Babb contends 
that the federal-sector provision’s particular 
framing—which, quite unlike the private-
sector provision, requires that employment 
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decisions be made “free from any 
discrimination” based on age— counsels a 
different result here than in Gross, and should 
be read to embody a motivating-factor (rather 
than but-for) causation standard. Although 
Babb’s argument is not insubstantial, it is 
foreclosed by our existing precedent.  
 
In Trask v. Secretary, Department of 
Veterans Affairs, this Court applied the 
McDonnell Douglas standard to an ADEA 
claim brought by two federal government 
employees—indeed, two employees who 
worked at the same facility where Babb 
worked and made many of the same 
allegations that Babb has made here. Under 
the prior-panel-precedent rule, Trask is 
binding on us. It is true, as Babb says, that the 
panel in Trask did not analyze the linguistic 
differences between the ADEA’s private- and 
federal-sector provisions— differences that 
she claims make all the difference. Even so, 
we have long—and consistently, and 
forcefully—rejected an “overlooked reason” 
(or “overlooked argument”) exception to the 
prior-precedent rule.  
 
Accordingly, under Trask, the district court 
did not err in applying the McDonnell 
Douglas test to Babb’s ADEA age-
discrimination claim. And under that 
standard, we can find no reversible error in 
the district court’s decision. In particular, we 
hold that the district court correctly 
concluded that Babb failed to demonstrate 
that the Medical Center’s proffered reasons 
for the adverse employment decisions that 
she alleges were pretexual and that the “real” 
reason for those decisions was because Babb 
was too old. There are four primary adverse 
employment decisions that Babb says were 
made against her because of her age: (1) 
removal of her advanced scope; (2) non-
selection for anticoagulation; (3) denial of 
training opportunities; and (4) provision of 
only four hours of holiday pay under her new 
Module B schedule. We consider each in 
turn. 
 
Addressing Babb’s claim that her advanced 
scope was removed for discriminatory 
reasons, the Secretary proffered testimony 
from Dr. Williams, the decision-maker who 
removed Babb’s advanced-scope 
designation, explaining a nondiscriminatory 
reason for the decision. Williams testified 
that he decided that Babb would no longer 
practice DSM—thereby eliminating her need 
for an advanced scope—because geriatric 
patients presented such complex medical 
cases that it would be in patients’ best interest 
for care to be provided by interdisciplinary 
medical teams rather than by independent 
pharmacists practicing DSM. Babb quarrels 
with Williams’ choice to remove DSM from 
her schedule in the Geriatric Clinic, but her 
arguments reduce to criticism of Williams’ 
business judgment. Under the McDonnell 
Douglas framework, to successfully rebut an 
employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory 
reason for making a business decision, a 
plaintiff must “meet that reason head on and 
rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by 
simply quarreling with the wisdom of that 
reason.” Here, Babb fails to tackle Williams’ 
proffered nondiscriminatory reason “head 
on” to prove that a choice to provide 
interdisciplinary care to frail geriatric 
patients is not, in fact, what motivated 
Williams’ decision.  
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Addressing Babb’s non-selection for the 
anticoagulation position, Babb argues that 
age discrimination underlay the Medical 
Center’s hiring of two younger pharmacists. 
The Secretary offered evidence of the 
Medical Center’s nondiscriminatory reasons: 
(1) that the selected pharmacists were more 
experienced than Babb and (2) that Babb 
performed poorly in her interview, offering 
inadequate answers to medical questions and 
making disparaging remarks about 
coworkers. Babb does not meaningfully 
contest the Secretary’s assessment that she 
interviewed poorly for the anticoagulation 
position; in fact, she acknowledged that her 
interview was the worst of her life. Babb does 
contest the conclusion that she was less 
qualified for the positions than the chosen 
pharmacists. But while it may be (as Babb 
argues) that her experience was different 
from the selected pharmacists’, it was not 
necessarily better than theirs. The fact is that 
the hired pharmacists had anticoagulation 
experience that Babb lacked, and a 
reasonable employer could rely on that 
particular experience in making an 
anticoagulation hiring decision, as the 
Secretary contends occurred here. Babb has 
failed to prove that that the Secretary’s 
proffered explanations her non-selection are 
pretextual and that age discrimination is the 
real reason she was passed over.  
 
Addressing Babb’s assertion that she was 
unlawfully denied access to training 
opportunities, the Secretary offers testimony 
from Dr. Howard and Dr. Stewart to explain 
nondiscriminatory reasons for those denials. 
Dr. Howard testified that she denied Babb’s 
request to attend a two-day geriatrics training 
because (1) the registration deadline had 
passed by the time Babb requested 
permission to attend the training, (2) Babb 
was responsible for caring for patients in the 
Geriatric Clinic at the time of the training, 
and (3) Howard believed that Babb already 
possessed a good understanding of the 
subject matter being taught at the training. 
Dr. Stewart testified that at the time Babb’s 
request for anticoagulation training was 
denied, the anticoagulation department was 
busy, understaffed, and already burdened 
with the responsibility of training medical 
residents. Babb attempts to demonstrate that 
these proffered nondiscriminatory reasons 
for denials of training are pretextual by 
pointing out other individuals at the Medical 
Center who were provided with special 
training opportunities, but the fact that other 
individuals received some special training 
does not prove that the real reason that 
Babb’s requested training was denied was 
discriminatory—i.e., it does not meet the 
Secretary’s explanation “head on.”  
 
Finally, addressing Babb’s claim regarding 
discrimination in the administration of 
holiday pay in her Module B position, the 
Secretary has explained that holiday pay is 
tied to Babb’s Module B schedule. Babb is 
scheduled to work nine-hour shifts Tuesday 
through Friday with a four-hour shift every 
Saturday; because Babb is never scheduled to 
work on a Monday, her Monday holiday pay 
is calculated by referencing back to her most 
recent work day, a four hour Saturday shift. 
Babb admitted that she earned more money 
on her Tuesday-Saturday schedule (even with 
her holiday pay complaints) than she would 
have earned on a traditional Monday-Friday 
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schedule with eight hours of holiday pay for 
each Monday holiday. When Babb 
complained about her holiday pay, the VA 
offered to permanently move her to a 
traditional Monday-Friday schedule that 
would entitle her to eight hours of holiday 
pay for each Monday holiday, but Babb 
refused the offer. Babb has failed to rebut the 
Secretary’s nondiscriminatory explanation 
for Babb’s holiday pay—namely, that it was 
calculated in relation to her Tuesday-
Saturday schedule.  
 
The Secretary has provided 
nondiscriminatory reasons for adverse 
employment decisions about which Babb has 
complained. Babb has failed to adequately 
rebut those nondiscriminatory reasons—to 
meet them “head on”— and prove that they 
are pretextual. Thus, under McDonnell 
Douglas, we affirm the district court’s order 
of summary judgment on Babb’s age 




Babb similarly asserts that the district court 
erred in applying McDonnell Douglas—
again, rather than the motivating-factor 
test—to her retaliation claim. And again, if 
we were starting from scratch, we might 
agree. But again, we are not, and so we 
cannot. 
 
 In University of Texas Southwest Medical 
Center v. Nassar, the Supreme Court held 
(following the rationale of its earlier decision 
in Gross) that Title VII’s private-sector 
retaliation provision requires a but-for, rather 
than motivating-factor, causation standard. 
As it had done in Gross, the Court 
emphasized the provision’s use of the phrase 
“because”—in particular, its prohibition of 
any discrimination “because” an employee 
has engaged in protected EEO activity. 
“Given the lack of any meaningful textual 
difference between the text in this statute and 
the one in Gross,” the Court held, “the proper 
conclusion here, as in Gross, is that Title VII 
retaliation claims require proof that the desire 
to retaliate was the but-for cause of the 
challenged employment action.”  
 
But, Babb asserts—as she does in connection 
with her ADEA claim—the language of Title 
VII’s federal-sector anti-retaliation provision 
is different. Almost exactly like its ADEA 
analogue, it states that personnel decisions 
(again, with exceptions not relevant here) 
“shall be made free from any discrimination 
based on … sex ….” Babb insists that the 
absence of the “because” language that drove 
the result in Nassar, combined with the 
presence of the broad phrase “free from any 
discrimination,” requires application of a 
motivating-factor, rather than but-for, 
causation standard.  
 
Again, though, our earlier decision in Trask 
stands in Babb’s way. There, citing both Title 
VII’s private-sector anti-retaliation provision 
and Nassar, we held—again, in a case 
involving federal-government employees—
that the McDonnell Douglas test and a but-
for causation standard applied. And for 
reasons already explained, it is no answer to 
Trask that the panel there did not engage the 
linguistic differences between the private- 
and federal-sector anti-retaliation provisions. 
We are bound just the same.  
 611 
Accordingly, we are constrained to hold that 
the district court did not err in applying the 
McDonnell Douglas framework to Babb’s 
retaliation claim. And under that standard, we 
cannot say that the district court was wrong 
to grant summary judgment to the Secretary. 
In particular, we hold that the district court 
correctly concluded that Babb failed to 
demonstrate that the Medical Center’s 
proffered reasons for the adverse 
employment decisions that she alleges were 
pretextual and that those decisions were 
actually motivated by retaliatory animus.  
 
Babb points to the same adverse employment 
actions in her retaliation claims as she did in 
her age discrimination claims. As explained 
above—and for the same reasons—Babb has 
failed to demonstrate that the Secretary’s 
proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for 
making each employment decision were 
pretextual. Just as Babb’s age discrimination 
claims fail because Babb has failed to show 
that the Secretary’s nondiscriminatory reason 
for the action was pretextual, Babb’s 
retaliation claims similarly fail. We affirm 
the district court’s order of summary 
judgment in favor of the Secretary on Babb’s 




Finally, Babb claims that the district court 
erred in granting summary judgment for the 
Secretary on her hostile-work-environment 
claim. We disagree; summary judgment was 
proper.  
 
“A hostile work environment claim under 
Title VII is established upon proof that ‘the 
workplace is permeated with discriminatory 
intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of the victim’s employment and 
create an abusive working environment.’” 
“In evaluating the objective severity of the 
harassment, this court looks at the totality of 
the circumstances and considers, among 
other things: (1) the frequency of the conduct, 
(2) the severity of the conduct, (3) whether 
the conduct is physically threatening or 
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, 
and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably 
interferes with employee’s job performance.” 
The district court here correctly concluded 
that Babb failed to allege an objectively 
hostile environment so filled with 
intimidation and ridicule that it was 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter her 
working conditions.  
 
In support of her hostile-work-environment 
claim, Babb points to many of the same 
pieces of evidence that she invokes in 
connection with her discrimination and 
retaliation claims—e.g., the removal of her 
advanced scope, the denial of her request for 
anticoagulation training, the fact that she was 
not hired for the anticoagulation position for 
which she applied. In addition, she points to 
three remarks made to her that, she says, 
pertained to her age, gender, or protected 
activity: (1) one pharmacy administrator once 
asked her, “When do you retire?”; (2) another 
once referred to “Magic Mike” as a “middle-
aged woman movie” while speaking to Babb; 
and (3) the same called her a “mow mow” 
(which Babb interpreted as “a grandma 
comment”) during an investigation of a 
vulgar email.  
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Babb has not raised a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding her hostile work-
environment claim. Her allegations pale in 
comparison to the sort of conduct that this 
Court has deemed sufficiently “severe and 
pervasive” to create an objectively abusive 
environment. Given the facts alleged by 
Babb, the district court correctly ruled that 
her hostile-work-environment claim failed as 




For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment 
on Babb’s ADEA age-discrimination claim, 
Title VII retaliation claim, and hostile-work-
environment claim. We reverse the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment on 
Babb’s Title VII gender-discrimination claim 
and remand for consideration under the 
“motivating-factor” standard.  
 
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and 






















































Hassan A. Kanu 
 
June 28, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted June 28 a 
petition asking for clarification on what 
federal government workers must prove 
when they file discrimination claims. 
The main question for the court in the case is 
about the standard federal workers must meet 
to show there was age discrimination 
underlying a termination, demotion, or some 
other negative job action. A decision from the 
justices would resolve a federal appeals court 
split on the issue. The high court’s analysis 
may ultimately make it easier or tougher for 
federal government workers to prove they 
were discriminated against based on age or 
even other protected categories, like race or 
sex. 
Norris Babb’s case against the Department of 
Veterans Affairs alleges discrimination and 
retaliation in violation of Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act. She 
alleges she was denied opportunities to 
advance at a department facility in Florida 
because of her gender and age, and that 
management retaliated against her for filing 
complaints about the issue.  
Babb’s petition presented a “subsidiary 
question” for the court about whether 
retaliation against federal workers over 
protected activity—like filing a 
discrimination complaint—is explicitly 
barred by Title VII, but the justices limited 
their review to the standard for proving bias 
under the ADEA statute.  
Private vs. Federal 
Federal laws against discrimination in 
employment have different provisions for 
workers in the private sector compared to 
those in public employment. Broadly 
speaking, the private sector provisions ban 
employment decisions that are made 
“because of” someone’s age or because they 
engaged in protected activity. The provisions 
that apply to the federal sector generally use 
different language that requires that 
employment decisions “shall be made free 
from” discrimination.  
The Supreme Court has interpreted the 
“because of” language as requiring what’s 
known as “but-for” causation, which means 
the plaintiff must prove that they wouldn’t 
have been harmed except for the fact of their 
identity or protected act. It has done so in 
both Title VII retaliation and ADEA 
discrimination cases.  
But Congress in 1991 also amended Title VII 
so that discrimination claims could be proved 
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based on the test that was developed through 
interpreting the language in the federal sector 
provisions—known as the “motivating 
factor” standard. That test requires plaintiffs 
to show that bias was a factor in causing the 
harm they suffered. The amendments limit 
how much money and damages can be 
recovered, and retaliation claims brought 
under that statute retained the “but-for” 
causation standard, which is tougher for 
plaintiffs to surmount. 
“Congress thus adopted a motivating-factor 
standard for causation in Title VII’s private-
sector discrimination provision, but it did not 
do so in other provisions of Title VII or any 
provisions of the ADEA,” the VA said in its 
brief.  
Babb and the VA both urged the high court to 
resolve the standard of causation issue for age 
discrimination complaints by federal 
workers. The government argued that the 
stricter “but-for” standard should apply, 
while Babb argued for the more lenient 
motivating factor analysis.  
Some federal appeals courts—including the 
Ninth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit in 
Babb’s case—have held that the age bias 
statute requires but-for causation. The Ninth 
Circuit’s decision concluded that Supreme 
Court precedent doesn’t permit use of the 
motivating-factor test during trial in federal 
sector cases, but does in the summary 
judgment phase—when courts make a 
preliminary decision as to whether the 
plaintiff actually has a viable claim.  
The District of Columbia Circuit, on the other 
hand, has rejected that approach and applied 
the motivating factor analysis in those cases.  
Administrative “agencies that oversee 
discrimination and retaliation claims have 
followed the D.C. Circuit” and concluded 
“that federal employee’s burden of proof 
should be ‘a factor’ or ‘a motivating factor’ 
in Title VII and ADEA discrimination cases,” 
Babb’s attorneys said in her brief.  
The high court’s analysis could resolve those 
differences in how courts and agencies 
approach the issue.  
The case is Babb v. Wilkie, U.S., No. 18-882, 



















Danielle Nichole Smith 
 
June 28, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Friday agreed to 
weigh in on whether a federal worker has to 
show that a challenged action from an 
employer wouldn't have occurred if it wasn't 
for the employee's age in order to 
successfully plead a claim under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act.  
In its order, the high court granted Noris 
Babb's petition for writ of certiorari in her 
suit alleging the U.S. Department of Veterans 
Affairs discriminated and retaliated against 
her because of her gender and age. The 
justices specified that the question in their 
review would be limited to whether the 
federal- sector provision in the ADEA 
requires plaintiffs to "prove age was a but-for 
cause of the challenged personnel action."  
The case came before the Supreme Court 
after Babb appealed an Eleventh Circuit 
panel's partial revival of her suit against the 
agency. The panel had ruled in July that while 
the lower court should have applied the 
lighter "motivating factor" test for Babb's 
gender discrimination claims, the court was 
correct to analyze her ADEA and Title VII 
retaliation claims using the stricter 
McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting test. 
The panel noted, however, that its 
conclusions might have been different had it 
not been bound by an earlier circuit decision 
called Trask.  
However, Babb argued in her high court 
petition that the statutory language created a 
different standard of causation for federal-
sector workers bringing retaliation claims 
than private-sector workers. Because the 
ADEA provision for federal workers said that 
all personnel actions would be "free from any 
discrimination based on age," those workers 
only had to show that age was a factor in the 
challenged employer action to make a claim, 
Babb said.  
The Eleventh Circuit's decision created a 
greater burden for federal workers seeking to 
bring ADEA and Title VII retaliation claims 
within its jurisdiction than other federal 
employees would have elsewhere, Babb 
contended.  
The Department of Veterans Affairs, on the 
other hand, told the high court that the 
Eleventh Circuit correctly found that the so-
called "but-for" standard was the appropriate 
standard for federal workers bringing 
employment claims under the ADEA and 
Title VII. Still, the agency agreed that the 
Supreme Court should take up the case to 
resolve divisions among the circuit court and 
federal agencies on the proper standard of 
causation under the relevant provisions.  
Roman Martinez, an attorney for Babb, told 
Law360 on Friday that they were "happy the 
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Supreme Court decided to review the 
important issues presented by this case."  
"The law demands that no federal employee 
suffer from discrimination on the basis of 
age," Martinez said. "We look forward to 
vindicating that essential principle in this 
case."  
Babb initially sued the Department of 
Veterans Affairs in July 2014, alleging, 
among other things, that she was stripped her 
of an advanced certification, denied a transfer 
and training opportunities and shorted on 
holiday pay because she is a woman over 40. 
A Florida federal judge tossed the case in 
August 2016, and Babb appealed to the 
Eleventh Circuit the following October.  
Representatives for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs and the U.S. Department of 
Justice, which represents the federal 
government in litigation, didn't respond 
Friday to requests for comment.  
Babb is represented by Roman Martinez, 
Samir Deger-Sen and Margaret A. Upshaw of 
Latham & Watkins LLP, and Joseph Magri 
and Sean M. McFadden of Merkle & Magri 
PA.  
The Department of Veterans Affairs is 
represented by Solicitor General Noel J. 
Francisco, Assistant Attorney General Joseph 
H. Hunt and Marleigh D. Dover and 
Stephanie R. Marcus of the U.S. Department 
of Justice.  
The case is Babb v. Wilkie, case number 18-
























“Supreme Court to Determine Whether “But-For” Causation Required in Federal-
Sector ADEA Claims” 
 
 




July 2, 2019 
 
The petitioner contends that the differing 
language in the ADEA’s federal-sector 
provision permits a more lenient “motivating 
factor” analysis, rather than the ‘but-for” 
causation applied in the private sector. 
On June 28, the High Court granted certiorari 
in a case that will determine whether federal 
agency employees seeking to prevail on 
allegations of discrimination in violation of 
the ADEA’s federal-sector provision will be 
required to prove that “age was a but-for 
cause of the challenged personnel action.” 
 
Summary judgment. Below, in Babb v. 
Wilkie, a pharmacist at a VA medical center 
in Florida alleged that she was subjected to 
gender-plus-age discrimination in violation 
of Title VII and the ADEA. She also alleged 
retaliation due to her protected EEO activity 
and a discriminatory and retaliatory hostile 
work environment in violation of the same 
laws. The district court granted the VA’s 
motion for summary judgment on all of her 
claims. 
 
The employee appealed, contending, among 
other things, that the district court erred by 
applying the McDonnell Douglas standard 
instead of the more lenient “motivating 
factor” test to her gender and age 
discrimination and retaliation claims. 
 
On July 16, 2018, in an unpublished opinion, 
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary 
judgment of the employee’s ADEA, Title VII 
retaliation, and hostile worker environment 
claims, but it reversed on her gender 
discrimination claim and remanded for 
consideration under the motivating-factor 
standard. 
 
ADEA’s federal-sector provision. As to the 
employee’s age discrimination claim, the 
appeals court noted that the ADEA’s federal 
sector provision states in relevant part that 
“[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees 
or applicants for employment who are at least 
40 years of age shall be made free from any 
discrimination based on age.” The employee 
asserted that this particular framing, which, 
unlike the private-sector provision, requires 
that employment decisions be made “free 
from any discrimination” based on age, 
requires a different result than in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, Inc. (2006), and should be read to 
encompass a motivating-factor, rather than 
the but-for causation standard established 
in Gross. 
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While the Eleventh Circuit characterized the 
employee’s argument as “not insubstantial,” 
it was nonetheless foreclosed by existing 
precedent in Trask v. Secretary, Department 
of Veterans Affairs, in which the appeals 
court applied the McDonnell 
Douglas standard to an ADEA claim brought 
by two other federal government employees 
who had worked at the same facility where 
the plaintiff worked; they also made many of 
the same allegations. The court was bound by 
prior precedent. 
 
Although the panel in Trask did not analyze 
the linguistic differences between the 
ADEA’s private- and federal-sector 
provisions, as the employee asserted, the 
Eleventh Circuit had also consistently and 
forcefully rejected the “overlooked reason” 
exception to its prior precedent rule. Thus, 
the district court did not err in applying 
the McDonnell Douglas test to the 
employee’s ADEA age discrimination claim. 
 
Do Nassar and Gross apply in the federal 
sector? In her petition for certiorari, the 
employee framed the issue as whether the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in University of 
Texas Southwestern Medical Center. v. 
Nassar (2013) and Gross interpreting 
statutory language applicable to the private 
sector bars the use of the “a factor,” 
“motivating factor,” or “substantial factor” 
standard in Title VII and ADEA retaliation 
cases brought by federal-sector employees 
under different statutory language. 
According to the employee, the High Court’s 
reasoning in earlier cases suggests that the 
differing statutory language applicable to 
federal-sector and private-sector claims 
mandates differing approaches. 
 
Question narrowed. In granting certiorari, the 
Supreme Court narrowed the question it will 
address to reach only the burden of proof in 
federal-sector age discrimination claims: 
 
“Whether the federal-sector provision of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, which provides that personnel actions 
affecting agency employees aged 40 years or 
older shall be made free from any 
‘discrimination based on age,’ 29 U. S. C. 
§633a(a), requires a plaintiff to prove that age 










Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries  
Ruling Below: Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017) 
Overview: A same-sex couple were denied service at an Oregon bakery business due to their 
sexual orientation, which violated Oregon’s non-discrimination law. The defendants argue that 
there should be an exemption based on their own sincere religious beliefs of same-sex marriage. 
This case was remanded to a lower court by the U.S. Supreme Court based on their decision in 
2018 Masterpiece Cakeshop.  
 
Issue: (1) Whether Oregon violated the free speech and free exercise clauses of the First 
Amendment by compelling the Kleins to design and create a custom wedding cake to celebrate a 
same-sex wedding ritual in violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs; (2) whether the 
Supreme Court should overrule Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith; and (3) whether the Supreme Court should reaffirm Smith’s hybrid-rights 
doctrine, applying strict scrutiny to free exercise claims that implicate other fundamental rights, 
and resolve the circuit split over the doctrine’s precedential status. 
Melissa Elaine KLEIN, dba Sweetcakes by Melissa; and Aaron Wayne Klein, dba 
Sweetcakes by Melissa, Plaintiffs—Petitioners 
v. 
OREGON BUREAU OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Defendant—Respondent  
 
Court of Appeals of Oregon 
 
Decided on December 28, 2017 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
GARRETT, Judge:  
 
Melissa and Aaron Klein, the owners of a 
bakery doing business as Sweetcakes by 
Melissa (Sweetcakes), seek judicial review of 
a final order of the Bureau of Labor and 
Industries (BOLI) finding that the Kleins' 
refusal to provide a wedding cake to the 
complainants, a same-sex couple, 
violated  ORS 659A.403, which prohibits a 
place of public accommodation from denying 
"full and equal" service to a person "on 
account of * * * sexual orientation." The 
order further concluded that the Kleins 
violated another of Oregon's public 
accommodations laws, ORS 659A.409, by 
communicating an intention to unlawfully 
discriminate in the future. BOLI's order 
awarded damages to the complainants for 
their emotional and mental suffering from the 
denial of service and enjoined the Kleins 
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from further violating ORS 
659A.403 and ORS 659A.409. 
In their petition for judicial review, the 
Kleins argue that BOLI erroneously 
concluded that their refusal to supply a cake 
for a same-sex wedding was a denial of 
service "on account of" sexual orientation 
within the meaning of ORS 659A.403; 
alternatively, they argue that the application 
of that statute in this circumstance violates 
their constitutional   rights to free 
expressionand to the free exercise of their 
religious beliefs. The Kleins also argue that 
they were denied due process of law because 
BOLI's commissioner did not recuse himself 
in this case after making public comments 
about it, that the damages award is not 
supported by substantial evidence or 
substantial reason, and that BOLI 
erroneously treated the Kleins' public 
statements about this litigation as conveying 
an intention to violate public accommodation 
laws in the future. 
As explained below, we reject the Kleins' 
construction of ORS 659A.403 and conclude 
that their denial of service was "on account 
of" the complainants' sexual orientation for 
purposes of that statute. As for their 
constitutional arguments, we conclude that 
the final order does not impermissibly burden 
the Kleins' right to free expression under 
the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. We conclude that, 
under Employment Division, Oregon 
Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 
final order does not impermissibly burden the 
Kleins' right to the free exercise of their 
religion because it simply requires their 
compliance with a neutral law of general 
applicability, and the Kleins have made no 
showing that the state targeted them for 
enforcement because of their religious 
beliefs. For substantially the same reasons for 
which we reject their federal constitutional 
arguments, we reject the Kleins' arguments 
under the Oregon Constitution. We also 
reject the Kleins' arguments regarding the 
alleged bias of BOLI's commissioner and 
their challenge to BOLI's damages award. 
We agree with the Kleins, however, that the 
evidence does not support BOLI's conclusion 
that they violated ORS 659A.409. 
Accordingly, we reverse the order as to that 
determination and the related grant of 
injunctive relief. BOLI's order is otherwise 
affirmed. 
I. BACKGROUND 
We will discuss the relevant evidence and 
factual findings in greater detail within our 
discussion of particular assignments of error, 
but the following overview provides context 
for that later discussion. The complainants, 
Rachel Bowman-Cryer and Laurel Bowman-
Cryer, met in 2004 and had long considered 
themselves a couple. In 2012, they decided to 
marry. 
As part of the wedding planning, Rachel and 
her mother, Cheryl, attended a Portland 
bridal show. Melissa Klein had a booth at that 
bridal show, and she advertised wedding 
cakes made by her bakery business, 
Sweetcakes. Rachel and Cheryl visited the 
booth and told Melissa that they would like 
to order a cake from her. Racheland Cheryl 
were already familiar with Sweetcakes; two 
years earlier, Sweetcakes had designed, 
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created, and decorated a wedding cake for 
Cheryl's wedding, paid for by Rachel. 
After the bridal show, on January 17, 2013, 
Rachel and Cheryl visited the Sweetcakes 
bakery shop in Gresham for a cake-tasting 
appointment, intending to order a wedding 
cake. At the time of the appointment, Melissa 
was at home providing childcare, so her 
husband, Aaron, conducted the tasting. 
During that tasting, Aaron asked for the 
names of the bride and groom. Rachel told 
him that there were two brides and that their 
names were Rachel and Laurel. At that point, 
Aaron stated that he was sorry, but that 
Sweetcakes did not make wedding cakes for 
same-sex ceremonies because of his and 
Melissa's religious convictions. Rachel began 
crying, and Cheryl took her by the arm and 
walked her out of the shop. On the way to 
their car, Rachel became "hysterical" and 
kept apologizing to her mother, feeling that 
she had humiliated her. 
Cheryl consoled Rachel once they were in 
their car, and she assured her that they would 
find someone to make the wedding cake. 
Cheryl drove a short distance away, but then 
turned around and returned to Sweetcakes. 
This time, Cheryl reentered the shop by 
herself to talk with Aaron. During their 
conversation, Cheryl told Aaron that she had 
previously shared his thinking about 
homosexuality, but that her "truth had 
changed" as a result of having "two gay 
children." In response, Aaron quoted a Bible 
passage from the Book of Leviticus, stating, 
"You shall not lie with a male as one lies with 
a female; it is an abomination." Cheryl left 
and returned to the car, where Rachel had 
remained, "holding [her] head in her hands, 
just bawling." 
When Cheryl returned to the car, she told 
Rachel that Aaron had called her "an 
abomination," which further upset Rachel. 
Rachel later said that "[i]t made me feel like 
they were saying God made a mistake when 
he made me, that I wasn't supposed to be, that 
I wasn't supposed to love or be loved or have 
a family or live a good life and one day go to 
heaven." 
When Rachel and Cheryl arrived home, 
Cheryl told Laurel what had happened. 
Laurel, who had been raised Catholic, 
recognized the "abomination" reference from 
Leviticus and felt shame and anger. Rachel 
was inconsolable, which made Laurel even 
angrier. Later that same night, Laurel filled 
out an online complaint form with the Oregon 
Department of Justice (DOJ), describing the 
denial of service at Sweetcakes. 
In addition to the DOJ complaint, Laurel 
eventually filed a complaint with BOLI, as 
did Rachel, alleging that the Kleins had 
refused to make them a wedding cake 
because of their sexual orientation. BOLI 
initiated an investigation. 
Meanwhile, the controversy had become the 
subject of significant media attention. The 
Kleins were interviewed by, among others, 
the Christian Broadcast Network (CBN) and 
later by a radio talk show host, Tony Perkins. 
In the CBN interview, which was broadcast 
in September 2013, the Kleins explained that 
they did not want to participate in celebrating 
a same-sex marriage, wanted to live their 
lives in the service of God, and that, although 
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they did not want to see their bakery business 
go "belly up," they had "faith in the Lord and 
he's taken care of us up to this point and I'm 
sure he will in the future." The CBN 
broadcast also showed a handwritten sign, 
taped to the inside of the bakery's front 
window, which stated: 
"Closed but still in business. You can reach 
me by email or facebook. 
www.sweetcakesweb.com or Sweetcakes by 
Melissa facebook page. New phone 
number will be provided on my website and 
facebook. This fight is not over. We will 
continue to stand strong. Your religious 
freedom is becoming not free anymore. This 
is ridiculous that we cannot practice our faith. 
The LORD is good and we will continue to 
serve HIM with all our heart [heart symbol]." 
In the Perkins interview, which occurred in 
February 2014, Aaron explained that he and 
Melissa "had a feeling that [requests for 
same-sex wedding cakes were] going to 
become an issue" and that they had discussed 
the issue. During the interview, Aaron stated 
that "it was one of those situations where we 
said 'well I can see it is going to become an 
issue but we have to stand firm. It's our belief 
and we have a right to it, you know.'" 
BOLI's investigation determined that 
substantial evidence supported the 
complaints, and the agency eventually issued 
formal charges against the Kleins that 
described the initial refusal of service as well 
as the Kleins' subsequent participation in the 
CBN broadcast and Perkins interview. 
Specifically, BOLI alleged that the Kleins 
had violated ORS 659A.403, which entitles 
all persons "to the full and equal 
accommodations advantages, facilities and 
privileges of any place of public 
accommodation, without any distinction, 
discrimination or restriction on account of * 
* * sexual orientation," and further makes it 
"an unlawful practice for any person to deny 
full and equal accommodations, advantages, 
facilities and privileges of any place of public 
accommodation in violation of this 
section,"  BOLI further alleged that the 
Kleins' subsequent statements had violated 
another provision of the state's public 
accommodations laws, which makes it 
unlawful to communicate an intention to 
discriminate in the future on account of 
sexual orientation. 
After the issuance of formal charges, BOLI 
designated an ALJ to handle the contested 
case proceedings, and the Kleins and BOLI 
engaged in extensive motions practice before 
the ALJ. Among those motions, the Kleins 
sought to disqualify BOLI's commissioner, 
Brad Avakian, on the ground that he was 
biased against them, as evidenced by his 
public statements about the cake controversy. 
In a Facebook post shortly after Laurel filed 
the DOJ complaint, Avakian had provided a 
link to a story on www.kgw.com related to 
the refusal of service; in that post, he wrote, 
"Everyone has a right to their religious 
beliefs, but that doesn't mean they can 
disobey laws that are already in place. Having 
one set of rules for everybody ensures that 
people are treated fairly as they go about their 
daily lives." Later, shortly after the first of the 
BOLI complaints was filed, an article in The 
Oregonian quoted Avakian as saying that 
"[e]veryone is entitled to their own beliefs, 
but that doesn't mean that folks have the right 
to discriminate." According to the Kleins, 
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those statements and others indicated that 
Avakian had prejudged their case before the 
hearing. The ALJ disagreed and denied the 
motion to disqualify. 
The Kleins and BOLI also filed cross-
motions for summary judgment on multiple 
issues involving the merits of the case, 
including, as relevant on judicial review: (1) 
whether the complainants were denied 
service "on account of" their sexual 
orientation for purposes of Oregon's public 
accommodation laws; (2) if so, whether the 
application of those laws violates the Kleins' 
rights to free expression and religious 
worship under the state and federal 
constitutions; and (3) whether Aaron Klein's 
statements during the CBN and Perkins 
interviews, and the note on the Sweetcakes 
window, were the kinds of statements of 
a future intention to discriminate that are 
prohibited by ORS 659A.409. In an interim 
order on the cross-motions, the ALJ agreed 
with BOLI on the first two questions, 
concluding that the Kleins' refusal to provide 
a wedding cake violated ORS 659A.403, and 
that the statute was constitutional, both 
facially and as applied under the 
circumstances. However, the ALJ agreed 
with the Kleins that Aaron's statements 
during the CBN and Perkins interviews had 
not been prospective; rather, the ALJ 
determined that those statements "are 
properly construed as the recounting of past 
events that led to the present Charges being 
filed," and therefore did not violate ORS 
659A.409. 
After the ALJ's rulings on the various 
motions, only the issue of damages remained 
to be decided at a hearing. BOLI alleged that 
each complainant was claiming damages of 
"at least $75,000," and it adduced evidence at 
the hearing—through testimony of the 
complainants and others—concerning 
emotional harm that the complainants 
suffered in the wake of the Kleins' refusal to 
make their wedding cake. During closing 
arguments, BOLI also asked that the ALJ 
award damages for the distress that the 
complainants suffered as a result of media 
and socialmedia attention after the denial of 
service. In response, the Kleins argued that 
the complainants were not credible but that, 
even if the ALJ were to find them credible, 
their emotional distress was attributable to 
sources other than the denial of service that 
were not lawful bases for a damages award, 
such as media attention and family conflicts. 
The Kleins also argued that the amount of 
damages requested by BOLI far exceeded 
anything that the agency had previously 
sought for similar violations. 
After six days of testimony and argument 
regarding the damages issue, the ALJ issued 
a proposed final order that encompassed his 
earlier summary judgment and procedural 
rulings and also addressed the question of 
damages. With respect to damages, the ALJ 
found that Rachel had testified credibly about 
her emotional distress, but that Laurel had not 
been present at the cake refusal and had, in 
some respects, exaggerated the extent and 
severity of her emotional suffering. The ALJ 
concluded that there was no basis in law for 
awarding damages to the complainants for 
their emotional suffering caused by media 
and social-media attention. Ultimately, the 
ALJ determined that $75,000 was an 
appropriate award to compensate Rachel for 
her suffering as a result of the denial of 
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service, and that a lesser amount, $60,000, 
was appropriate to compensate Laurel. 
Both the Kleins and the agency filed 
exceptions to the ALJ's proposed final order. 
BOLI, through its commissioner, Avakian, 
then issued its final order that, for the most 
part, was consistent with the ALJ's reasoning 
in his proposed order. Specifically, BOLI's 
final order affirmed the ALJ's determinations 
that the Kleins violated ORS 659A.403, it 
affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that 
application of that statute did not violate the 
Kleins' constitutional rights, and it affirmed 
the damages awards. However, the final 
order departed from the ALJ's determination 
in one respect: whether the Kleins had 
violated ORS 659A.409 by conveying an 
intention to discriminate in the future. On that 
question, the final order determined that, 
based on Aaron's statements during the CBN 
and Perkins interviews, and the handwritten 
sign taped to the bakery's window, the Kleins 
had conveyed an intention to unlawfully 
discriminate in the future by refusing service 
based on sexual orientation. Thus, BOLI 
reversed the ALJ's ruling on that matter and 
concluded that the Kleins violated ORS 
659A.409; but, BOLI did not award any 
damages based on that particular violation 
"because there is no evidence in the record 
that Complainants experienced any mental, 
emotional, or physical suffering because of 
it." This petition for judicial review followed. 
II. ANALYSIS 
In their petition, the Kleins raise four 
assignments of error. In their first 
assignment, they argue that BOLI erred by 
applying ORS 659A.403 to their refusal to 
make the wedding cake. Within that 
assignment, they argue that BOLI 
misinterpreted the statute to apply to the 
refusal; alternatively, they argue that, as 
applied under these circumstances, the statute 
abridges their rights to freedom of expression 
and religious exercise under the federal and 
state constitutions. In their second 
assignment, the Kleins argue that their due 
process rights were violated by the 
commissioner's failure to recuse himself. The 
Kleins' third assignment asserts that BOLI's 
damages award is not supported by 
substantial evidence or substantial reason. 
And, in their fourth assignment, they argue 
that BOLI erred by applying ORS 
659A.409because their statements after the 
refusal did not communicate an intention to 
discriminate in the future. We address each 
assignment of error in turn. 
A. First Assignment: Interpretation and 
Application of ORS 659A.403 
1. Meaning and scope of ORS 659A.403 
In their first assignment of error, the Kleins 
argue that BOLI misinterpreted ORS 
659A.403—specifically, what it means to 
deny equal service "on account of" sexual 
orientation. According to the Kleins, they did 
not decline service to the complainants "on 
account of" their sexual orientation; rather, 
"they declined to facilitate the celebration of 
a union that conveys messages about 
marriage to which they do not [subscribe] and 
that contravene their religious beliefs." BOLI 
rejected that argument, reasoning that the 
Kleins' "refusal to provide a wedding cake for 
Complainants because it was for their same-
sex wedding was synonymous with refusing 
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to provide a cake because of Complainants' 
sexual orientation." We, like BOLI, are not 
persuaded that the text, context, or history 
of ORS 659A.403 contemplates the 
distinction proposed by the Kleins. 
We review BOLI's interpretation of ORS 
659A.403 for legal error, without deference 
to the agency's construction of the statute. To 
determine the legislature's intended meaning 
of ORS 659A.403, we use the analytic 
framework set forth in State v. Gaines, 
whereby we look to the text of the statute in 
its context, along with any helpful legislative 
history. 
The text of ORS 659A.403(1) leaves little 
doubt as to its breadth and operation. It 
provides, in full: 
"(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of 
this section, all persons within the 
jurisdiction of this state are entitled to the full 
and equal accommodations, advantages, 
facilities and privileges of any place of public 
accommodation, without any distinction, 
discrimination or restriction on account 
of race, color, religion, sex, sexual 
orientation, national origin, marital status or 
age if the individual is of age, as described in 
this section, or older." 
The phrase "on account of" is unambiguous: 
In ordinary usage, it is synonymous with "by 
reason of" or "because of."  And it has long 
been understood to carry that meaning in the 
context of antidiscrimination statutes.  
Thus, by its plain terms, the statute requires 
only that the denial of full and equal 
accommodations be causally connected to the 
protected characteristic or status—in this 
case, "sexual orientation," which is defined to 
mean "an individual's actual or perceived 
heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality 
or gender identity, regardless of whether the 
individual's gender identity, appearance, 
expression or behavior differs from that 
traditionally associated with the individual's 
sex at birth."  
In this case, Sweetcakes provides a service—
making wedding cakes—to heterosexual 
couples who intend to wed, but it denies the 
service to same-sex couples who likewise 
intend to wed. Under any plausible 
construction of the plain text of ORS 
659A.403, that denial of equal service is "on 
account of," or causally connected to, the 
sexual orientation of the couple seeking to 
purchase the Kleins' wedding-cake service. 
The Kleins do not point to any text in the 
statute or provide any context or legislative 
history suggesting that we should depart from 
the ordinary meaning of those words. What 
they argue instead is that the statute is silent 
as to whether it encompasses "gay conduct" 
as opposed to sexual orientation. The Kleins 
state that they are willing to serve 
homosexual customers, so long as those 
customers do not use the Kleins' cakes in 
celebration of same-sex weddings. As such, 
accordingto the Kleins, they do not 
discriminate against same-sex couples "on 
account of" their status; rather, they simply 
refuse to provide certain services that those 
same-sex couples want. The Kleins contend 
that BOLI's "broad equation of celebrations 
(weddings) of gay conduct (marriage) with 
gay status rewrites and expands Oregon's 
public accommodations law." 
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We see no evidence that the drafters of 
Oregon's public accommodations laws 
intended that type of distinction between 
status and conduct. First, there is no reason to 
believe that the legislature intended a 
"status/conduct" distinction specifically with 
regard to the subject of "sexual orientation." 
When the legislature in 2007 added "sexual 
orientation" to the list of protected 
characteristics in ORS 659A.403, Or Laws 
2007, ch 100, § 5, it was unquestionably 
aware of the unequal treatment that gays and 
lesbians faced in securing the same rights and 
benefits as heterosexual couples in 
committed relationships. During the same 
session that the legislature amended ORS 
659A.403 to include "sexual orientation," it 
adopted the Oregon Family Fairness Act, 
which recognized the "numerous obstacles" 
that gay and lesbian couplesfaced and was 
intended to "extend[ ] benefits, protections 
and responsibilities to committed same-sex 
partners and their children that are 
comparable to those provided to married 
individuals and their children by the laws of 
this state." To that end, section 9 of that law 
provided: 
"Any privilege, immunity, right or benefit 
granted by statute, administrative or court 
rule, policy, common law or any other law to 
an individual because the individual is or was 
married, or because the individual is or was 
an in-law in a specified way to another 
individual, is granted on equivalent terms, 
substantive and procedural, to an individual 
because the individual is or was in a domestic 
partnership or because the individual is or 
was, based on a domestic partnership, related 
in a specified way to another individual." 
The Kleins have not provided us with any 
persuasive explanation for why the 
legislature would have intended to grant 
equal privileges and immunities to 
individuals in same-sex relationships while 
simultaneously excepting those committed 
relationships from the protections of ORS 
659A.403. 
Nor does the Kleins' proposed distinction 
find support in the context or history of ORS 
659A.403 more generally. As originally 
enacted in 1953, the statute prohibited "any 
distinction, discrimination or restriction on 
account of race, religion, color or national 
origin." One of the purposes of the statute, the 
Supreme Court has observed, was "to prevent 
'operators and owners of businesses catering 
to the general public to subject Negroes to 
oppression and humiliation.'” Yet, under the 
distinction proposed by the Kleins, owners 
and operators of businesses could continue to 
oppress and humiliate black people simply by 
recasting their bias in terms of conduct rather 
than race. For instance, a restaurant could 
refuse to serve an interracial couple, not on 
account of the race of either customer, but on 
account of the conduct—interracial dating—
to which the proprietor objected. In the 
absence of any textual or contextual support, 
or legislative history on that point, we decline 
to construe ORS 659A.403 in a way that 
would so fundamentally undermine its 
purpose. 
Tellingly, the Kleins' argument for 
distinguishing between "gay conduct" and 
sexual orientation is rooted in principles that 
they derive from United States Supreme 
Court cases rather than anything in the text, 
context, or history of ORS 659A.403. 
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Specifically, the Kleins draw heavily on the 
Supreme Court's reasoning in Bray v. 
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, which 
concerned the viability of a federal cause of 
action under 42 USC section 1985(3) against 
persons obstructing access to abortion 
clinics. In that case, the Supreme Court 
addressed, among other things, whether the 
petitioners' opposition to abortion reflected 
an animus against women in general—that is, 
whether, because abortion is "an activity 
engaged in only by women, to disfavor it is 
ipso facto to discriminate invidiously against 
women as a class."  
In rejecting that theory of ipso facto 
discrimination, the Court observed: 
"Some activities may be such an irrational 
object of disfavor that, if they are targeted, 
and if they also happen to be engaged in 
exclusively or predominantly by a particular 
class of people, an intent to disfavor that class 
can readily be presumed. A tax on wearing 
yarmulkes is a tax on Jews. But opposition to 
voluntary abortion cannot possibly be 
considered such an irrational surrogate for 
opposition to (or paternalism towards) 
women. Whatever one thinks of abortion, it 
cannot be denied that there are common and 
respectable reasons for opposing it, other 
than hatred of, or condescension toward (or 
indeed any view at all concerning), women as 
a class—as is evident from the fact that men 
and women are on both sides of the issue, just 
as men and women are on both sides of 
petitioners' unlawful demonstrations." 
The Kleins argue that "[t]he same is true here. 
Whatever one thinks of same-sex weddings, 
there are respectable reasons for not wanting 
to facilitate them." They contend that BOLI 
simply "ignores Bray" and that BOLI's 
construction of ORS 659A.403 "fails the test 
for equating conduct with status" that the 
Supreme Court announced in that case. 
Bray, which involved a federal statute, does 
not inform the question of what the Oregon 
legislature intended when it enacted ORS 
659A.403. But beyond that, Bray does not 
articulate a relevant test for analyzing the 
issue presented in this case. Bray addressed 
the inferences that could be drawn from 
opposition to abortion as a "surrogate" for 
sex-based animus, and it was in that context 
that the Supreme Court described "irrational 
object[s] of disfavor" that "happen to be 
engaged in exclusively or predominantly by 
a particular class of people," such that intent 
to discriminate against that class can be 
presumed. 
Here, by contrast, there is no surrogate. The 
Kleins refused to make a wedding cake for 
the complainants precisely and expressly 
because of the relationship between sexual 
orientation and the conduct at issue (a 
wedding). And, where a close relationship 
between status and conduct exists, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the 
type of distinction urged by the Kleins. We 
therefore reject the Kleins' proposed 
distinction between status and conduct, and 
we hold that their refusal to serve the 
complainants is the type of discrimination 
"on account of * * * sexual orientation" that 
falls within the plain meaning of ORS 
659A.403.  
The reasons for the Kleins' discrimination on 
account of sexual orientation—regardless of 
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whether they are "common and respectable" 
within the meaning of Bray—raise questions 
of constitutional law, not statutory 
interpretation. The Kleins, in the remainder 
of their argument concerning the construction 
of ORS 659A.403, urge us to consider those 
constitutional questions and to interpret the 
statute in a way that avoids running afoul of 
the "Speech and Religion Clauses of the 
Oregon and United States constitutions." 
However, that canon applies only where the 
court is faced with competing plausible 
constructions of the statute. Here, the Kleins 
have not made that threshold showing of 
ambiguity. Accordingly, we affirm BOLI's 
order with regard to its construction of ORS 
659A.403, and we turn to the merits of the 
Kleins' constitutional arguments. 
2. Constitutional challenges to ORS 
659A.403 
The Kleins invoke both the United States and 
the Oregon constitutions in arguing that the 
final order violates their rights to free 
expression and the free exercise of their 
religion. Oregon courts generally seek to 
resolve arguments under the state 
constitution before turning to the federal 
constitution. In this case, however, the Kleins 
draw almost entirely on well-developed 
federal constitutional principles, and they do 
not meaningfully develop any independent 
state constitutional theories. Accordingly, in 
the discussion that follows, we address the 
Kleins' federal constitutional arguments first 
and their state arguments second.  
a. Free expression 
The Kleins argue that BOLI's final order 
violates their First Amendment right to 
freedom of speech. BOLI argues that the 
order simply enforces ORS 659A.403, a 
content-neutral regulation of conduct that 
does not implicate the First Amendment at 
all. And each side argues that United States 
Supreme Court precedent is decisively in its 
favor. 
The issues before us arise at the intersection 
of two competing principles: the 
government's interest in promoting full 
access to the state's economic life for all of its 
citizens, which is expressed in public 
accommodations statutes like ORS 
659A.403, and an individual's First 
Amendment right not to be compelled to 
express or associate with ideas with which 
she disagrees. Although the Supreme Court 
has grappled with that intersection before, it 
has not yet decided a case in this particular 
context, where the public accommodation at 
issue is a retail business selling a service, like 
cake-making, that is asserted to involve 
artistic expression.  
It is that asserted artistic element that 
complicates the First Amendment analysis—
and, ultimately, distinguishes this case from 
the precedents on which the parties rely. 
Generally speaking, the First Amendment 
does not prohibit government regulation of 
"commerce or conduct" whenever such 
regulation indirectly burdens speech. When, 
however, the government regulates activity 
that involves a "significant expressive 
element," some degree of First Amendment 
scrutiny is warranted.  
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In the discussion that follows, we conclude 
that the Kleins have not demonstrated that 
their wedding cakes invariably constitute 
fully protected speech, art, or other 
expression, and we therefore reject the 
Kleins' position that we must subject BOLI's 
order to strict scrutiny under the First 
Amendment. At most, the Kleins have shown 
that their cake-making business includes 
some arguably expressive elements as well as 
non-expressive elements, so as to trigger 
intermediate scrutiny. We assume (without 
deciding) that that is true, and then conclude 
that BOLI's order nonetheless survives 
intermediate scrutiny because any burden on 
the Kleins' expressive activities is no greater 
than is essential to further Oregon's 
substantial interest in promoting the ability of 
its citizens to participate equally in the 
marketplace without regard to sexual 
orientation. 
(1) "Public accommodations" and the First 
Amendment 
Oregon enacted its Public Accommodation 
Act in 1953. The original act guaranteed the 
provision of "full and equal accommodations, 
advantages, facilities and privileges * * * 
without any distinction, discrimination or 
restriction on account of race, religion, color, 
or national origin." It applied to "any hotel, 
motel or motor court, any place offering to 
the public food or drink for consumption on 
the premises, or any place offering to the 
public entertainment, recreation or 
amusement.” Oregon's statute was thus 
similar in scope to Title II of the federal Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits 
discrimination "on the ground of race, color, 
religion, or national origin" in three broad 
categories of public accommodations: those 
that provide lodging to transient guests, those 
that sell food for consumption on the 
premises, and those that host "exhibition[s] 
or entertainment," such as theaters and sports 
arenas. When the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the public accommodations 
provisions of Title II in 1964, it observed that 
the constitutionality of state public 
accommodations laws at that point had 
remained "unquestioned," citing previous 
instances in which it had "rejected the claim 
that the prohibition of racial discrimination in 
public accommodations interferes with 
personal liberty."  
Over two decades, the Oregon legislature 
incrementally expanded the definition of 
"place of public accommodation" to include 
"trailer park[s]" and "campground[s]," and 
then to places "offering to the public food or 
drink for consumption on or off the 
premises.” Then, in 1973, the legislature 
significantly expanded the definition to 
include "any place or service offering to the 
public accommodations, advantages, 
facilities or privileges whether in the nature 
of goods, services, lodgings, amusements or 
otherwise," subject to an exception for "any 
institution, bona fide club or place of 
accommodation which is in its nature 
distinctly private." Other states similarly 
enlarged the scope of their public-
accommodations laws over time.  
First Amendment challenges to the 
application of public-accommodations 
laws—and other forms of anti-discrimination 
laws—have been mostly unsuccessful. The 
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly 
acknowledged that public accommodations 
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statutes in particular are "well within the 
State's usual power to enact when a 
legislature has reason to believe that a given 
group is the target of discrimination."  The 
Court has further acknowledged that states 
enjoy "broad authority to create rights of 
public access on behalf of [their] citizens," in 
order to ensure "wide participation in 
political, economic, and cultural life" and to 
prevent the "stigmatizing injury" and "the 
denial of equal opportunities" that 
accompanies invidious discrimination in 
public accommodations. And the Court has 
recognized a state's interest in preventing the 
"unique evils" that stem from "invidious 
discrimination in the distribution of publicly 
available goods, services, and other 
advantages." 
However, as states adopted more expansive 
definitions of "places of public 
accommodation," their anti-discrimination 
statutes began to reach entities that 
were different in kind from the commercial 
establishments that were the original target of 
public accommodations laws. As a result, on 
two occasions, the Court held that the 
application of such laws violated the First 
Amendment. 
First, in Hurley, the court held that 
Massachusetts's public accommodations law 
could not be applied to require a St. Patrick's 
Day parade organizer to include a gay-rights 
group in its parade.  Observing that state 
public accommodations laws do not, "as a 
general matter, violate the First or Fourteenth 
Amendments," the Court went on to conclude 
that the Massachusetts law had been "applied 
in a peculiar way" to a private parade, a result 
that "essentially requir[ed]" the parade 
organizers to "alter the expressive content of 
their parade" by accommodating a message 
(of support for gay rights) that they did not 
want to include. The Court further reasoned 
that such an application of the statute "had the 
effect of declaring the [parade] sponsors' 
speech itself to be the public 
accommodation," which violated "the 
fundamental rule of protection under the First 
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy 
to choose the content of his own message."  
Following Hurley, the Court decided Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale, (Dale), in which 
it held that applying New Jersey's public 
accommodations law to require the Boy 
Scouts to admit a gay scoutmaster violated 
the group's First Amendment right to 
freedom of association. The Court observed 
that, over time, public accommodations laws 
had been expanded to cover more than just 
"traditional places of public 
accommodation—like inns and trains." 
According to the Court, New Jersey's 
definition of a "place of public 
accommodation" was "extremely broad," 
particularly because the state had "applied its 
public accommodations law to a private 
entity without even attempting to tie the term 
'place' to a physical location." The court 
distinguished Dale from prior cases in which 
it held that public accommodations laws 
posed no First Amendment problem, 
observing that, in those prior cases, the law's 
enforcement did not "materially interfere 
with the ideas that the organization sought to 
express."  
Thus, Hurley and Dale demonstrate that the 
First Amendment may stand as a barrier to 
the application of state public 
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accommodations laws when such laws are 
applied to "peculiar" circumstances outside 
of the usual commercial context.  
In this case, the Kleins concede that 
Sweetcakes is a "place of public 
accommodation" under Oregon law because 
it is a retail bakery open to the public. But the 
Kleins contend that, as in Hurley and Dale, 
application of ORS 659A.403 in this case 
violates their First Amendment rights. 
(2) First Amendment precedent 
BOLI and the Kleins offer competing United 
States Supreme Court precedent that, they 
argue, clearly requires a result in their 
respective favors. We begin our analysis by 
explaining why we do not regard the 
authorities cited by the parties as controlling. 
The Kleins argue that the effect of BOLI's 
final order is to compel them to express a 
message—a celebration of same-sex 
marriage—with which they disagree. They 
primarily draw on two interrelated lines 
of First Amendment cases that, they contend, 
preclude the application of ORS 
659A.403 here. 
First, the Kleins rely on cases holding that the 
government may not compel a person to 
speak or promote a government message with 
which the speaker does not agree.  
We do not consider that line of cases to be 
helpful here. In "compelled speech" cases 
like Barnette and Wooley, the government 
prescribed a specific message that the 
individual was required to express. ORS 
659A.403 does nothing of the sort; it is a 
content-neutral regulation that is not directed 
at expression at all. It does not even regulate 
cake-making; it simply prohibits the refusal 
of service based on membership in a 
protected class. The United States Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that such content-
neutral regulations—although they may have 
incidental effects on an individual's 
expression—are an altogether different, and 
generally permissible, species of government 
action than a regulation of speech. In short, 
we reject the Kleins' analogy of this case to 
Barnette and Wooley. 
Second, the Kleins rely heavily on Hurley 
and Dale, which, as discussed above, 
invalidated the application of public 
accommodations statutes in "peculiar" 
circumstances outside of the usual 
commercial context. The difficulty with that 
analogy is that this case does involve the 
usual commercial context; Sweetcakes is not 
a private parade or membership organization, 
and it is hardly "peculiar," as that term was 
used in Hurley, to apply ORS 659A.403 to a 
retail bakery like Sweetcakes that is open to 
the public and that exists for the purpose of 
engaging in commercial transactions. Indeed, 
the Kleins accept the premise that 
Sweetcakes is a place of public 
accommodation under Oregon law, and that, 
as such, it must generally open its doors to 
customers of all sexual orientations, 
regardless of the Kleins' religious views 
about homosexuality. Thus, if the Kleins are 
to succeed in avoiding compliance with the 
statute, it cannot be because their activity 
occurs outside the ordinary commercial 
context that the government has wide latitude 
to regulate, as was the case in Hurley and 
Dale. The Kleins must find support 
elsewhere. 
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In BOLI's view, on the other hand, the Kleins' 
arguments are disposed of by the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in FAIR. In 
that case, an association of law schools and 
law faculty (FAIR) sought to enjoin the 
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment, a 
federal law that requires higher-education 
institutions, as a condition for receiving 
federal funds, to provide military recruiters 
with the same access to their campuses as 
non-military recruiters. Because FAIR 
opposed the military's policy at that time 
regarding homosexual service-members, 
FAIR argued that the equal-access 
requirement violated the schools' First 
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and 
association.  
The Court rejected FAIR's compelled-speech 
argument, reasoning that the Solomon 
Amendment "neither limits what law schools 
may say nor requires them to say anything," 
and, therefore, the law was a "far cry" from 
the compulsions at issue in Barnette and 
Wooley. The Court acknowledged that 
compliance with the Solomon Amendment 
would indirectly require the schools to 
"speak" in a sense because it would require 
the schools to send emails and post notices on 
behalf of the military if they chose to do so 
for other recruiters. Nevertheless, the Court 
found it dispositive that the Solomon 
Amendment did not "dictate the content of 
the speech at all, which is only 'compelled' if, 
and to the extent [that,] the school provides 
such speech for other recruiters." The Court 
distinguished that situation from those where 
"the complaining speaker's own message was 
affected by the speech it was forced to 
accommodate."  
In BOLI's view, this case is like FAIR 
because ORS 659A.403 does not directly 
compel any speech; even if one considers the 
Kleins' cake-making to involve some element 
of expression, the law only compels the 
Kleins to engage in that expression for same-
sex couples "if, and to the extent" that the 
Kleins do so for the general public. 
This case is distinguishable from FAIR, 
however, in a significant way. Essential to the 
holding in FAIR was that the schools were not 
compelled to express a message with which 
they disagreed. The schools evidently did not 
assert, nor did the Supreme Court 
contemplate, that there was a meaningful 
ideological or expressive component to the 
emails or notices themselves, which merely 
conveyed factual information about the 
presence of recruiters on campus. The Court 
thus distinguished the case from Barnette and 
Wooley, cases that addressed the harm that 
results from true compelled speech—that is, 
depriving a person of autonomy as a speaker 
and "inva[ding]" that person's "'individual 
freedom of mind.'” 
Here, unlike in FAIR, the Kleins very much 
do object to the substantive content of the 
expression that they believe would be 
compelled. They argue that their wedding 
cakes are works of art that express a 
celebratory message about the wedding for 
which they are intended, and that the Kleins 
cannot be compelled to create that art for a 
wedding that they do not believe should be 
celebrated. And there is evidentiary support 
for the Kleins' view, at least insofar as every 
wedding cake that they create partially 
reflects their own creative and aesthetic 
judgment. Whether that is sufficient to make 
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their cakes "art," the creation of which the 
government may not compel, is a question to 
which we will turn below, but even the 
Kleins' subjective belief that BOLI's order 
compels them to express a specific message 
that they ideologically oppose makes this 
case different from FAIR. 
That fact is also what makes this case difficult 
to compare to other public accommodations 
cases that the United States Supreme Court 
has decided. It appears that the Supreme 
Court has never decided a free-speech 
challenge to the application of a public 
accommodations law to a retail establishment 
selling highly customized, creative goods and 
services that arguably are in the nature of art 
or other expression. 
To put the problem into sharper focus, we see 
no reason in principle why the services of a 
singer, composer, or painter could not fit the 
definition of a "place of public 
accommodation" under ORS 659A.400. One 
can imagine, for example, a person whose 
business is writing commissioned music or 
poetry for weddings, or producing a sculpture 
or portrait of the couple kissing at an altar. 
One can also imagine such a person who 
advertises and is willing to sell those services 
to the general public, but who holds strong 
religious convictions against same-sex 
marriage and would feel her "freedom of 
mind" violated if she were compelled to 
produce her art for such an occasion. For the 
Kleins, this is that case. BOLI disagrees that 
a wedding cake is factually like those other 
examples, but the legal point that those 
examples illustrate is that existing public 
accommodations case law is awkwardly 
applied to a person whose "business" is 
artistic expression. The Court has not told us 
how to apply a requirement of 
nondiscrimination to an artist. 
We believe, moreover, that it is plausible that 
the United States Supreme Court would hold 
the First Amendment to be implicated by 
applying a public accommodations law to 
require the creation of pure speech or art. If 
BOLI's order can be understood to compel 
the Kleins to create pure "expression" that 
they would not otherwise create, it is possible 
that the Court would regard BOLI's order as 
a regulation of content, thus subject to strict 
scrutiny, the test for regulating fully 
protected expression.  
Although the Court has not clearly articulated 
the extent to which the First Amendment 
protects visual art and its creation, it has held 
that the First Amendment covers various 
forms of artistic expression, including music; 
"live entertainment," such as musical and 
dramatic performances; and video games. 
The Court has also made clear that a 
particularized, discernible message is not a 
prerequisite for First Amendment protection.  
In short, although ORS 659A.403 is a 
content-neutral regulation that is not directed 
at expression, the Kleins' arguments cannot 
be dismissed on that ground alone. Rather, 
we must decide whether the Kleins' cake-
making activity is sufficiently expressive, 
communicative, or artistic so as to implicate 
the First Amendment, and, if it is, whether 
BOLI's final order compelling the creation of 
such expression in a particular circumstance 
survives First Amendment scrutiny. 
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(3) Whether these cakes implicate the First 
Amendment 
If, as BOLI argues, the Kleins' wedding cakes 
are just "food" with no meaningful artistic or 
communicative component, then, as the 
foregoing discussion illustrates, BOLI's final 
order does not implicate the First 
Amendment; the Kleins' objection to having 
to "speak" as a result of ORS 659A.403 is no 
more powerful than it would be coming from 
the seller of a ham sandwich. On the other 
hand, if and to the extent that the Kleins' 
wedding cakes constitute artistic or 
communicative expression, then the First 
Amendment is implicated by BOLI's final 
order. In short, we must decide whether the 
act that the Kleins refused to perform—to 
design and create a wedding cake—is 
"sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication" so as to "fall within the 
scope" of the First Amendment.  
On this point, BOLI makes a threshold 
argument that we must address, which is that, 
because the Kleins refused service to Rachel 
and Laurel before even finding out what kind 
of cake the couple wanted, there is no basis 
for assessing the "artistic" component of 
whatever cake might have resulted. For all we 
know, BOLI reasons, Rachel and Laurel 
might have wanted a standardized cake that 
would not have involved any meaningful 
expressive activity on the part of the Kleins. 
However, we believe the fair interpretation of 
this record is that the Kleins do not offer such 
"standardized" or "off the shelf" wedding 
cakes; they testified that their practice for 
creating wedding cakes includes a 
collaborative and customized design process 
that is individual to the customer. According 
to the Kleins, they intend—and their "clients 
expect"—that "each cake will be uniquely 
crafted to be a statement of each customer's 
personality, physical tastes, theme and 
desires, as well as their palate." According to 
Melissa, she "almost never make[s] a cake 
without creating a unique element of style 
and customization." Furthermore, the 
complainants expressly stated that they 
wanted a cake "like" the one that the Kleins 
had created for Rachel's mother's wedding, 
which was a custom-designed cake. On this 
record, we therefore assume that any cake 
that the Kleins made for Rachel and Laurel 
would have followed the Kleins' customary 
practice. 
Consequently, the question is whether that 
customary practice, and its end product, are 
in the nature of "art." As noted above, if the 
ultimate effect of BOLI's order is to compel 
the Kleins to create something akin to pure 
speech, then BOLI's order may be subject to 
strict scrutiny. If, on the other hand, the 
Kleins' cake-making retail business involves, 
at most, both expressive and non-expressive 
components, and if Oregon's interest in 
enforcing ORS 659A.403 is unrelated to the 
content of the expressive components of a 
wedding cake, then BOLI's order need only 
survive intermediate scrutiny to comport with 
the First Amendment. 
The record reflects that the Kleins' wedding 
cakes follow a collaborative design process 
through which Melissa uses her customers' 
preferences to develop a custom design, 
including choices as to "color," "style," and 
"other decorative detail." Melissa shows 
customers previous designs "as inspiration," 
and she then draws "various designs on sheets 
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of paper" as part of a dialogue with the 
customer. From that dialogue, Melissa 
"conceives" and customizes "a variety of 
decorating suggestions" as she ultimately 
finalizes the design. Thus, the process does 
not simply involve the Kleins executing 
precise instructions from their customers; 
instead, it is clear that Melissa uses her own 
design skills and aesthetic judgments. 
Therefore, on this record, the Kleins' 
argument that their products entail artistic 
expression is entitled to be taken seriously. 
That being said, we are not persuaded that the 
Kleins' wedding cakes are entitled to the 
same level of constitutional protection as 
pure speech or traditional forms of artistic 
expression. In order to establish that their 
wedding cakes are fundamentally pieces of 
art, it is not enough that the 
Kleins believe them to be pieces of 
art. For First Amendment purposes, the 
expressive character of a thing must turn not 
only on how it is subjectively perceived by its 
maker, but also on how it will be perceived 
and experienced by others. Here, although we 
accept that the Kleins imbue each wedding 
cake with their own aesthetic choices, they 
have made no showing that other people will 
necessarily experience any wedding cake that 
the Kleins create predominantly as 
"expression" rather than as food. 
Although the Kleins' wedding cakes involve 
aesthetic judgments and have decorative 
elements, the Kleins have not demonstrated 
that their cakes are inherently "art," like 
sculptures, paintings, musical compositions, 
and other works that are both intended to 
be and are experienced predominantly as 
expression. Rather, their cakes, even when 
custom-designed for a ceremonial occasion, 
are still cakes made to be eaten. Although the 
Kleins themselves may place more 
importance on the communicative aspect of 
one of their cakes, there is no information in 
this record that would permit an inference 
that the same is true in all cases for 
the Kleins' customers and the people who 
attend the weddings for which the cakes are 
created. Moreover, to the extent that the 
cakes are expressive, they do not reflect only 
the Kleins' expression. Rather, they are 
products of a collaborative process in which 
Melissa's artistic execution is subservient to a 
customer's wishes and preferences. For those 
reasons, we do not agree that the Kleins' 
cakes can be understood to fundamentally 
and inherently embody the Kleins' 
expression, for purposes of the First 
Amendment.  
We also reject the Kleins' argument that, 
under the facts of this case, BOLI's order 
compels them to "host or accommodate 
another speaker's message" in a manner that 
the Supreme Court has deemed to be a 
violation of the First Amendment. In the only 
such case that involved the enforcement of a 
content-neutral public accommodations 
law, Hurley, the problem was that the 
speaker's autonomy was affected by the 
forced intermingling of messages, with 
consequences for how others would perceive 
the content of the expression. Here, because 
the Kleins refused to provide their wedding-
cake service to Rachel and Laurel altogether, 
this is not a situation where the Kleins were 
asked to articulate, host, or accommodate a 
specific message that they found offensive. It 
would be a different case if BOLI's order had 
awarded damages against the Kleins for 
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refusing to decorate a cake with a specific 
message requested by a customer. 
The Kleins' additional concern, as we 
understand it, is that a wedding cake 
communicates a "celebratory message" about 
the wedding for which it is intended, and the 
Kleins do not wish to "host" the message that 
same-sex weddings should be celebrated. 
But, unlike in Hurley, the Kleins have not 
raised a nonspeculative possibility that 
anyone attending the wedding will impute 
that message to the Kleins. We think it more 
likely that wedding attendees understand that 
various commercial vendors involved with 
the event are there for commercial rather than 
ideological purposes. Moreover, to the extent 
that the Kleins subjectively feel that they are 
being "associated" with the idea that same 
sex marriage is worthy of celebration, the 
Kleins are free to engage in their own speech 
that disclaims such support.  
In short, we disagree that the Kleins' wedding 
cakes are invariably in the nature of fully 
protected speech or artistic expression, and 
we further disagree that BOLI's order forces 
the Kleins to host, accommodate, or associate 
with anyone else's particular message. Thus, 
because we conclude that BOLI's order does 
not have the effect of compelling fully 
protected expression, it does not trigger strict 
scrutiny under the First Amendment. 
As noted above, however, BOLI's order is 
still arguably subject to intermediate First 
Amendment scrutiny if the Kleins' cake-
making activity involves both expressive and 
non-expressive elements. Here, we 
acknowledge that the Kleins' cake-making 
process is not a simple matter of combining 
ingredients and following a customer's 
precise specifications. Instead, based on the 
Kleins' customary practice, the ultimate 
effect of BOLI's order is to compel them to 
engage in a collaborative process with a 
customer and to create a custom product that 
they would not otherwise make. The Kleins' 
argument that that process involves 
individualized aesthetic judgments that are 
themselves within the realm of First 
Amendment protected expression is not 
implausible on its face. 
Ultimately, however, we need not resolve 
whether that argument is correct. That is 
because, even assuming (without deciding) 
that the Kleins' cake-making business 
involves aspects that may be deemed 
"expressive" for purposes of the First 
Amendment, BOLI's order is subject, at most, 
to intermediate scrutiny, and it survives such 
scrutiny, as explained below. 
(4) BOLI's final order survives First 
Amendment scrutiny 
Neither ORS 659A.403 nor BOLI's order is 
directed toward the expressive content of the 
Kleins' business. When a content-neutral 
regulation indirectly imposes a burden on 
protected expression, it will be sustained if 
"'it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; if the governmental 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and if the incidental restriction on 
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of 
that interest.'" 
We address each factor in turn. 
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We first address the state's interest in 
enforcing its public-accommodations law. As 
noted above, the United States Supreme 
Court has consistently acknowledged 
that states have a compelling interest both in 
ensuring equal access to publicly available 
goods and services and in preventing the 
dignitary harm that results from 
discriminatory denials of service. That 
interest is no less compelling with respect to 
the provision of services for same-sex 
weddings; indeed, that interest is particularly 
acute when the state seeks to prevent the 
dignitary harms that result from the unequal 
treatment of same-sex couples who choose to 
exercise their fundamental right to marry. 
Thus, we readily conclude that BOLI's order 
furthers "an important or substantial 
governmental interest." 
Furthermore, Oregon's interest is in no way 
related to the suppression of free expression. 
Rather, Oregon has an interest in preventing 
the harms that result from invidious 
discrimination that is "wholly apart from the 
point of view such conduct may transmit." 
BOLI's order reflects a concern with ensuring 
equal access to products like wedding cakes 
when a seller chooses to sell them to the 
general public, not a concern with 
influencing the expressive choices involved 
in designing or decorating a cake. 
Finally, we conclude that any burden 
imposed on the Kleins' expression is no 
greater than essential to further the 
state's interest. Again, it is significant that 
BOLI's order does not compel the Kleins to 
express an articulable message with which 
they disagree; rather, their objection is to 
being compelled to engage in any conduct 
that they regard as expressive.  "'[A]n 
incidental burden on speech is no greater than 
is essential, and therefore is permissible'" if 
"'the neutral regulation promotes a 
substantial government interest that would be 
achieved less effectively absent the 
regulation.'" Given that the state's interest is 
to avoid the "evil of unequal treatment, which 
is the injury to an individual's sense of self-
worth and personal integrity," there is no 
doubt that that interest would be undermined 
if businesses that market their goods and 
services to the "public" are given a special 
privilege to exclude certain groups from the 
meaning of that word. Thus, we conclude that 
the final order in this case survives First 
Amendment scrutiny. 
(5) Oregon Constitution, Article I, section 8 
The Kleins assert that BOLI's final order also 
violates their rights under Article I, section 8, 
of the Oregon Constitution, which provides 
that "[n]o law shall be passed restraining the 
free expression of opinion, or restricting the 
right to speak, write, or print freely on any 
subject whatever[.]" The Kleins' argument is 
limited to the observation that Article I, 
section 8, has been held to establish broader 
protection for speech than the First 
Amendment, a premise from which they 
conclude that, "since BOLI's Final Order 
violates the federal Constitution's Speech 
Clause, it also violates the Oregon 
Constitution's broader counterpart a fortiori." 
We have rejected the First Amendment 
predicate for that derivative argument, and 
the Kleins do not offer any separate analysis 
under the state constitution. Accordingly, we 
reject their argument under Article I, section 
8, without further discussion.  
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b. Free exercise of religion 
We turn to the Kleins' contention that BOLI's 
order violates their constitutional right to the 
free exercise of their religion. The Kleins 
advance two arguments under the United 
States Constitution: (1) BOLI's final order is 
not merely the application of a "neutral and 
generally applicable" law because it 
impermissibly "targets" religion, and (2) the 
order implicates the Kleins' "hybrid rights," 
subjecting it to heightened scrutiny that it 
cannot survive. The Kleins also invoke the 
Oregon Constitution's free-exercise clauses 
in Article I, sections 2 and 3, contending that: 
(1) as under the federal constitution, the final 
order impermissibly targets religion, and (2) 
even if the final order does not impermissibly 
target religion, they should be granted an 
exemption to ORS 659A.403 on religious 
grounds. For the reasons explained below, we 
reject the Kleins' arguments. 
The First Amendment proscribes laws 
"prohibiting the free exercise of" religion. 
The question presented by this case is 
whether BOLI's final order enforcing ORS 
659A.403 against the Kleins runs afoul of 
that constitutional guarantee; if it does, the 
order is invalid unless it can survive strict 
scrutiny.  
The answer begins with Employment 
Division, Oregon Department of Human 
Resources v. Smith, in which the United 
States Supreme Court held that "the right of 
free exercise does not relieve an individual of 
the obligation to comply with a 'valid and 
neutral law of general applicability on the 
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) 
conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).'" Put another way, neutral and 
generally applicable laws do not offend 
the Free Exercise Clause simply because "the 
law has the incidental effect of burdening a 
particular religious practice."  
To determine whether a law is "neutral," 
courts first ask whether "the object of [the] 
law is to infringe upon or restrict practices 
because of their religious motivation."  To 
determine a law's object, we begin with the 
text, as "the minimum requirement of 
neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its 
face.". "A law lacks facial neutrality if it 
refers to a religious practice without a secular 
meaning discernible from the language or 
context." "Apart from the text, the effect of a 
law in its real operation is strong evidence of 
its object." Additionally, whether a law is 
"generally applicable" depends on whether 
the government selectively seeks to advance 
its interests "only against conduct with a 
religious motivation." 
Nothing in the text of ORS 659A.403 or 
BOLI's final order is facially discriminatory 
towards the exercise of religious beliefs. 
Rather, the statute prohibits any "place of 
public accommodation" from discriminating 
"on account of" protected characteristics, 
including "sexual orientation." Similarly, 
BOLI's order is, on its face, a neutral 
application of ORS 659A.403 that gives no 
indication that the result would have been 
different if the Kleins' refusal of service was 
based upon secular rather than religious 
convictions. 
A law that is written in neutral terms may still 
violate the Free Exercise Clause, 
however. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
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Inc., the Court concluded that the city 
ordinances in question—which prohibited 
certain animal slaughtering for "ritual[s]" and 
"sacrifice"—were not neutral because some 
important terms, as the ordinances defined 
them, targeted the Santeria religion's practice 
of ritualistic animal sacrifice while 
exempting other secular and religious 
practices like hunting and kosher slaughter. 
The laws were also not "generally applicable" 
because they were substantially 
underinclusive in advancing the 
government's stated interests of protecting 
the public health and preventingcruelty to 
animals. Rather, the laws were "drafted with 
care to forbid few killings but those 
occasioned by religious sacrifice." 
Here, the Kleins advance a similar argument 
that BOLI's order violates the Free Exercise 
Clause because it applies ORS 659A.403 in a 
way that impermissibly "targets" religion for 
disfavored treatment. They contend that the 
final order was a "novel expansion" of ORS 
659A.403 that "was, at best, discretionary 
and done for the specific purpose of forcing 
business owners with moral reservations 
about same-sex marriage to either violate 
their consciences or go out of business." 
(Emphasis removed.) BOLI responds that no 
evidence exists to support the Kleins' 
assertions, which are "pure speculation and 
utterly without merit." 
On review of the record, we agree with BOLI. 
The Kleins have directed us to no evidence 
whatsoever that ORS 659A.403 was enacted 
for the purpose of singling out religiously 
motivated action, or that BOLI has 
selectively targeted religion in its 
enforcement of the statute. The Kleins 
likewise fail to support their assertion that 
BOLI's final order constitutes a "novel 
expansion" of the statute, rather than a 
straightforward application of a facially 
neutral statute to the facts of this case. For 
those reasons, the Kleins' "targeting" 
argument is meritless. 
The Kleins' second argument under the 
federal Free Exercise Clause is that the final 
order burdens their "hybrid rights." That is, 
the final order burdens both Free Exercise 
rights and other constitutional rights, a 
combination that purportedly triggers an 
exception to Smith and subjects even neutral 
laws of general applicability to strict scrutiny. 
The Kleins' argument relies on the following 
passage from Smith: 
"The only decisions in which we have held 
that the First Amendment bars application of 
a neutral, generally applicable law to 
religiously motivated action have involved 
not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but 
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with 
other constitutional protections, such as 
freedom of speech * * *. * * * 
"The present case does not present such a 
hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim 
unconnected with any communicative 
activity * * *." 
We have previously expressed skepticism 
about whether a "hybrid-rights "doctrine" 
exists, and, to the extent it does, how it could 
be properly applied. In Church at 295 S. 18th 
Street, St. Helens, we referred to 
the Smith passage as "dictum," observing that 
it merely "noted—without reference to any 
particular standard—that, in the past, the 
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Court had struck down neutral, generally 
applicable laws when a case 'involved' both 
the Free Exercise Clause and some other 
constitutional protection.” We questioned 
whether that dictum could be soundly applied 
as a legal standard in other cases: 
"Why the addition of another constitutional 
claim would affect the standard of review of 
a free exercise claim is not immediately 
obvious. Indeed, if the mere allegation of an 
additional constitutional claim has the effect 
of altering the standard articulated in Smith, 
then the 'hybrid' exception likely would 
swallow the Smith rule; free exercise claims 
will frequently also pose at least a colorable 
free speech claim. On the other hand, if the 
Court meant that strict scrutiny pertains only 
when an additional constitutional claim is 
successfully asserted, then the rule 
of Smith becomes mere surplusage, as the 
church already would win under the alternate 
constitutional theory." 
Other courts have similarly called the Smith 
passage dictum and have declined to follow 
it. 
The intervening years have given us no 
reason to reconsider our view that 
the Smith passage was dictum. Despite the 
considerable doubts about the "hybrid-rights 
doctrine" that have been expressed in case 
law and academic commentary, the United 
States Supreme Court has taken no further 
steps to embrace such a doctrine. We 
therefore agree with the Sixth Circuit's 
reasoning that, "at least until the Supreme 
Court holds that legal standards under 
the Free Exercise Clause vary depending on 
whether other constitutional rights are 
implicated, we will not use a stricter legal 
standard than that used in Smith to evaluate 
generally applicable, exception less state 
regulations under the Free Exercise Clause." 
Accordingly, we reject the Kleins' "hybrid-
rights doctrine" argument. 
As noted, the Kleins also invoke Article I, 
sections 2 and 3, of the Oregon Constitution 
(the free-exercise clauses). Under those 
clauses, when a law is not neutral and 
expressly targets religion, courts examine the 
law with "exacting scrutiny"; when the law is 
"neutral toward religion," the Oregon 
Supreme Court has framed the proper inquiry 
as whether there is "statutory authority to 
make such a regulation" and whether an 
individual claims "exemption on religious 
grounds."  
The Kleins' first argument is that the statute 
and final order are not neutral toward religion 
because they "target" the Kleins' religious 
practice. In support of that contention, the 
Kleins essentially incorporate their 
arguments under the federal Free Exercise 
Clause; they do not contend that the analysis 
meaningfully differs under the state 
constitution, and we therefore reject that 
argument for the same reasons discussed 
above. 
Second, the Kleins argue that, even in the 
absence of impermissible targeting, they 
should be granted a religious exemption from 
compliance with ORS 659A.403. They rely 
on two cases—Hickman and Cooper v. 
Eugene Sch. Dist. As BOLI correctly points 
out, however, neither of those cases actually 
created a religious exemption to a neutral 
law, or discussed the criteria, methodology, 
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or standards that a court would use in 
determining whether to grant one. Cooper 
dealt with a law that was "not neutral toward 
religion," which the Supreme Court 
distinguished from a "general" and "neutral" 
regulation that could present an issue of an 
"individual claim to exemption on religious 
grounds." Nearly two decades later, Hickman 
simply cited Cooper, in a case that similarly 
did not present the issue of whether to grant a 
religious exemption. 
In short, although the Kleins argue that the 
Oregon Constitution requires that they be 
granted an exemption on religious grounds to 
an otherwise neutral law, the cases on which 
they rely did not impose such a requirement, 
but merely acknowledged an abstract 
possibility that it could happen in a future 
case. The Kleins have not offered a focused 
argument for why the Oregon Constitution 
requires an exemption in this case, under the 
methodology for interpreting our 
constitution. They simply assert that a 
religious exemption to ORS 659A.403's 
requirement of nondiscrimination on account 
of sexual orientation would impair the state's 
nondiscrimination goals "minimally, if at 
all," while furthering goals of "respect and 
tolerance for people of different beliefs." 
That argument does not amount to solid 
constitutional ground in which to root an 
individual exemption to a valid and neutral 
statute. 
Moreover, it is far from clear that a religious 
exemption as proposed by the Kleins would 
have only a "minimal" effect on the state's 
antidiscrimination objectives. The Kleins 
seek an exemption based on their sincere 
religious opposition to same-sex marriage; 
but those with sincere religious objections to 
marriage between people of different races, 
ethnicities, or faiths could just as readily 
demand the same exemption. The Kleins do 
not offer a principled basis for limiting their 
requested exemption in the manner that they 
propose, except to argue that there are 
"decent and honorable" reasons, grounded in 
religious faith, for opposing same-sex 
marriage, as recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court in Obergefell. That is not in 
dispute. But neither the sincerity, nor the 
religious basis, nor the historical pedigree of 
a particular belief has been held to give a 
special license for discrimination. 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject the 
Kleins' arguments that BOLI's final order 
violates the federal Free Exercise 
Clause or Article I, sections 2 and 3, of the 
Oregon Constitution. 
B. Second Assignment: Commissioner's 
Failure to Recuse Himself 
In their second assignment of error, the 
Kleins assert that BOLI's commissioner, 
Avakian, "the ultimate decision maker in this 
case, violated the Kleins' [d]ue [p]rocess 
rights by failing to recuse himself despite 
numerous public comments revealing his 
intent to rule against them." Specifically, they 
argue that Avakian's comments about the 
cake controversy in a Facebook post and in 
an article that appeared in The 
Oregonian show that he judged the Kleins' 
case before giving them an opportunity to 
present their version of the facts and the law. 
We agree with BOLI that Avakian's 
comments reflect, at most, his general views 
about the law and public policy, and therefore 
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are not the kind of comments that require 
disqualification. 
To establish a due-process violation, "[o]ne 
claiming that a decision[ ]maker is biased has 
the burden of showing actual bias." When 
that claim of bias is based on prejudgment, 
the relevant inquiry is whether "the decision 
maker has so prejudged the particular matter 
as to be incapable of determining its merits 
on the basis of the evidence and arguments 
presented.” 
Importantly, in assessing bias, courts have 
long distinguished between a decision-
maker's prejudgment of facts as opposed to 
preconceptions about law or policy, 
particularlyin the context of quasi-judicial 
decisions. As we explained in Samuel v. 
Board of Chiropractic Examiners, rev den, 
"[a] preconceived point of view concerning 
an issue of law * * * is not an independent 
basis for disqualification." In Cement Inst., 
the United States Supreme Court articulated 
that principle in the context of a challenge to 
the impartiality of the Federal Trade 
Commission: 
"[No previous] decision of this Court would 
require us to hold that it would be a violation 
of procedural due process for a judge to sit in 
a case after he had expressed an opinion as to 
whether certain types of conduct were 
prohibited by law. In fact, judges frequently 
try the same case more than once and decide 
identical issues each time, although these 
issues involved questions both of law and 
fact. Certainly, the Federal Trade 
Commission cannot possibly be 
under stronger constitutional compulsions in 
this respect than a court." 
Accordingly, public comments that convey 
preconceptions about law or policy related to 
a dispute do not automatically disqualify a 
decision-maker from judging that 
controversy. As Judge Jerome 
Frank succinctly observed in In re J.P. 
Linahan, Inc., if "'bias' and 'partiality' be 
defined to mean the total absence of 
preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then 
no one has ever had a fair trial and no one 
ever will." The touchstone of bias, instead, is 
whether the comments show that the decision 
maker is not capable of judging the 
controversy fairly on its own facts. 
In assessing a decision-maker's capability in 
that regard, we presume that public officials 
will perform their duties lawfully.  
In this case, Avakian's comments on 
Facebook and in the The Oregonian fall short 
of the kinds of statements that reflect 
prejudgment of the facts or an impermissibly 
closed-minded view of law or policy so as to 
indicate that he, as a decision maker, cannot 
be impartial. On Facebook, before a BOLI 
complaint had been filed, Avakian posted: 
"Everyone has a right to their religious 
beliefs, but that doesn't mean they can 
disobey laws that are already in place. Having 
one set of rules for everybody ensures that 
people are treated fairly as they goabout their 
daily lives." 
Below that paragraph, Avakian provided a 
link to "'Ace of Cakes' offers free wedding 
cake for Ore. Gay couple www.kgw.com.," 
followed by another paragraph: 
"The Oregon Department of Justice is 
looking into a complaint that a Gresham 
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bakery refused to make a wedding cake for a 
same sex marriage. * * * It started when a 
mother and daughter showed up at Sweet 
Cakes by Melissa looking for a wedding 
cake." 
Viewed in context with the rest of the post, 
Avakian's statements that "[e]veryone has a 
right to their religious beliefs, but that doesn't 
mean they can disobey laws that are already 
in place," and that "[h]aving one set of rules 
for everybody ensures that people are treated 
fairly as they go about their daily lives," are 
comments about the controversy between the 
Kleins and the complainants. However, they 
do not describe particular facts of the case, 
suggest that 
Avakian has already investigated or decided 
those facts, or even suggest that he has fixed 
views as to any defenses or interpretations of 
the law that might be advanced in the context 
of a contested proceeding. That is, they 
reflect his general views of law and policy 
regarding public accommodations laws, but 
not the type of prejudgment that casts doubt 
on whether he is capable of judging the 
controversy fairly in an official proceeding. 
Avakian's statements in The Oregonian 
article likewise fail to demonstrate that he 
was incapable of fairly judging this case. As 
BOLI points out, the Kleins selectively quote 
from that article to create an impression that 
Avakian was commenting specifically on 
their conduct. For instance, in quoting 
excerpts, the Kleins argue that Avakian "said 
that 'folks' in Oregon do not have a 'right to 
discriminate' and stated that those who use 
their 'beliefs' to justify discrimination need to 
be 'rehabilitate[d].'" (Alterations by the 
Kleins.) Later, the Kleins characterize 
Avakian as stating that "the Kleins * * * 
needed to be 'rehabilitate[d].'" 
The full quotations from that article, viewed 
in context, present a different picture. The 
article states, "'Everybody is entitled to their 
own beliefs, but that doesn't mean that folks 
have the right to discriminate,' Avakian 
said, speaking generally." That sentence 
follows a paragraph in which the author 
describes the antidiscrimination law 
generally. Given that context, and the 
author's express qualification that Avakian 
was "speaking generally," there is no basis on 
which to conclude that Avakian was 
commenting specifically on the merits of the 
Kleins' case. 
Similarly, and contrary to the Kleins' 
suggestion, the article does not quote 
Avakian as saying that the Kleins must be 
"rehabilitated." Rather, the article quotes 
Avakian concerning a more general 
proposition: "'The goal is never to shut down 
a business. The goal is to rehabilitate,' 
Avakian said. 'For those who do violate the 
law, we want them to learn from that 
experience and have a good, successful 
business in Oregon.'" Again, nothing in that 
quote suggests that Avakian was responding 
to a question about the Kleins in particular, as 
opposed to BOLI investigations in general. 
Indeed, the context again suggests the latter. 
The next sentence in the article states, "The 
bureau's civil rights division conducts about 
2,200 investigations a year on all types of 
discrimination, Avakian said." 
There is, in fact, only one quote attributed to 
Avakian in The Oregonian article that 
appears to relate specifically to the Kleins' 
 644 
case—one that they do not mention. With 
regard to BOLI's investigation of the 
complaint against the Kleins, Avakian is 
quoted as saying, "'We are committed to a fair 
and thorough investigation to determine 
whether there's substantial evidence of 
unlawful discrimination.'" 
In sum, the public comments on which the 
Kleins rely do not demonstrate anything 
more than Avakian's general views about law 
and policy related to antidiscrimination 
statutes. Because those types of public 
comments do not establish a lack of 
impartiality for purposes of due process, we 
reject the Kleins' second assignment of error. 
C. Third Assignment: Damages Award 
In their third assignment of error, the Kleins 
argue that BOLI's damages award of $75,000 
and $60,000 to Rachel and Laurel, 
respectively, is not supported by substantial 
evidence or substantial reason. Within the 
assignment of error, they make three distinct 
contentions: (1) the damages award is 
inconsistent with BOLI's findings and 
ignores the Kleins' mitigating evidence and 
evidence of the complainants' discovery 
abuses; (2) the damages award is "internally 
contradictory" with regard to recovery for 
emotional distress resulting from publicity of 
the case; and (3) the damages award is out of 
line with BOLI's awards in other cases. As 
discussed below, we reject each of those 
challenges. 
To better frame the arguments, we provide 
additional context for the damages award. 
Under ORS 659A.850(4)(a)(B), BOLI is 
authorized to "[e]liminate the effects of the 
unlawful practice that the respondent is found 
to have engaged in, including but not limited 
to paying an award of actual damages 
suffered by the complainant and complying 
with injunctive or other equitable relief[.]" In 
this case, BOLI's formal charges alleged that, 
pursuant to that statute, each complainant 
claimed "[d]amages for emotional, mental, 
and physical suffering in the amount of at 
least $75,000." 
At the hearing on damages, BOLI offered 
evidence of the emotional distress that the 
complainants suffered as a result of the 
Kleins' denial of service, including testimony 
from Rachel and Laurel. The Kleins offered 
evidence to rebut BOLI's evidence that the 
refusal of service was the source of the 
complainants' distress, including evidence 
that, during the relevant time period, the 
complainants were engaged in a custody 
dispute for their two foster children. They 
also elicited testimony from Rachel's brother 
to support their theory that the complainants 
were pursuing the case for political reasons 
rather than to remedy emotional distress. 
During closing arguments, BOLI's 
prosecutor explained that the agency was 
seeking damages related to two different 
causes: 
"There are two distinct causes of emotional 
distress damages in this case. The first is the 
damage that's based on the refusal itself, and 
for that the Agency is seeking $75,000 for 
each Complainant. There is also the damages 
that resulted from the media scrutiny of this 
case, and for that amount we would defer to 
the forum's discretion." 
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BOLI's prosecutor then proceeded to argue 
the two causes separately, first recounting 
testimony about the feelings of 
embarrassment, depression, sadness, and 
anger that Rachel and Laurel experienced 
around the time of the refusal and thereafter, 
including the strain that it put on their 
relationship and their relationships with 
others. The prosecutor then argued that "[t]he 
second cause of emotional distress is this 
media scrutiny." She contended that the 
media coverage had made Rachel and Laurel 
fearful for their lives, afraid for the safety of 
their foster children, and anxious that it 
would jeopardize their then-pending efforts 
to adopt the children. 
Anticipating a challenge to the amount of the 
damages sought, BOLI's prosecutor argued 
that emotional distress damages are "very 
fact specific," and that "$75,000 for the 
refusal itself is very well within the 
parameters of what's appropriate."  
The Kleins responded that the complainants 
had not told a consistent story throughout; 
that there was no credible evidence that the 
emotional distress suffered by the 
complainants was actually caused by the 
denial of service as opposed to other factors 
in the complainants' lives, such as the custody 
dispute; that neither Rachel nor Laurel was 
present for Aaron's "abomination" statement 
when Cheryl returned to the shop and that, in 
any event, there was disagreement as to what 
he actually said; and that the previous cases 
referenced by BOLI's prosecutor involved 
more severe instances of discriminatory 
treatment. 
In rebuttal, BOLI's prosecutor emphasized 
that whether Aaron called the complainants 
"an abomination" or quoted a Bible verse 
using that word was "beside the point": 
"[H]ow it was couched doesn't really matter; 
the word is what resonated with the 
Complainants." 
In his proposed final order, the ALJ set forth 
extensive factual findings, including express 
credibility determinations regarding the 
witnesses at the hearing. The ALJ found that 
Rachel, despite being an "extremely 
emotional witness," had "answered questions 
directly in a forthright manner" and "did not 
try to minimize the effect of media exposure 
on her emotional state as compared to 
how the cake denial affected her." The ALJ 
explained that it credited Rachel's testimony 
"about her emotional suffering in its 
entirety," but that he "only credited her 
testimony about media exposure when she 
testified about specific incidents." 
The ALJ found Laurel less credible. That was 
because Laurel "was a very bitter and angry 
witness who had a strong tendency to 
exaggerate and over-dramatize events," 
argued with the Kleins' attorney and "had to 
be counseled by the ALJ to answer the 
questions asked of her instead of 
editorializing about the cake refusal and how 
it affected her," and her "testimony was 
inconsistent in several respects with more 
credible evidence.” Thus, the ALJ "only 
credited her testimony about media exposure 
when she testified about specific incidents" 
and otherwise credited her testimony only 
"when it was either (a) undisputed, or (b) 
disputed but corroborated by other credible 
testimony." 
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The ALJ then set forth his reasoning 
regarding a damages award, describing 
specific aspects of each complainant's 
emotional suffering and distinguished 
"suffering from the cake refusal" from 
"suffering from publicity about the case." 
With regard to the latter, the ALJ ultimately 
concluded that, as a factual matter, the Kleins 
were "responsible" for at least some of the 
publicity that had followed the initial refusal, 
but that "there is no basis in law for awarding 
damages to Complainants for their emotional 
suffering caused by media and social media 
attention related to this case." 
The ALJ's proposed final order then set forth 
his conclusion on the amount of damages 
related to the initial refusal: 
"In this case, the forum concludes that 
$75,000 and $60,000, are appropriate awards 
to compensate Complainants [Rachel] and 
[Laurel], respectively, for the emotional 
suffering they experienced from 
Respondents' cake refusal. [Laurel] is 
awarded the lesser amount because she was 
not present at the cake refusal and the forum 
found her testimony about the extent and 
severity of her emotional suffering to be 
exaggerated in some respects." 
BOLI, in its final order, largely adopted the 
reasoning and conclusions proposed by the 
ALJ, including his credibility determinations. 
BOLI, like the ALJ, separately discussed the 
emotional suffering of each complainant with 
regard to the denial of service and from 
publicity. And, like the ALJ, BOLI 
concluded that damages for emotional 
suffering caused by media attention were not 
recoverable. 
BOLI's final order also adopted the ALJ's 
analysis of the amount of damages to each 
complainant. The order states: 
"In this case, the ALJ proposed that $75,000 
and $60,000, are appropriate awards to 
compensate [Rachel and Laurel], 
respectively, for the emotional suffering they 
experienced from Respondents' denial of 
service. The proposal for [Laurel] is less 
because she was not present at the denial and 
the ALJ found her testimony about the extent 
and severity of her emotional suffering to be 
exaggerated in some respects. In this 
particular case, the demeanor of the witnesses 
was critical in determining both the 
sincerity and extent of the harm that was felt 
by [Rachel and Laurel]. As such, the 
Commissioner defers to the ALJ's perception 
of the witnesses and evidence presented at 
hearing and adopts the noneconomic award 
as proposed, finding also that this 
noneconomic award is consistent with the 
forum's prior orders." 
In a footnote to that paragraph, the order cites 
specific BOLI cases in which damages were 
awarded, in amounts ranging from $50,000 to 
$350,000 per complainant. 
With that background, we return to the issues 
presented by the Kleins' third assignment of 
error. 
1. Countervailing evidence 
The Kleins assert that BOLI's order "is 
inconsistent with its credibility 
determinations"—specifically, BOLI's 
findings regarding what Aaron actually said 
to Cheryl when she returned to Sweetcakes 
after the initial refusal of service. According 
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to the Kleins, BOLI found as fact that Aaron 
did not actually refer to Rachel as an 
"abomination" but had only quoted a verse 
from the Book of Leviticus, stating, "You 
shall not lie with a male as one lies with a 
female; it is an abomination." Yet, BOLI 
awarded damages to both complainants "for 
harm attributable to being called 
'abomination[s].'" 
We do not read BOLI's order to rest on a 
finding that Aaron specifically called the 
complainants "an abomination" as opposed to 
quoting a biblical verse. As described above, 
BOLI argued during the damages hearing 
that exactly how the word was "couched" was 
beside the point. BOLI's final order likewise 
reflects a focus on the effect of the word 
"abomination" on the complainants, 
including their recognition of that biblical 
reference and their associations with the 
reference. For instance, the order states that 
Rachel, who was brought up as a Southern 
Baptist, "interpreted [Aaron's] use of the 
word 'abomination' [to] mean that God made 
a mistake when he made her, that she wasn't 
supposed to exist, and that she had no right to 
love or be loved[.]" Similarly, the order states 
that Laurel recognized the statement as a 
reference from Leviticus and, based on her 
religious background, "understood the term 
'abomination' to mean 'this is a creature not 
created by God, not created with a soul. They 
are unworthy of holy love. They are not 
worthy of life.'" 
Viewing the final order as a whole, we see no 
inconsistency. BOLI found that Aaron used 
the term "abomination" in the course of 
explaining why he was denying service to the 
complainants on account of their sexual 
orientation, and further found that the 
complainants experienced emotional distress 
based on the use of that term. It is that nexus 
that underlies BOLI's damages award. 
The Kleins also argue that the final order does 
not account for certain evidence that 
undermined the damages case, including 
evidence that the complainants were pursuing 
the case out of a desire for political change 
and that they were experiencing stress from 
their custody dispute at the time. The Kleins 
also argue that the final order fails to account 
for ways in which the complainants frustrated 
the Kleins efforts to "discover the true extent 
of their alleged emotional harm." According 
to the Kleins, the final order therefore lacks 
substantial reason. 
The Kleins' argument in that regard 
"misconceives the nature of the substantial 
reason requirement." As the Supreme Court 
explained in Jenkins, an order satisfies the 
substantial reason requirement so long as it 
"provide[s] an explanation connecting the 
facts of the case and the result reached, and 
[there is] no indication that, in making its 
decision, the [agency] relied on evidence that 
did not qualify as substantial evidence." 
Beyond that, an agency generally is not 
required to explain why it was not persuaded 
by particular evidence.  
In this case, BOLI's order includes extensive 
factual findings regarding the emotional 
suffering that the complainants experienced 
and it connects the amount of damages to that 
suffering. That is sufficient to satisfy the 
substantial reason requirement, and we 
decline to reweigh, under the guise of 
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substantial reason, the competing evidence as 
to the extent of the complainants' damages. 
2. Damages from publicity and media 
attention 
Next, the Kleins argue that the damages 
award is internally inconsistent in its 
treatment of harm caused by media attention 
from the case. According to the Kleins, 
BOLI's formal charges "sought $150,000 in 
total damages based on alleged emotional 
suffering stemming from the denial of service 
and subsequent media exposure." (Emphases 
by the Kleins.) But then, despite concluding 
that the complainants were not entitled to 
recover for harm attributable to media 
exposure, the final order awards an amount 
close to the prayer. 
The Kleins' argument proceeds from a 
mistaken premise. BOLI's formal charges did 
not seek "$150,000 in total damages based 
on alleged emotional suffering stemming 
from the denial of service and subsequent 
media exposure."  Rather, the formal charges 
sought damages in "the amount of at least 
$75,000" for each complainant. And, as 
described above, BOLI's prosecutor clearly 
expressed during the damages hearing—and 
the ALJ plainly understood—that BOLI was 
seeking $75,000 for each complainant for the 
refusal itself and additional damages, at the 
ALJ's discretion, for harm attributable to 
media and social media attention. Both the 
ALJ's preliminary order and BOLI's final 
order reflect that understanding of the 
damages request. Thus, there is no plausible 
basis on which to infer that, by awarding 
$75,000 to Rachel and $60,000 to Laurel, 
BOLI relied to any extent on emotional 
suffering from media attention, particularly 
when BOLI's order expressly says otherwise. 
The Kleins' alternative contention regarding 
publicity damages is based on a statement 
that BOLI made in the context of denying 
recovery for those damages. In that part of the 
order, BOLI concluded that "complainants' 
emotional harm related to the denial of 
service continued throughout the period of 
media attention and that the facts related 
solely to emotional harm resulting from 
media attention do not adequately support an 
award of damages." According to the Kleins, 
that emphasized text reflects that BOLI 
"awarded damages for harm lasting over 
twenty-six months" related solely to the 
initial denial of service, yet the proposed final 
order and final order "note a near total lack of 
any such evidence" regarding persistent harm 
from the initial refusal. 
The Kleins' mischaracterize the relevant 
orders. In his proposed final order, the ALJ 
distinguished testimony about specific 
incidents involving emotional suffering from 
testimony about emotional suffering more 
generally. The ALJ credited Laurel's 
testimony that she "still feels emotional 
effects from the denial of service because 
[Rachel and their two children] 'were' still 
suffering and that 'was' tearing me apart." The 
ALJ also specifically found that Rachel had 
not tried "to minimize the effect of media 
exposure on her emotional state as compared 
to how the cake denial affected her," and he 
credited Rachel's testimony "about her 
emotional suffering in its entirety." His order 
further states: 
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"Without giving any specific examples, 
[Rachel] credibly testified that, in a general 
sense, the cake refusal has caused her 
continued emotional suffering up to the time 
of hearing. Other than that, she did not testify 
as to any specific suffering she experienced 
after February 1 that was directly attributable 
to the cake refusal." 
In adopting the ALJ's reasoning, BOLI's final 
order similarly distinguished between 
generalized testimony and testimony about 
specific instances of suffering, and it repeated 
the ALJ's findings in that regard. 
Viewed in context, BOLI's findings and 
conclusions demonstrate that it credited 
Laurel's and Rachel's testimony that, at the 
time of the hearing, they continued to 
experience some degree of emotional 
suffering from the initial refusal, but the final 
order also reflects that BOLI understood that 
evidence to be generalized and 
limited. Nothing in the final order indicates 
that BOLI gave that evidence more weight 
than it could bear, or suggests that the agency 
relied on evidence that was not substantial 
when determining damages. Rather, the 
complainants' generalized evidence of 
continued suffering until the time of the 
hearing is one among the many facts on 
which the agency relied to support the 
damages award in the final order.  
3. Consistency with other BOLI awards 
Finally, the Kleins argue that BOLI's award 
lacks substantial reason because it is "out of 
line with comparable cases." The Kleins 
contend, as they did below, that the 
complainants' suffering relates to a single, 
discrete incident, whereas past BOLI cases 
with such significant damages awards 
involved ongoing harassment and typically 
involved emotional suffering so severe that it 
required medical treatment. 
Fact-matching, when considering emotional 
distress damages, is of limited value. As we 
explained in Edwards, BOLI must consider 
"the type of discriminatory conduct, and the 
duration, frequency, and severity of the 
conduct. It also considers the type and 
duration of the mental distress and the 
vulnerability of the [c]omplainant." The 
actual amount of any award, therefore, 
depends on the facts presented by each 
complainant. 
As BOLI notes in its final order, the agency 
has awarded far greater damages than 
$75,000 and $60,000 to a complainant in 
cases involving invidious discrimination. 
Nonetheless, given BOLI's detailed factual 
findings about the effect of the refusal of 
service on these particular complainants—
including anger, depression, questioning 
their own identity and self-worth, 
embarrassment, shame, frustration, along 
with anxiety and reduced excitement about 
the wedding itself—we cannot say that the 
order is so far out of line with previous cases 
that it lacks substantial reason. 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject the third 
assignment of error and affirm the damages 
award. 
D. Fourth Assignment: Application of ORS 
659A.409 
In their fourth assignment of error, the Kleins 
contend that BOLI erred in concluding that 
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they violated ORS 659A.409. That statute 
provides, as pertinent here, that 
"it is an unlawful practice for any person 
acting on behalf of any place of public 
accommodation as defined in ORS 
659A.400 to publish, circulate, issue or 
display, or cause to be published, circulated, 
issue or displayed, any communication, 
notice, advertisement or sign of any kind to 
the effect that any of the accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, services or privileges 
of the place of public accommodation will be 
refused, withheld from or denied to, or that 
any discrimination will be made against, any 
person on account of race, color, religion, 
sex, sexual orientation, national origin, 
marital status or age * * *." 
In essence, the statute makes it unlawful to 
threaten to commit unlawful discrimination. 
In its final order, BOLI concluded that the 
Kleins did so through several statements, as 
discussed below, and enjoined them from 
committing further violations. 
The Kleins acknowledge that BOLI "may 
enjoin people from threatening to 
discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation," without implicating the First 
Amendment. However, the Kleins argue that 
the statements that BOLI found objectionable 
did not communicate any intention to 
discriminate in the future, but merely 
expressed the Kleins' views about the 
ongoing controversy and their belief in the 
validity of their legal and moral position. 
The final order describes three discrete 
statements attributed to the Kleins. First, in 
the February 2014 interview with Tony 
Perkins, Aaron described his brief 
conversation with Rachel at Sweetcakes that 
led to him telling her, "[W]e don't do same-
sex marriage, same-sex wedding cakes." 
Second, at a different point in that same 
interview, Aaron related an earlier 
conversation that he had had with Melissa 
regarding the prospect of legalized same-sex 
marriage; in that conversation, according to 
Aaron, he and Melissa agreed that they could 
"see it is going to become an issue but we 
have to stand firm." Third, BOLI relied on the 
handwritten sign that was taped to the inside 
of Sweetcakes' front window, which read, in 
part, "Closed but still in business. * * * This 
fight is not over. We will continue to stand 
strong. Your religious freedom is becoming 
not free anymore. This is ridiculous that we 
cannot practice our faith. The LORD is good 
and we will continue to serve HIM with all 
our heart." 
In the final order, BOLI reasoned that the 
above statements, considered in "text and 
context," were properly construed as "the 
recounting of past events," but also 
"constitute notice that discrimination will be 
made in the future by refusing such services." 
As a result, BOLI's final order included 
language ordering the Kleins "to cease and 
desist" from making any communication "to 
the effect that" they would discriminate in the 
future "on account of sexual orientation." The 
language in the order precisely tracks the 
statutory language in ORS 659A.409, quoted 
above. 
On judicial review, the Kleins essentially 
make two arguments. First, they argue that 
BOLI erred in concluding that the three 
statements, individually or collectively, 
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violated ORS 659A.409 by communicating 
an intention to discriminate in the future. In 
the Kleins' view, those statements simply 
describe "the facts of this case, their view of 
the law, and their intent to vindicate that 
view." Second, the Kleins argue that BOLI's 
injunction is overbroad to the extent that it 
purports to restrict the Kleins from 
expressing those views. 
We agree with the Kleins' first point. Aaron's 
statements in the February 2014 interview 
can be reasonably understood only one way: 
as describing past events. BOLI's order states 
that Aaron "did not say only that he would not 
do complainants' specific marriage and cake 
but, that respondents 'don't do' same-sex 
marriage and cakes." But regardless of 
whether his words can be understood to refer 
generally to same-sex marriage and cakes, 
BOLI ignores the context in which he made 
that remark during the interview. Aaron was 
asked by the interviewer, "Tell us how this 
unfolded and your reaction to that." He 
responded by describing what had 
happened on the day of the refusal, including, 
"I said, 'I'm very sorry, I feel like you may 
have wasted your time. You know we don't 
do same-sex marriage, same-sex wedding 
cakes.' And she got upset, noticeably, and I 
understand that." Viewed in that context, 
Aaron's recounting of those historical events 
cannot be understood as a statement that he 
would deny service in the future. 
Likewise, Aaron's recounting, during the 
interview, of past conversations that he and 
Melissa had engaged in before the denial of 
service cannot reasonably be understood as 
an assertion of their plans to discriminate in 
the future. Aaron was asked by the 
interviewer whether the controversy with the 
complainants had caught him off guard, and 
he responded, "[I]t was one of those 
situations where we said 'well I can see it is 
going to become an issue but we have to 
stand firm.'" That statement plainly recounted 
his past thinking and cannot reasonably be 
construed as the kind of threat of prospective 
discrimination that ORS 659A.409 prohibits. 
That leaves the note taped to the Sweetcakes 
window. Again, that note read: 
"Closed but still in business. You can reach 
me by email or facebook. 
www.sweetcakesweb.com or Sweetcakes by 
Melissa facebook page. New phone number 
will be provided on my website and 
facebook. This fight is not over. We will 
continue to stand strong. Your religious 
freedom is becoming not free anymore. This 
is ridiculous that we cannot practice our faith. 
The LORD is good and we will continue to 
serve HIM with all our heart [heart symbol]." 
BOLI concedes that the statement could refer 
to their intention to stand strong in their legal 
fight, but argues that it "also could refer to the 
denial of services to same-sex couples." 
We are not persuaded that, given the 
ambiguity in the note, it can serve as an 
independent basis for BOLI's determination 
that the Kleins violated ORS 659A.409—
and, indeed, BOLI did not purport to rely on 
the note alone. As explained above, in 
overturning the ALJ's determination 
regarding ORS 659A.409, BOLI relied 
heavily on statements in the Perkins 
interview—taken out of context—to 
conclude that the Kleins had communicated 
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an intention to discriminate in the future. 
When those statements and the note are 
viewed in their proper context, the record 
does not support BOLI's conclusion that the 
Kleins violated ORS 659A.409. We therefore 
reverse that part of BOLI's order.  
Reversed as to BOLI's conclusion that the 
Kleins violated ORS 659A.409 and the 





































“Supreme Court passes, for now, on a new wedding cake dispute”  
 
 
The Los Angeles Times  
 
David Savage   
 
June 17, 2019 
 
The Supreme Court announced Monday it 
would not decide, for now, whether a 
Christian couple from Oregon had a 
constitutional right to defy that state’s civil 
rights law and refuse to make a wedding cake 
for the marriage of two women. 
Instead, the justices told an Oregon court to 
take a second look at the case based on last 
year’s high court ruling in favor of a Christian 
cake maker from Colorado. 
In doing so, the court kept alive the couple’s 
appeal and left open the question of whether 
businesses can discriminate against gays and 
lesbians based on their religious beliefs. 
The tentative decision shows again that Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and his colleagues 
are inclined to put off rulings on culture war 
controversies. 
Melissa and Aaron Klein refused to make a 
cake in 2013 for the marriage of two women. 
Oregon authorities fined them $135,000 for 
violating the state’s law that requires 
businesses to provide full and equal service 
for all customers, without regard to race, 
religion or sexual orientation. 
The case could have set a national precedent, 
deciding whether conservative Christians 
may receive a religious exemption from laws 
that bar discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or transgender status. There is no 
federal law that forbids discrimination based 
on sexual orientation, but Oregon, like 
California and 20 other states, prohibits such 
discrimination by businesses and employers. 
The justices had considered the appeal since 
early February. The couple’s lawyers asked 
the court to hear the case and issue a national 
ruling. Oregon’s attorney general said the 
appeal should be turned down. 
The justices did neither. The court issued a 
one-line order sending the case of Klein vs. 
Oregon Bureau of Labor back to an Oregon 
court “for further consideration in light of 
Masterpiece Cakeshop vs. Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission.” In that case, the 
justices by a 7-2 vote said a Christian cake 
maker had been treated unfairly by a state 
civil rights commission. 
The Kleins were represented in the Supreme 
Court by the Texas-based First Liberty 
Institute, and its president, Kelly 
Shackelford, called the outcome “a victory 
for Aaron and Melissa Klein and for the 
religious liberty of all Americans.” 
Rachel and Laurel Bowman-Cryer, the two 
women who sued after they were turned 
away, were represented by Lambda Legal, 
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which called the outcome “very 
disappointing” 
“It is a long-standing rule that the freedom of 
religion is not a license for businesses to 
discriminate,” said Jennifer Pizer, a senior 
counsel for the legal defense fund. 
In recent years, several Catholic social 
services agencies have objected to arranging 
adoptions for same-sex couples, and a small 
number of business owners — including a 
photographer in New Mexico and a florist in 
Washington state — waged legal battles after 
refusing to participate in same-sex marriage 
ceremonies. 
Until now, the Christian business owners 
have lost in the courts. Judges have upheld 
the state civil rights laws and the principle of 
nondiscrimination. 
Four conservative justices dissented in 2015 
when the court upheld an equal right to marry 
for same-sex couples. With Justice Brett M. 
Kavanaugh having joined the court, there 
may now be five justices ready to side with 
religious conservatives on the question of 
whether their beliefs can override civil rights 
statutes. 
Retired Justice Anthony M. Kennedy played 
the key role in the court’s 2015 decision on 
equal marriage rights. He was torn last year 
over the case of a baker from Colorado who 
cited his Christian beliefs as reason for 
turning away two men who were planning a 
wedding party. 
Kennedy wrote an opinion in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop that did not resolve how future 
cases would be decided. He endorsed equal 
rights for gays and lesbians, but said Jack 
Phillips, the baker in that case, had been 
subjected to religious “hostility” by a state 
commission. 
“These disputes must be resolved with 
tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere 
religious belief, and without subjecting gay 
persons to indignities when they seek goods 
and services in an open market,” he wrote. 
The Klein appeal asked the justices to decide 
“whether Oregon violated the Free Speech 
and Free Exercise Clauses of the 1st 
Amendment by compelling the couple to 
design and create a custom wedding cake to 
celebrate a same-sex wedding ritual, in 
violation of their sincerely held religious 
beliefs” and whether “the court should 
overrule” a disputed 1990 decision barring 
most religious exemptions. 
The case began early in 2013 when the 
Bowman-Cryers were preparing to marry. 
The women had been together for nearly 10 
years and were in the process of adopting two 
children with special needs. Rachel and her 
mother went to the Sweet Cakes shop in 
Gresham, Ore., a small city just east of 
Portland, where they had purchased 
decorative cakes before. But when Aaron 
Klein learned the marriage would have two 
brides, he said the shop would not make a 
cake for them. 
In a later conversation with Rachel’s mother, 
Klein quoted a passage from the biblical 
Book of Leviticus and its reference to “an 
abomination,” which many religious 
conservatives read as a condemnation of 
homosexual conduct. 
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The two women filed a complaint with the 
state agency that enforces its 
antidiscrimination law. An administrative 
law judge held a hearing and awarded the 
couple $135,000 in compensation for their 
emotional suffering. The state commission 
and the state’s courts rejected appeals filed by 
the Kleins. 
Last year, the Oregon Supreme Court refused 
to hear their case. And last fall, shortly after 
Kavanaugh was confirmed, the Christian 












































Marcia Coyle  
 
June 17, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday said it 
will not take up and hear arguments over 
whether a baker who refused on religious 
grounds to make a wedding cake for a same-
sex couple violated a state’s anti-
discrimination law. 
The justices vacated the lower court ruling 
and sent the case Klein v. Oregon Bureau of 
Labor & Industries back to the Oregon Court 
of Appeals for further consideration in light 
of the high court’s decision last term 
in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission. 
In Masterpiece, the justices avoided deciding 
the First Amendment speech and religion 
claims by a Colorado baker. The 7-2 majority 
on June 4, 2018, reversed the commission 
and the Colorado Court of Appeals because 
the commission did not give a neutral hearing 
to the baker. Some commission members, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy said, showed 
hostility towards the baker’s religious beliefs. 
“The outcome of cases like this in other 
circumstances must await further elaboration 
in the courts, all in the context of recognizing 
that these disputes must be resolved with 
tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere 
religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay 
persons to indignities when they seek goods 
and services in an open market,” Kennedy, 
who announced his retirement later that 
month, said. Justice Brett Kavanaugh 
succeeded Kennedy. 
In the Oregon case, Melissa and Aaron Klein 
owned a bakery doing business as 
Sweetcakes by Melissa. Rachel Bowman-
Cryer and her mother, Cheryl, visited the 
bakery in 2013 for a cake-tasting 
appointment. Rachel and her longtime 
partner Laurel Bowman-Cryer were planning 
to marry. 
During the tasting, Aaron Klein told them 
that Sweetcakes would not make wedding 
cakes for same-sex ceremonies because of his 
and Melissa’s religious convictions. The 
couple who wanted a cake filed complaints 
with the Oregon bureau, alleging the Kleins 
refused to make them a wedding cake 
because of their sexual orientation. 
The bureau found that the Kleins had violated 
the state’s public accommodations law by 
denying “full and equal” service to a person 
“on account of sexual orientation” and a 
second public accommodations law by 
communicating an intention to unlawfully 
discriminate in the future. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals agreed that 
their refusal to make the cakes was “on 
account of” the couple’s sexual orientation. It 
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also found that the bureau’s final order did 
not impermissibly burden the Kleins’ First 
Amendment right to free exercise of their 
religion because, as the U.S. Supreme Court 
held in 1990 in Employment Division v. 
Smith, the order “simply requires their 
compliance with a neutral law of general 
applicability, and the Kleins have made no 
showing that the state targeted them for 
enforcement because of their religious 
beliefs.” 
In their Supreme Court petition, the Kleins, 
represented by Adam Gustafson, partner at 
Boyden Gray & Associates, pressed again 
their First Amendment speech and free 
exercise claims. They also asked the justices 
to overrule the 1990 Smith decision. The 
Smith majority opinion was written by 
Justice Antonin Scalia. 
Oregon Solicitor General Benjamin 
Gutman countered that the Kleins denied 
service to the same-sex couple based on their 
sexual orientation before discussing the 
design of any cake. Under Supreme Court 
cases, he wrote, “baking is conduct, not 
speech, and Oregon may regulate that 
conduct for purposes unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression. Whether a 
particular cake reflecting a specific message 
could be protected by the First Amendment is 























“The Supreme Court is Showing an Instinct for Self-Preservation, at Least Until 
Next Year’s Election”  
 
 
The New York Times  
 
Linda Greenhouse  
 
June 20, 2019 
 
The justices of the Supreme Court know how 
to keep out of trouble. That’s the takeaway 
from the order the court issued on Monday, 
sending back to the lower court a new case 
about another baker who wouldn’t bake a 
wedding cake.  
The case, Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor 
and Industries, was a near-exact replica of 
last year’s Masterpiece Cakeshop case. Like 
the owner of that Colorado bakery, the 
husband and wife owners of Sweetcakes by 
Melissa in Gresham, Ore., claimed that their 
religion prohibited them from designing and 
baking a cake to be used in celebrating a 
same-sex marriage. To do so, the owners 
explained in their petition to the Supreme 
Court, would amount to “complicity in sin.” 
In fact, they said, the very reason they baked 
wedding cakes was to “celebrate weddings 
between one man and one woman.”  
Like Colorado, Oregon has a public 
accommodations law that bars business from 
discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation. Acting on the complaint of a 
lesbian couple, the official in charge of 
enforcing that law imposed a $135,000 fine 
to be paid to the couple as “compensatory 
damages for emotional, mental and physical 
suffering.” The Oregon Court of Appeals 
upheld the order, and the Oregon Supreme 
Court refused to hear the appeal.  
On Monday, instead of adding the case to 
their docket, the justices vacated the lower-
court decision and told the Oregon Court of 
Appeals to reconsider the case “in light of” 
last June’s Masterpiece Cakeshop decision. 
Objectively, that disposition makes little 
sense. The Supreme Court didn’t actually 
decide the constitutional issues in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop. Rather, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion found 
that two Colorado officials who had a hand in 
deciding the case against the baker had made 
comments that indicated an impermissible 
“hostility” to religion. As Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg observed in dissent, comments by 
“one or two members of one of the four 
decision-making entities” involved in 
passing judgment in the case did not amount 
to anything the Supreme Court had ever 
deemed close to impinging on the free 
exercise of religion. The decision was, in 
other words, a punt. It has no “light” to shed 
on the Oregon dispute.  
To add a case to the Supreme Court’s docket 
takes only four votes. The Oregon bakers’ 
appeal described their case as an “ideal 
vehicle” that “squarely presents the 
constitutional questions that the court did not 
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answer in Masterpiece Cakeshop.” Wasn’t 
that enough to interest four justices? Quite 
likely, it was, at least initially. That’s where 
serious strategizing must have come into 
play. The appeal reached the court last 
October. The justices took it up at their 
private conference 10 times. While the 
closed-door conference is the Supreme 
Court’s ultimate black box, we know enough 
about it to be certain that it’s not a place for 
idle chatter. No doubt memos were 
circulating, with arguments for and against 
taking the case. Having ducked this particular 
front in the culture wars a year ago, did the 
justices really want to get back in now?  
I think that what finally prevailed was an 
institutional instinct for self-preservation. 
Why re-enter this battle at this moment? 
Cases granted this spring will be argued in the 
fall, to be decided next spring with the 
political season at its height and the court 
itself under a bright election-year spotlight. 
The court already has plenty to do next term, 
with three cases granted on whether federal 
law protects gay and transgender people 
against discrimination on the job. The 
conflict between private conscience and 
public duty is age-old. The court has time to 
resolve it in future cases. In fact, another such 
case will soon be on the way to the Supreme 
Court. This month, the Washington State 
Supreme Court reinstated a ruling against a 
flower shop owner who, because of her 
“relationship with Jesus Christ,” told a gay 
couple, longtime customers, that she could 
not design a flower arrangement for their 
wedding. The justices had vacated that ruling 
and sent the case back to the state court last 
summer for reconsideration in light of 
Masterpiece Cakeshop. The state court, 
deeming Masterpiece Cakeshop irrelevant, 
reissued its original opinion almost word for 
word.  
What I discern as the Supreme Court’s 
instinct for self-preservation was also on 
display last month in an abortion case from 
Indiana. The state was appealing a ruling that 
invalidated its law banning abortions for 
reasons of the race, sex or disability of the 
fetus, a law enacted in deliberate and flagrant 
violation of existing abortion precedents. The 
state’s appeal, Box v. Planned Parenthood of 
Indiana and Kentucky, went to conference an 
astonishing 15 times over five months. 
Ultimately, the court denied the appeal, 
noting in an unsigned opinion that because 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit is the only court to have 
considered such a law, “we follow our 
ordinary practice of denying petitions insofar 
as they raise legal issues that have not been 
considered by additional Courts of Appeals.”  
On a court deeply divided on the subject of 
abortion, that disposition was unanimous. 
Ordinarily, when the court turns down an 
appeal, it says nothing. That the justices 
chose to explain themselves in this instance 
has to be seen, it seems to me, as sending a 
message. If I read that message correctly, we 
can expect the same outcome when the states 
that are now busy banning abortion appeal to 
the Supreme Court from the lower-court 
rulings that will inevitably strike down the 
new laws. (But to be precise, my prediction 
holds only until Election Day 2020, when the 
justices will be free from whatever constraint 
they now feel about taking a step likely to 
incite a public backlash against the 
Republican Party.)  
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These reflections on the court’s instinct for 
self-preservation lead me to a final question: 
What to do about the census case? As the 
world knows, the deeply contested question 
of the validity of the Trump administration’s 
plan to ask about citizenship has become 
even more fraught with revelations from the 
computer files of a recently deceased 
Republican redistricting specialist, Thomas 
Hofeller. The documents appear to validate 
the conclusion reached by Federal District 
Judge Jesse Furman, whose ruling against the 
Trump administration is before the justices, 
that the administration’s purported good-
government reason for adding the citizenship 
question was a pretext. The real reason, the 
documents indicate, was to provide a 
statistical basis for entrenching Republican 
power by disregarding noncitizens in the 
population counts for future redistricting.  
The court heard argument in the case in April, 
a month before the new information surfaced 
in an unrelated redistricting case. Judge 
Furman, responding to a request by one set of 
plaintiffs to reopen the census case for further 
discovery, said that with the case now before 
the Supreme Court, he lacked authority to do 
so. Those plaintiffs, represented by the 
American Civil Liberties Union, have now 
asked the justices for a “limited remand” that 
would send the case back to the District Court 
“to allow exploration of where the truth lies.”  
Even if the justices were so inclined, the 
request presents obvious logistical 
difficulties, with the clock ticking toward the 
date when the census forms have to be in final 
shape for distribution. It was that deadline 
that led the court to grant the administration’s 
request to hear the appeal directly from the 
District Court without waiting for a decision 
from the Court of Appeals.  
But there is another option, suggested by the 
plaintiffs in a final footnote to their latest 
brief: Just dismiss the appeal. The procedure 
is known as a DIG: “dismissed as 
improvidently granted.” The justices use it 
once or twice a term, usually when a case 
turns out, on further reflection, not to be what 
they thought it was when they granted it. In 
fact, the court used a DIG on April 23 to 
dismiss a securities case, Emulex Corp. v. 
Varjabedian, that had been argued a week 
earlier.  
The court deployed a DIG on the last day of 
the term in June 2012 to dismiss a case, First 
American Financial Corp. v. Edwards, that 
had been argued a full five months earlier. 
That case presented a question with 
important implications for the separation of 
powers: whether Congress can enact a law 
that confers standing — the right to sue — on 
people who, while they can point to a legal 
violation, did not suffer a concrete injury 
traceable to the violation. Circumstantial 
evidence strongly suggests that after the case 
was argued on Nov. 28, 2011, the assignment 
to write the majority opinion went to Justice 
Clarence Thomas.  
For reasons never revealed, Justice Thomas 
apparently failed to keep the four colleagues 
he needed on board with his analysis of the 
case, and a decision was never published. Did 
he overreach and scare the others away by 
trying to make too big a statement about the 
relationship between Congress and the 
judiciary? Did the court, tormented that term 
by the first Obamacare case, just throw up its 
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hands? The fate of First American Financial 
is one of the little mysteries I’d like to see 
solved one of these years.  
For the time being, it’s a reminder that the 
court knows how to get itself out of a tight 
spot when it needs to. A DIG requires no 
explanation. Its effect is to wipe the Supreme 
Court slate clean, as if the appeal had never 
even reached the court. A DIG here would 
leave Judge Furman’s opinion in place and 
would enable the professionals in the Census 
Bureau, who strongly objected to adding the 
citizenship question, free to go about their 
business counting us — all of us. If I’m right 
about these recent signals that the court 
























































Greg Stohr  
 
June 17, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court ordered 
reconsideration of a $135,000 award against 
an Oregon bakery that refused to make a cake 
for a same-sex wedding in a case that revived 
a fractious debate over religious rights and 
equal treatment. 
After more than three months of deliberation, 
the justices Monday set aside the award and 
told an Oregon state appeals court to revisit 
the case in light of a 2018 Supreme Court 
ruling in a similar fight from Colorado. The 
Supreme Court resolved that case narrowly -
- and avoided the core constitutional 
questions -- by saying Colorado officials had 
shown animus toward the baker’s religious 
views. 
The latest case involves “Sweetcakes by 
Melissa,” a now-closed Portland-area bakery 
owned by Melissa and Aaron Klein. The 
Kleins, who are Christian, cited religious 
grounds when they refused to provide a cake 
for Rachel and Laurel Bowman-Cryer in 
2013. 
The Bowman-Cryers filed a complaint with 
the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries, 
the state’s civil rights watchdog, which found 
the bakers in violation of a state anti-
discrimination law and awarded the two 
women $135,000. An Oregon state appeals 
court upheld the award. 
The Kleins say the state violated their speech 
and religious freedoms. They said the ruling 
“will chill expression and enlarge the power 
of bureaucrats to force unwilling speakers to 
participate in rituals and to promote 
ideologies of all kinds that violate their 
creeds and their consciences.” 
The Kleins, who paid the penalty plus interest 
in 2015, say the dispute forced them to close 
their business. The couple benefited from a 
crowdfunding campaign that raised more 
than $350,000, according to a report at the 
time. 
‘Months of Delay’ 
Oregon Attorney General Ellen Rosenblum 
said the lower court applied “well-established 
First Amendment principles to conclude that 
a bakery open to the public did not have a 
constitutional right to discriminate against 
customers on the basis of the customers’ 
sexual orientation.” 
The Supreme Court took an unusually long 
time to decide how to handle the case before 
settling on what is often a routine step. The 
appeal was scheduled for possible discussion 
at the justices’ private conference 13 times. 
The Supreme Court didn’t spell out precisely 
what concerns it had about the award. But the 
Oregon court’s reconsideration is likely to 
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focus on the role of Brad Avakian, whose 
position as commissioner of the Bureau of 
Labor and Industries made him the key 
decision maker in the case. 
Shortly after the Bowman-Cryers filed their 
complaint, Avakian posted a news article 
about the dispute on Facebook, along with 
the comment: “Everyone has a right to their 
religious beliefs, but that doesn’t mean they 
can disobey laws already in place. Having 
one set of rules for everybody ensures that 
people are treated fairly as they go about their 
daily lives.” Avakian didn’t specifically 
comment on the dispute between Sweetcakes 
and the Bowman-Cryers. 
In upholding the award, an Oregon state 
appeals court said Avakian’s comments “fall 
short of the kinds of statements that reflect 
prejudgment of the facts or an impermissibly 
closed-minded view of law or policy so as to 
indicate that he, as a decision maker, cannot 
be impartial.” 
The case is Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor 














“Appeals court upholds fine against Christian bakers who refused to make same-





Gordan R. Friedman 
 
December 28, 2017 
The Oregon Court of Appeals on 
Thursday upheld a decision by Oregon's 
labor commissioner that forced 
two Gresham bakers to pay $135,000 to a 
lesbian couple for whom the bakers refused 
to make a wedding cake. 
Melissa and Aaron Klein made national 
headlines in 2013 when they refused to bake 
a cake for Rachel and Laurel Bowman-
Cryer, citing their Christian beliefs. The 
Bowman-Cryers complained to the Oregon 
Bureau of Labor and Industries, saying they 
had been refused service because of their 
sexual orientation. 
An administrative law judge ruled that the 
Kleins' bakery, Sweetcakes by Melissa, 
violated a law that bans discrimination 
based on sexual orientation in places that 
serve the public. Brad Avakian, the state 
labor commissioner, affirmed heavy 
damages against the Kleins for the 
Bowman-Cryer's emotional and mental 
distress. 
The decision will likely be the most 
controversial ruling, and the one with the 
biggest impact, handed down by Avakian 
during his nearly 10 years in the role. He has 
decided not to seek re-election when his 
term expires next year. 
The Kleins appealed Avakian's decision, 
arguing for a religious exemption from the 
Oregon Equality Act, the anti-
discrimination law. They also argued 
Avakian was biased against them, that his 
actions violated their rights to free 
expression as artists and their right to due 
process, and that the fine was excessive. 
But in their ruling Thursday, a panel of state 
appeals court judges sided with Avakian, 
saying the Kleins did, in fact, deny the 
Bowman-Cryers because they were 
lesbians. The justices also rejected the 
Kleins' argument that Avakian's ruling 
violated state and federal free speech 
protections. 
In the ruling, Judge Chris Garrett wrote that 
Avakian's order does not violate the Klein's 
free speech rights because it simply 
"requires their compliance with a neutral 
law." Garrett also wrote that the Kleins 
"have made no showing that the state 
targeted them for enforcement because of 
their religious beliefs." 
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In a statement, Avakian said the Appeals 
Court ruling "sends a strong signal that 
Oregon remains open to all." 
Through their attorney, the Bowman-Cryers 
said Thursday's ruling affirms "the long-
standing idea that discrimination has no 
place in America." 
"All of us are equal under the law and 
should be treated equally," the couple said. 
Any ruling to the contrary would "create a 
sweeping license to discriminate," they said. 
The appeals court ruling represents an 
"important victory" for the Bowman-
Cryers, who faced humiliation, harassment 
and death threats after their wedding 
preparations turned into an ordeal, said 
Nancy Marcus, senior attorney at Lambda 
Law, a national pro-LGBT rights group. 
Marcus said the court's ruling is critical yet 
"completely unsurprising" because it aligns 
with courts in other states, which have not 
allowed businesses to exempt themselves 
from anti-discrimination laws. 
Adam Gustafson, lead attorney for the 
Kleins and the former White House counsel 
for President George H.W. Bush, was not 
immediately available for comment. 
Gustafson had argued the bakers' religious 
beliefs should shield them from being 
compelled to conduct speech -- in this case, 
baking a cake. Such a requirement would 
"offend the conscience and the 
constitution," Gustafson argued. 
The First Liberty Institute, a religious 
freedom law firm whose attorneys also 
represented the Kleins, said it is 
disappointed by Thursday's ruling. "The 
Oregon Court of Appeals decided that 
Aaron and Melissa Klein are not entitled to 
the Constitution's promises of religious 
liberty and free speech," said Kelly 
Shackelford, the institute's president. 
The Kleins paid the fine following 
Avakian's order and closed their 
baking business around the same time. 
Donors gave the bakers more than 
$500,000, money they say has been spent on 
legal fees. The $135,000 damage award 
belonging to the Bowman-Cryers has been 
locked in an escrow account pending 
appeals. 
The Kleins' case is one of several similar 
cases that has attracted significant media 
attention. Another, stemming from a 
Colorado ruling, was argued before the U.S. 
Supreme Court earlier this month. The court 
justices are reportedly divided over whether 
a baker was justified in turning away a gay 
couple seeking a wedding cake because of 
their religious beliefs. That baker, like the 
Kleins, contends that creating and custom-
decorating a cake is an act of artistic 
expression that deserves more free speech 
protections than the sales of other goods and 
services. 
 
 
 
